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On the now common understanding that with its rapid economic 
development China has progressively gained recognition on the world stage, 
this thesis aims to offer a sociological understanding of China’s ambition to 
project its soft power via media products, and the way in which it is 
constructed and received in the target countries. Based on field research 
carried out in 2011-2012 in China, South Korea, and Japan, this research 
explores the reception of its media products (commercial TV series and CCTV 
International) in South Korea and Japan. It considers how China’s projection 
of soft power is shaped by the foreign/cultural policy of the PRC and the 
receiving country’s setting within the soft power field. The emphasis is on 
how commercial media products and state-governed news media are used to 
realize China’s cultural globalization strategy in the construction of its soft 
power. The argument is proffered that media products, which have potential 
soft power influence, are controlled and managed by the state, media 
institutions and the market demands of the importing country. It is shown 
that the South Korean government usually regulates foreign commercial 
media products in order not to give unnecessary exposure of foreign 
countries to the Korean society, while the Japanese government does not 
have a strong state regulation. Evidence is also given to show that the foreign 
media products are not only managed by market structures and media 
practitioners’ engagement, but that they are also filtered by accommodating 
to the market demands of the society. The study then goes on to show that 
locally embedded consumption shapes the South Koreans and Japanese 
experience in their understanding, consumption, and reception of Chinese 
soft power. This is exemplified in the tug of war between China and other 
“Chinese” products (Hong Kongese and Taiwanese) and is well represented in 
South Korean and Japanese consumers’ ambivalent and complicated attitudes 
towards Chinese media products. The thesis then offers a case study of CCTV 
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International as a medium of Chinese soft power that has found it relatively 
difficult to reach foreign audiences due to market structures and 
questionable attractiveness to the audiences. It is shown that the market 
penetration of CCTV International is restricted to the local market structure, 
and the audience’s exposure to the channel is managed by the market 
penetration and the perception of the news contents. The conclusions of the 
study can be summarized: (1) Soft power is an interactive process in which 
both the exporting country and importing country co-produce possible 
outcomes to generate soft power influence; (2) China’s policy trajectory and 
institutional setting are important for the production of Chinese soft power; 
(3) The receiving countries’ market structure and demands, domestic 
institutions play an integral role in shaping the soft power field for China; 
and (4) The logic of China’s projection of its soft power is highly contingent 
on how the media market of the recipients is structured and how the 
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With the rise of China there are two main propositions in the foreign domain: 
“China as an Opportunity” and “China as a Threat.” Perceiving China as 
opportunities and threats is predominantly a result of its economic 
ascendancy. These two different faces of China’s rise reflect coexistence of 
hope and fear for other countries. In an attempt to counter the geopolitical 
anxiety over China’s rise, the official Xinhua News Agency, released a 
publicity film on the national image (Guojia xingxiangpian)1 of China for the 
first time at Times Square, New York (People’s Daily 2010; Reuters 2011), to 
coincide with President Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United States (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2011).2 Not only did it 
reflect China’s endeavor to promote its soft power—which refers to “the 
ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, 
persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred 
outcomes” (Nye 2011)—but it also hints at the recent development of the 
Chinese media system and production of media products along with China’s 
“going global” cultural strategy.3  
In 2012, in the first year of his presidency, President Xi Jinping, 
presented his vision of “the Chinese dream” (Zhongguomeng). The Chinese 
                                                                
1 Throughout the thesis all translations from Chinese to English are made by the author. Also, 
unless specified, all tables and figures are created by the author. 
2 President Hu’s visit to the US was from January 18, 2011, to January 21, 2011.  
3 Zou chuqu can be translated as both “going global” as its liberal translation and “going out” 
as its literal translation. The preference in this study is to use the former expression because 
it engages with the transnational phenomenon of globalization.  
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dream presents how and where China will be heading by focusing on the 
internal dynamics of economic development and a sustainable and healthy 
China, Xi’s vision gives a rosy outlook on the present and future of the 
country. For the individual Chinese, the Chinese dream might be a good life 
such as economical and psychological well-being. For the country the dream 
might be “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”  
China’s projection of soft power, similar to envisioning the Chinese 
dreams, is embedded in the revival of the Chinese nation with its ascendancy. 
In this context, this dissertation attempts to answer “How can the PRC 
convert its growing economic power into enduring political and cultural 
influence in Asia and around the globe? (Callahan 2013: 1).” Within the 
context of the rise of China, this study explores the ways in which the Chinese 
attempts to produce soft power are received in its Northeast Asian 
neighboring countries. Regarding the discourse analysis of documentary 
sources of the Chinese government, the time-frame of the study is from 1991 
to 2012, namely between the administrations of Jiang Zemin (1991 – 2001) 
and Hu Jintao (2002 – 2012). Specifically, with regard to the period under 
scrutiny, it explores the way in which Chinese media products, as instruments 
of China’s soft power strategy, are constructed and received in South Korea 
and Japan.  
 
1.1 Soft Power and the Rise of China  
In the twenty-first century, during the period of President Hu Jintao’s 
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administration (2002-2010), the Chinese government has mapped out 
conceptually the country’s present and projected long-term future in three 
five-year plans, the Tenth (2001-2005), Eleventh (2006-2010), and Twelfth 
(2011-2015). In 2004, during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), it 
proposed a cultural strategic call for “cultural going out” (Wenhua “zouchuqu”) 
or, culturally “going global.” In the Plan, the term “cultural industries” 
(Wenhuachanye) in China was introduced and incorporated. Some interpret 
the Tenth Five-Year Plan as a preparation for developing a system for 
exporting cultural products in the next Five-Year Plan (Esraey and Qiang 
2011; Hong 2011; Su 2010; see also Chapter 3).  
In line with its global strategy, during these years of the Tenth Five-
Year Plan (2001-2005), the Chinese government started promoting the 
Chinese language and culture by establishing Confucius Institutes, which 
many scholars see as a means and format of developing China’s soft power 
around the world (Cheng 2009; Chey 2008; Gil 2008; Hartig 2009; Lee 2009; 
Nye 2005; Paradise 2009; Starr 2009; and Yang 2010). The East Asian region 
was strategically considered as a test bed of such institutes.4 The first 
Confucius Institute was established in Seoul in 2004 and the second in Tokyo 
the year after (Lee 2009). By 2013, there are more than 400 such institutes in 
over 100 countries (Xinhua News 2013), reflecting China’s seriousness about 
implementing its “going out” policy. 
                                                                
4 However, the existing literature does not usually address such gaps that I note here. Thus, 
attempts to consider soft power in a comparative context have yet to be explored. Regarding 
the Confucius Institutes, there is no research on how other countries perceive them or China.   
4 
 
Subsequently, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) focused on 
promoting Chinese culture (Zhonghua wenhua) in a more explicit way as a 
means to enhance China’s influence around the world (Guoji yingxiangli) and 
to project its cultural soft power (Wenhua ruanshili). In July 2009, the State 
Council announced “A Plan for Promoting the Cultural Industries of China 
(Wenhuachanye zhenxingguihua).”  
The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) emphasizes China’s rise to 
“cultural superpower” status with socialistic characteristics (Shehuizhuyi 
wenhuaqiangguo), which shows its transparent ambition of projecting both 
cultural soft power (wenhua ruanshili) and Chinese competitive cultural 
power (Zhonghuawenhua de guojijingzhengli) to build a socialist cultural 
power (shehuizhuyi wenhuaqiangguo).  As Hong (2011) points out, this plan 
(2011-2015) asserts the importance of the cultural industry as a pillar 
industry for the time, manifesting that the Chinese central government views 
the cultural industry as a basis of steering the country’s economic 
development further.  
Reading and interpreting China’s Five-Year Plans is important for 
looking back and ahead its development and envisioning futures. In 
accordance with mapping out futures within these plans, what is even more 
significant is to pay attention to the document titled “Cultural Reform and the 
Development Plan in the National Twelfth Five-Year Planning Period (Guojia 
“Shi’erwu” Shiqi Wenhuagaige fazhan guihua gangyao)” published by the 
General Office of the Communist Party of China (Zhonggong zhongyang 
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banggongshi) and General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China (Guowuyuan banggongshi, SC) in February 2012. This is based on 
two documents: “The CCP’s Decisions on Issues on Reform of the Cultural 
System and Socialist Cultural Development and Prosperity (Zhonggong 
zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhuatizhi gaige、tuidong shehuizhuyiwenhua 
dafazhan dafanrong ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding)” and “The PRC’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan: Economic and Social Development” 
(Zhonghuarenmingongheguo guominjingji he shehuifazhan di shi’er ge wu nian 
guihua gangyao). 
The government’s ambition to develop Chinese soft power was 
presented in the context of further engaging with comprehensive national 
power (zonghe guoli) and the international competitiveness and influence of 
Chinese culture (Zhonghuawenhua de guoji jingzhengli and yingxiangli). Also, 
in the document, it was clearly indicated that building a socialist cultural 
power requires strengthening cultural soft power, promoting Chinese culture, 
and sustaining socialist cultural development with Chinese characteristics.  
Having considered the development of China’s policies pertaining to 
its ambition to project its soft power overseas attention will now be given to 
the empirical focus of this research with regard the target countries of 
SouthKorea and Japan. 
 
1.2 The research focus  
Two surveys on China’s rise are of interest to contextualize how the country 
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projects its soft power. A Pew Global survey and a GlobeScan survey5 
investigated the world’s reaction to the rise of China on two fronts: “China as 
a Threat” Theory (Zhongguo Weixielun) and “China as an Opportunity” 
Theory (Zhongguo Jihuilun),6 derived from contentious advertisements7 in 
The Economist. To map out South Korean and Japanese responses to the 
question regarding their attitude of whether “China becoming a more 
economic and military power is good for our country,” the results from the 
2010 version of the Pew Global survey were analyzed. 
As Figure 1.1 shows, to the question about “China becoming more 
economically powerful,” 62.98 percent of Japanese respondents (N=696) said 
it was good; 23.26 percent of the respondents said it was not a good thing,8 
and 8.75 percent answered “don’t know.” Of the Korean respondents (N=705), 
45.18 percent said this was a good thing, while 49 percent of the respondents 
                                                                
5 The Pew Global Survey of 2010 (country of respondents: Argentina, Brazil, Britain, Egypt, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, 
Russia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the US) asked two questions regarding attitudes 
toward China: (1) Turning to China, overall, do you think that China’s growing economy is a 
good thing or a bad thing for our country? and (2) Overall, do you think that China's growing 
military power is a good thing or a bad thing for our country? The BBC Country Rating Poll 
released a survey with GlobeScan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA): 
1. Please tell me if you think each of the following are having a mainly positive or mainly 
negative influence in the world: a. China; 2. For each of the following possible future trends, 
please tell me if you would see it as mainly positive or mainly negative: a. China becomes 
significantly more powerful economically than it is today. b. China becomes significantly 
more powerful militarily than it is today.  
6 The existing survey questions and advertisements which are based on the two conflicting 
assumptions—China Threat Theory and China Opportunity Theory—indicate that these two 
arguments prevail.  
7
 In June 2011, The Economist presented two sets of advertisements at a platform at King’s 
Cross Station in London. On June 28, 2011, at the time a conference on Chinese Studies was 
held at the London School of Economics and Political Science, which I attended as a presenter, 
I encountered two advertisements by The Economist at a platform at King’s Cross Station in 
London. Titles of the advertisements were “China is a Friend to the West” and “China is a 
Threat to the West” (See Appendix 1). 
8 The total number of observations excludes “refused” responses for the calculation because 
the number of respondents to the answer was considerably small (see Figure 1.1). However, 
for the two occasions, the number of answers for “don’t know” is taken into account.  
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said it was not, whereas 10.09 percent answered “don’t know.” So, on the 
evidence of this survey, the Japanese respondents had a more positive 
attitude towards China as a growing economic power than the South Koreans 
(see Figure 1.1). 
In terms of attitudes towards China’s becoming a military power 
[Japan (N=696), South Korea (N=705)], 89.22 percent of the Japanese said 
this was not good, while 86.36 percent of Koreans said it was not good. Only 
4.16 percent of the Japanese respondents thought China’s status as an 
emergent military nation was good; 7.65 percent of the Korean respondents 
shared the same view, and 6.60 percent of the Japanese respondents and 5.95 
percent of the Korean respondents responded “don’t know.” Ostensibly, South 
Koreans and Japanese viewed China’s becoming more militarily powerful 
negatively.  
These views of China will likely influence Japanese and Koreans 
reception of the country’s projection of soft power. The contradictory 
aspirations for China to project its soft power whilst having military 
ambitions are arguably problematic to these foreign audiences.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Perceptions of China’s Growing Economyand Military  






 Source: Pew Global Survey (2010) 
 
Having considered the complicated relationship with China, this thesis aims 
to explore interactions between China and the historically, culturally, and the 
institutionally embedded local structures of the receiving countries, the 
following key research questions will be posed:  
 How does the projection of Chinese soft power through exporting cultural 
and media commodities take place?  
 What are the processes and mechanisms of the configuration of China’s 
sott power in Japan and South Korea?  
 How do media marketplaces and consumers in the two receiving 
countries respond to Chinese soft power?  
These questions are posed to explore the ways in which China’s soft power is 
produced in the source country and received in South Korea and Japan at the 
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how the field research and the methodology are organized.  
 
1.3 Methodology and fieldwork 
Prior to conducting the field research, projected key informants were 
contacted via email.9 Pilot studies were conducted in Beijing in December 
2011, Seoul in November 2011, and Tokyo in February 2012. During 
fieldwork, published statistics, local documents, government documents, and 
local scholarly works in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and English were 
collected.  
Local materials, which were collected during the fieldwork sites in 
China, South Korea, and Japan, were analyzed via discourse analysis and 
interpretations of interviews, documents and statistical data. They are 
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean materials either in these languages or in 
English and they were selected as being in pertinent to the scope of the 
research. Government documents, including guidelines and directives, are 
particularly important sources for mapping out and interpreting the 
Chinese government’s development of soft power policies (see Chapter 3).  
A new change in the organization of the Chinese government, which 
is a governing body of the cultural and media industries of China, is worth 
mentioning here. The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television 
(SARFT) was restructured in 2013 and is now commixed with GAPP (General 
                                                                
9 See Emerson et al. (2011).  
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Administration of Press and Publication).10  The new organization has 
responsibilities not only for audio-visual products online and offline but also 
for publications and print media. Given that it’s very new, there is ambiguity 
regarding the organizational restructuring and thus it is questionable 
whether it will bring a real impact on the relevant industries or not. As the 
scope of this thesis is up to 2012, in order to avoid any confusion the decision 
was made not to use SAPPRFT. Also, the study does not consider print media; 
thus, there is not much discussion here.   
Interviews in the three countries were conducted. Field research in 
Japan was conducted in Tokyo and Yokohama from mid-March to May 2012. 
Tokyo, the capital of Japan, was selected as it has a representative account 
among interviewees. Yokohama, on the other hand, was chosen for its 
Chinatown that has a huge Chinese population.11 Field research in South 
Korea was largely conducted in metropolitan Seoul from mid-November 
2011 to January 2012, and mid-March 2012. 12 Seoul, the capital of South 
Korea, was selected to gather a comprehensive account of interviewees in 
order to ensure a comprehensively varied sample of consumers of Chinese 
media products.  
Field notes were taken during each interview and immediately after 
summary comments were added. Based on the informant’s consent, most of 
                                                                
10 Thus, its new name is now the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television of the People's Republic of China (SAPPRFT). 
11 Both older and new Chinese immigrants exist in Yokohama. See Shu (1999) for a detailed 
discussion. 
12 Some of the timelines are overlapped with others because of tight schedules. For the 
details, see Appendix 2.  
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the interviews were recorded, and transcription of the interviews was made 
in the language in which the interview was conducted. After transcribing, a 
short summary was prepared of the key information of each interview by 
category and country to capture the bigger context and to become familiar 
with the interviews. Further contacts for face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews were made through the “snowballing” method (Donna 1998; 
Patton 2002).  
One group of informants is media practitioners. Thirty-two media 
professionals in China and four Chinese audiences were interviewed.13 
Fourteen Japanese and fourteen Korean media practitioners were 
interviewed. First, having different ranks of media practitioners can provide 
diverse and detailed views of the media process. Second, it is important to 
include media professionals who are in this different circuit of media with 
different positions for finding out the multifaceted and interactive nature of 
processes and operation of media market. Specifically, different types of 
media companies and TV stations have their own practices and unwritten 
guidelines.  
Another group of informants were audiences and non-consumers of 
Chinese media products. Eighty-three Korean audiences and non-consumers 
of Chinese media products; fifty-nine Japanese audiences and non-consumers 
                                                                
13 It is important to have data from film industry of China because there is a practice of 
crossing boundaries between cultural and media industries. In South Korea, the boundaries 
between TV industry and film industry in terms of (creative) labor are relatively rigid and 
not much overlapping between different sectors, whereas in China, such boundaries with 
regard to media personnel could be blurred. For instance, those who work for TV could 
rather be easily working in film for next projects. 
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were interviewed. These informants were chosen for the following reasons. 
First, it is not a coincidence that most of the surveys on the media are largely 
based on young people. For any kind of survey on media consumption and 
effects, the ages between 18 and 49 are very important. This is the age group 
that tends to have the most influence on public opinion and trends in 
consumption pattern. Any kind of influence coming from soft power through 
media is likely to be affective to them or has through or on them can be the 
most effective. Thus, it is important to survey this demography in the 
research.   
Second, the sample used in this study consists of educated 
respondents. Given that South Korea and Japan have relatively a higher 
portion of those who hold a university degree, the choice of the younger 
generation as the respondents for this study was not a big bias. According to 
the World Bank (2011), Japan has a tertiary rate of 60 percent. The college 
entrance rate in 2012 for South Korea was 71.3 percent (Statistics Korea 
2012: 31). Thus, it is rather easy to find a young people who have at least an 
upper-secondary education as informants. Thus it can be surmised that 
educated respondents are likely to have a larger influence on the discourse of 
Chinese soft power on the side of the receiving countries. 
Lastly, the development of the Chinese media and the characteristic of 
young people give were valid reasons to select people in their 20s and 30s as 
the majority of my informants. At one end, they are arguably generating 
trends and enjoying being in the circuit of transnational consumption. They 
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also have a rapport with learning culture and language and thus are potential 
targets of soft power. At another end, they are potential consumers in the 
future of further developed Chinese media. Thus, they are agents of social, 
cultural, and global transformation interacting in their lives, as they do, with 
the influx of diverse and foreign cultures. 
To explore China as a country set on exporting soft power, field 
research was carried out in four Chinese cities: Beijing, Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
and Shenzhen from December 2011 to July 201214 (see Appendix 2 for the 
detailed interview schedule). In order to investigate how China’s culture is 
produced and exported through its media, individuals in the following 
categories were interviewed: (1) media practitioners in media and 
broadcasting companies and TV stations; (2) media practitioners in the film 
industry for reference; (3) journalists; and (4) scholars who research the 
relevant area. Entry into media companies and TV stations was difficult, 
especially if the researchers were not local.15 The only way to overcome this 
is via an introduction by someone who knows the people who work in such 
places. With the help of my former Chinese professor and Chinese friends, I 
obtained contacts and conducted interviews. Journalists who manage the 
online platforms of their newspapers in China and Hong Kong were 
interviewed. In order to have a picture of how locals think of their own media 
and how they consume the media as a reference point, four Chinese people 
                                                                
14 Additional visits were made to Beijing (August 2013) and Shanghai (December 2013) and 
Seoul (July 2013). 




participated in the interviews. Relevant materials including commercial 




All articles on Chinese issues, in particular those on soft power and foreign 
media, were collected during my fieldwork in Tokyo and Yokohama of Japan 
in 2012. For interviews, informants were recruited via my personal 
network.16 As in South Korea, there were two groups of informants in Japan: 
Media practitioners and a Japanese audience. And, importantly, media 
industry personnel from broadcasting stations and production companies 
were interviewed.  
Although the focus was the audience of Chinese media, particularly 
television series, the responses of Japanese informants towards Korean 
popular media products were also obtained. Korean media have a 
considerable presence in Japan where Korean TV dramas, variety shows, and 
music programs can be received on the different Japanese TV channels. 
Korean pop culture products, as well as culture and lifestyles, can be 
consumed in Shinokubo (Shinjuku, the heart of Tokyo). In order to better 
understand the reception of foreign culture in Japan, it is important to 
capture the consumption of Korean culture in the country. Japanese people 
                                                                
16 Targeted research objects especially were university-based Confucius Institutes or 
affiliated with the Department of Chinese (Studies) and international schools. However, I 
was able to find informants without going to these specific kinds of institutions.  
15 
 
who consumed both Korean culture and Chinese culture were interviewed as 
an important reference point (see Appendix 2).17 
 
In South Korea 
All the articles, in particular those on China focusing on Chinese soft power 
and the media in South Korea, were collected during fieldwork, as well as 
when I visited my home country between 2011 and 2013.18 The Media 
industry in South Korea is more or less a closed one, where practitioners do 
not usually welcome investigations by outsiders. However, my previous work 
experience with the Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC) and the Hong 
Kong personnel in 2008, and in the Taiwanese film industry in 2009, enabled 
me to access the field without difficulty. It was thus quite easy for me to 
obtain contacts with other media practitioners through introductions by 
previous co-workers and their networks. As in Japan, I conducted interviews 
with audiences of Chinese media and individuals who do not have an interest 
in Chinese media programs but were consumers of American or Japanese 
programs.19 
 
1.4 Significance of the study 
Existing research on soft power has mainly been carried out using political 
science and international relations perspectives, which tend to place less 
                                                                
17 For the details of informants, see Appendix 2.  
18 The main fieldwork was conducted in China, Japan, and South Korea between 2011 and 
2012. Additional fieldwork was conducted in these countries in 2013.  
19 See Chapter 6 for a further discussion of such issues.  
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emphasis on empirical first-hand data. Research specifically on Chinese soft 
power has focused on the developing world (McGiffert 2009; J. Wang 2011: 
15) and the West, as well as on China’s official and academic point of views 
on soft power (Nye 2011). This study, in contrast, contributes to the current 
research on China’s soft power by analyzing its manifestation in two 
interconnected processes of strategic generation and embedded reception in 
the neighboring Northeast Asian developed countries of Japan and South 
Korea. 
              Previous studies have tended to look at audiences and consumers in 
Chinese societies (Sun 2007), but little attention has been paid to the 
reception of Chinese media and the influence of soft power in non-Chinese 
societies or the non-Sinophone world. Such research endeavors have put 
forward the importance of the study of soft power and China and nourish the 
field further; however, they fail to address the comprehensive picture of 
China’s projection of its soft power by paying less attention to linking data to 
policy and to consider the two sides of the soft power-making process. 
Following this brief contextualization of the research situation regarding 
China and soft power, attention is given to the importance of understanding 
the delivery of Chinese soft power targeted on two of its economically 
developed neighboring countries, namely Japan and South Korea.  
This study offers a comparative account of the locally embedded 
international influence of Chinese soft power in these two Northeast Asian 
countries. This contribution chimes with Chua who acknowledges that 
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“empirical questions and the present study of East Asia Pop Culture will 
hopefully invite comparative analysis from researchers examining other 
instances of the regionalization of media elsewhere in the world (2012: 153).” 
The comparison between Japanese and Korean audiences carried out in this 
study illuminates the specific local settings and experiences of these two 
countries in relation to cross-border cultural flows in the East Asia region.  
The empirical research reported in this study clearly point to the 
impact of outward Chinese cultural flow to the non-Sinophone world,20 
although it is neither prevalent nor dominant by any means yet. In attesting 
to the predominance of market-oriented flows this research also highlights 
the relative lack of reverse media and cultural flows (Chua 2012: 3). For 
example, this is particular the case in Asia where Japanese and Korean media 
and cultural flows are well-studied in other Asian countries; however, 
Chinese cultural flows are less studied other than in Sinophone countries. 
The results of field work shows that the co-construction of soft 
power by the implementation of the projector state’s cultural policy and 
market effort and the recipients’ domestic institutional arrangements shapes 
                                                                
20 The Sinophone world refers to Chinese-speaking communities: “a network of places of 
cultural production outside China and on the margins of China and Chineseness, where a 
historical process of heterogenizing and localizing of the continental Chinese culture has 
been taking place for several centuries (Shih 2007: 4).” For a detailed discussion, see Shu-mei 
Shih, Visuality and Identity: Sinophone Articulations across the Pacific (2007), Berkeley: 
University of California Press. This may be arguable in that Japan and Korea use Chinese 
characters to a certain extent, in particular in premodern societies. However, there is no 
doubt that the Japanese and Korean languages have their own developed writing system and 
Shih’s discussion does not include the two countries; therefore, I would delineate Japan and 
Korea as belonging to the non-Sinophone world. Ching Kwan Lee (2009) explores China’s 
investment in Africa with a focus on labor relations by creating a Chinese enclave in Africa. 
However, I argue that the term Sinosphere does not merely mean Chinese influence in a 
particular region or country, but rather it has shared values on a long-term scale. 
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the processes and mechanisms of how soft power works. By exploring the 
two interactional mechanisms,21 the research theoretically connects not only 
an agency to a contextualizing structure; it also, as an exercise in empirically-
based interpretative sociology, provides a sociological understanding of soft 
power—and particularly the social outcomes of the actor’s behaviors in a 
comparative historical framework. The findings of the study have 
implications for policy and practice. The knowledge gained could assist 
governments and institutions in generating and consuming soft power and in 
developing better policies. For governments with aspirations to project soft 
power, the findings of the research could provide insight into how to better 
communicate with internal and external audiences. The findings will also be 
of interest to the receivers of soft power and its influence on them. 
 
1.5 Organization of the study 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 lays out the context of the 
research, the research problems of China’s soft power ambition, the research 
methodology, and considers the current relevant scholarly literature on soft 
power. The remainder of the dissertation comprises six chapters. Chapter 2 
presents a systematic review of previous scholarship on soft power and an 
                                                                
21 Interaction here does not mean an investigation of China’s soft power in East Asia and 
Japan and Korea’s soft power in China simultaneously. This dissertation limits its scope to the 
interactive process of Chinese soft power in its Northeast Asian neighborhood. However, 
circular pathways of soft power in East Asia—China’s projection of soft power in East Asia, 
and (as a reaction) East Asian countries’ soft power projections—offer an important future 
research agenda for the author. The East Asian soft-power projection might be mentioned in 
the course of this dissertation, but it may serve as a separate future research question (see 
Chapter 8).  
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analytical framework to map out the argument of the thesis. Chapter 3 
projects the historical trajectory of the process of the construction of Chinese 
soft power by analyzing the Chinese government’s documents in relation to 
soft power building. Chapter 4 investigates China’s media sector which 
contributes to its “going global” strategy. In particular, it investigates China’s 
involvement with commercial products, its approach to the production of 
television series, and international broadcasting projects.  
Drawing on archival and field-work data collected in China, Japan, and 
South Korea, chapters 5–7 analyze the ways in which the institutionalized 
scope of Chinese soft power is reconfigured in East Asia at the levels of the 
state, media marketplaces, and consumers. Chapter 5 analyzes the role of 
media marketplaces and practitioners in embracing Chinese media products. 
Chapter 6 investigates the reception of Chinese soft power through Chinese 
media consumption in the two receiving countries. These chapters illuminate 
the how and the why of responses of the two East Asian countries to Chinese 
commercialized media products. Chapter 7 is devoted to a case study of 
CCTV-International as the shop window of China’s international broadcasting 
strategy and as integral, as it is, to its “going global” strategy and in line with 
its overall configuration of soft power. Chapter 8 summarizes the main 
findings of the research and highlights the contributions and implications of 
the study. It considers possible research areas for further investigation 
regarding theory, method, and comparison. It sheds light on the same but 
different pathways of China’s manifestion of soft power in its Northeast Asian 
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neighborhood as attributed to a set of interactions of history, culture, markets, 
and institutions. It thus offers a variety of soft power models and 
mechanisms synthesizing various subfields of sociology to be explored in 
future research. It also considers the predicament China faces developing its 














































The conceptual and thematic focus of this thesis, “soft power,” is, in the words 
of its creator Joseph Nye, “an academic concept that has migrated to the front 
pages of newspapers and been used by top leaders” (Nye 2011: 81). As such, 
soft power is not only a part of scholarly debates, but it has also entered into 
the media scene and the world of policymaking (d’Hooghe 2011). This 
chapter aims to offer a systematic investigation on soft power in existing 
academic works and the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
The term “soft power” was first coined by Nye (1990; 2004; 2011)22 
who defined the term as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive 
means of framing the agenda [sic], persuading, and eliciting positive 
attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes (Nye 2011).”23 Nye’s 
definition of soft power is inherently based on a dichotomy which 
distinguishes soft power from “hard power” (see Table 2.1). The way soft 
power is separated from hard power implies soft power is the rest of the 







                                                                
22 How the concept of soft power is incorporated in Chinese discourse will be examined 
throughout the thesis. 
23 See his earlier definition on soft power: “getting others to want the outcomes that you 
want co-opts people rather than coerces them (Nye 2004: 5).”  
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Table 2.1 Three Types of Power 
 





























Source: Nye (2004: 49). 
 
 
Nye also claims that hard power comes from tangible sources such as force 
and money and soft power comes from intangible sources such as 
institutions, ideas, values, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies 
(Nye 2011: 21). Such a conceptualization leads to a focus on the sources of 
soft power24 (see J. Wang 2011: 15) rather than on “how (soft) power works” 
or “how these sources contribute to the exercise of power.” More precisely, it 
begs the question what intangible sources can contribute to or can generate 
soft power? Hollywood, pop culture, international students, and political 
values, such as individualism, are examples of American soft power discussed 
by Nye (Nye 2004). Nye highlights the role of culture, in particular popular 
culture, as conducive to a country’s projection of its soft power; in Nye’s 
words: “Popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft 
                                                                
24 For similar reasoning, see “Much has been discussed and debated about what constitutes 
Chinese soft power and how China wields and projects its soft power, especially in 
developing countries (Jian Wang 2011: 15).” 
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power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are 
somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar (Nye 2004: 15-16).” In 
addition, he observes the attraction of popular culture can play a significant 
role in achieving foreign policy objectives (Nye 2004: 48-49).  
But the binary conceptualizing of soft and hard power may not 
always be useful. For example, “the dichotomy of hard and soft power masks 
the potential for using hard power resources to implement soft power and 
vice versa” (Rothman 2011: 50).25 It has been argued that foreign aid and 
Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), even foreign direct investments 
(FDI), are tangible resources that contribute to soft power (Kurlantzick 2007; 
Wang and Lu 2008). When money is used as soft power resources, soft power 
can be generated as a byproduct of economic benefits and incentives. 
Nevertheless, nation-states need to have soft-power resources—culture, 
political values, and foreign policy—to achieve a certain level of soft power 
influence, as discussed in Nye’s work (Nye 1990; 2004; 2011).  
On this understanding, then, it has been argued that China, as a rising 
power, needs to have soft power. In 2003, for example, Zheng Bijian 
suggested that peaceful development (heping fazhan) and a peaceful rise 
(heping jueqi) were necessary to minimize the worrisome threats that other 
countries face due to the rise of China. In order to maintain its rise and 
expand its influence, he adumbrated that China needs to have a “softer” tool 
                                                                
25 It is noted that Nye never clearly addresses hard power sources. This is partly because of 
the fact that economic and military power is labeled as “hard power,” while “soft power” 
seems to be a residual type of power except for hard power. Such views are continuing with 
the resource-based nature of the concept.   
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to mediate it’s internationalization. In an attempt to offer a clear definition of 
soft power, Sheng Ding (2008) categorizes power into “attribute power,” 
“relational power,” “structural power,” and “cultural attractiveness.” “Attribute 
power” focuses on the assets which states have (Ding 2008: 41).” Under the 
assumption that power resources are embedded in relations between actors, 
“relational power” is exercised by attraction and co-option rather than 
coercion (Ding 2008: 41-42). This derives from Nye’s conceptualization of 
hard and soft power. “Structural power” refers to power that originates from 
the structures of the international system (Ding 2008: 42). In particular, it 
includes international norms, rules, and institutions. Political values, 
institutions, and culture as soft power resources are reflected in “cultural 
attractiveness,” which includes the appeal of political values based on 
governance performance and diplomatic finesse. Ding’s four types may be 
useful to consider the different characteristics soft power might encompass. 
Yet such a classification of power may not sufficiently overcome the 
shortcomings in clarififying the concept as it starts from and relies on Nye’s 
approach to hard and soft power.  
Regarding attempts to operationalize the concept of soft power, David 
Lampton (2008) proposes “ideational power” as “the power to create and 
disseminate knowledge and ideas.” As suggested by the subtitle of the book 
The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds, China has evolved 
from Mao Zedong’s reliance on coercive power (military force and the 
coercive use of ideology), through Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on economic or 
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remunerative power, to current leaders’ more balanced strategy that, while 
emphasizing economic power, is trying to increase China’s “ideational power” 
as well as its military might (Lampton 2008: 252).” He suggests this term “as 
a broader and slightly different theoretical construct from normative power 
or soft power (J. Wang 2011),” which contrasts with coercive, military, and 
economic power in the context of China.  
Mingjiang Li (2009) attempts to bring the concepts of “institutional,” 
“identifying,” and “assimilation” power to enhance the definition of soft 
power, which correspond to institutions, politics, and culture, respectively. In 
particular, “institutional power” refers to a state’s ability to propose new 
international institutional arrangements. “Identifying power” is a state’s 
ability to influence other states through the latter’s recognition of its 
leadership role. “Assimilation power” refers to the attraction of a society’s 
cultural values, ideology, and social system.  
Notwithstanding these theoretical efforts to supplement Nye’s under-
theorized notion of soft power, such attempts have not paid equal attention 
to move from the “resource” understanding soft power to disciplinary- or 
industry-based understandings of soft power. Attempts to provide possible 
revisions of the concept can benefit from considering an extensive account of 
soft power from different angles that is not limited to a resource-based 
approach and considers products and industries involved in the construction 
of soft power. 
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2.1 Conceptualizing Chinese soft power 
2.1.1 Disciplinary-based approaches 
In recent years, there have been several accounts that point to the number of 
increasing discourses on China’s soft power in the context of its economic 
growth allowing for the making of several observations about the current 
state of Chinese soft power research26 and its limitations. First, the literature 
from political science, international relations, and area studies often discuss 
the concept of soft power (Ding 2008; Huang and Ding 2006; Li 2009; Tang et 
al. 2012). Resource-based soft power approaches consider soft power in the 
context of allocations of resources—culture, political system and foreign 
policy are explored (Cho and Jeong 2008; Gill and Huang 2006; McGiffert 
2009).27 The focus has largely been on “what constitutes soft power” and soft 
power as a means of public diplomacy (d’Hooghe 2011; J. Wang 2011) and 
image building (H. Li 2011; Volz 2011; H. Wang 2011; Zhang 2011). This 
body of literature has a tendency of conceptual listing of fragments of 
information or top-down approach without primary data. 
 The significance of soft power in the context of China’s state policy has 
been investigated, mostly focusing on a single Five-Year Plan or a single 
governmental document (Esraey and Qiang 2011; Hong 2011). Analysis of 
the Twelfth Five-Year Plan of economic restructuring, which focused on the 
communication sector, is an example of this (Su 2010). Some analyses have 
                                                                
26 It is noted that some of works present as an intersection of one of the two branches or are 
interrelated. I attempted to include previous literature which purports to deal with soft 
power. 
27 In relation to the discussion of different resources that are defined for Chinese soft power, 
see Chapter 2 Section 3.  
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offered a temporal—often timely—interpretation of the document; however, 
these only covering a narrow span of time and a limited number of sources 
may lead to inadequate analyses. For deeper analysis, a close examination of 
more than one document or a comparison of different types of documents is 
required.  
 Within the fields of media, cultural, and communication studies, the 
focus on soft power has somewhat expanded.28 Scholars in these fields 
attempt to analyze policies in relation to China’s state-implemented 
development of its cultural industries. They tend to extract concepts from 
media cultural policies to make an implicit link to soft power within the 
realm of communication (Keane 2006; X. Zhang 2006). For example, some 
scholars point out that the Chinese government has used its communication 
capacity (chuanboli) 29 —a vehicle of increasing Chinese media’s 
competitiveness and impact—to enhance communication with the world 
(Keane 2006; X. Zhang 2006). Xiaoming Zhang (2006) discusses Chinese 
cultural institutional reform spanning public cultural institutions (shiye) to 
industry (chanye). Keane (2006) identifies “how culture and creativity are 
conjoined in Chinese development strategies.” On the other hand, big national 
events such as the Beijing Olympics (Nye 2011: xi) and the Shanghai Expo 
have been depicted as platforms for the projection of Chinese soft power. As 
President Hu Jintao announced in 2008, “China’s intent is to increase its soft 
                                                                
28 For instance, other nation-states’ exercise of culture as soft power can be seen in the 
following examples: the United States (Nye 2004), Japan (Iwabuchi 2002; McGray 2002; 
Otmazgin 2009), and South Korea (Black, Epstein and Tokita 2010; Chua 2012). 
29 This term can be translated as chuanboli, chuanbo liliang, or chuanbo nengli. 
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power, and the Olympics were an important part of that strategy (Nye 2011: 
xi),” such event plays a significant role in exercising China’s soft power. As 
with the Beijing Olympics, Beijing expected to develop and project its soft 
power through this international event. However, academic discussions also 
need to pay attention to other types of Chinese media and culture inside and 
outside China.30 
Most of the existing scholarly works tends to underproblematize 
China’s soft power (Li 2009). They do not distinguish the resources of soft 
power from the effects and assume Chinese soft power as a given just 
because soft-power policies were implemented by the Chinese government 
(d’Hooghe 2011), as if the way soft power works might be a unidirectional 
process of projection only. They have not sufficiently contextualized China’s 
projection of its soft power as an interactive mechanism which regulates the 
dynamics between actor and recipient. In this regard, a systematic 
investigation of how Chinese soft power has developed and how it relates to a 
trajectory and geopolitical position between China and the neighboring 
countries of Japan and South Korea is needed.  
A systematic empirical and theoretical sociological investigation of 
soft power is still lacking. Despite the fact that both political scientists and 
sociologists acknowledge the significance of power in the international and 
                                                                
30 For Chinese Television series, see Yu (2011), Zhu (2008), and Zhu and Berry (2009). These 
works have brought scholars to start to engage with Chinese TV as an emerging field; 
however, these, which are not in line with soft power discussions, only analyze Chinese TV in 




nation-state arenas, political scientists have shown reluctance to embrace 
culture in the context of power dynamics as a research domain (Wedeen 
2002). One of the important components of soft power, culture, thus, is often 
avoided in political science studies of power. As Wedeen (2002) pointed out 
over a decade ago, an approach to understand culture as practices of 
meaning-making is overlooked in mainstream political science. 
In part due to the unrecognized need or even reluctance to bring 
culture back in, soft power has emerged as a concept which serves as a 
residual or unintentional category of the hard-soft power dichotomy. 
Simultaneously, soft power can also be understood as a byproduct of such an 
approach. In contrast, from a sociological angle, soft power as a field of study 
can be understood not as a taken-for-granted category of power, but as an 
autonomous and visible force that might shape the cultural wealth of nations 
through image management and the projection of cultural influence. In this 
regard, an agency-structure framework, the interplay between agency and 
structure for the projection of soft power, can be potentially useful in the 
study of a country’s soft power when it takes into consideration both the 
producer and receivers of soft power, which together shape the soft power 
field. In the framework, the power dynamics of the co-production of soft 
power may not be equal. Thus, there is much room for sociologists to study 





2.1.2 The resource-based approach 
According to Nye’s original conceptualization, soft power relies on three 
resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies (Nye 2011: 84). Many 
scholars have investigated Chinese soft power according to this resource-
based approach.31 Wang Huning (1993) argues that “culture is the main 
source of a state’s soft power,” implicitly referring to China’s long 
civilizational history, and Chinese values, specifically Confucianism. Wang and 
Lu (2008) noted that “The Chinese discussion of the sources of China’s 
attraction to the world focuses on traditional Chinese culture and the Chinese 
economic development model” (Wang and Lu 2008: 445). But language is not 
one of the main resources taken into account by Nye. Yet, language is an 
important constitutive element of culture, which China certainly uses in its 
projection of soft power. Chinese as a “global” language is promoted 
alongside culture in the Confucius Institutes, which scholars and the media 
generally consider as a tool of Chinese soft power (Cheng 2009; Chey 2008; 
Gil 2008; Gil 2009; Hartig 2009; Lee 2009; Nye 2005; Paradise 2009; Starr 
2009; and Yang 2010). This also serves as an important example of China’s 
commitment to exert its soft power to meet its public diplomacy initiative by 
                                                                
31 The following are the classification of key resource-based Chinese “soft” power by different 
authors: (1) culture: traditional culture (Wang 1993; Wang and Lu 2008); Chinese 
civilization (Cho and Jeong 2008); popular culture (Kurlantzick 2007; Nye 2004; 2011); 
culture in general (Wang 1993; Men); cultural attractiveness (Ding 2008; Yan 2007); (2) 
politics and local/national governance: political values and system (Ding 2008; Yan 2007); 
national governance system (societal development, education, social science system) (Pang); 
ideology (Men); (3) foreign policy: public diplomacy (d’Hooghe 2011); diplomatic finesse 
(Ding 2008); peaceful rise and development (Cho and Jeong 2008); international institutions 
(Men 2011); international mobilization (Yan 2007); (4) economic developmental model (Cho 
and Jeong 2008; Wang and Lu 2008) and (5) other: international image of the country (Men 
2011); intangible power (Wang 1993). 
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establishing such institutes through cooperation between Chinese and 
foreign partners (Cull 2008; d’Hooghe 2007; Rawnsley 2009; and Lee 2009). 
It is more than reasonable to surmise that this way of using culture as part of 
the state’s agenda is a deliberate attempt to minimize further unnecessary 
ideological and political conflicts between China and other nation-states. This 
is so because, indubitably, political ideology forms an integral part of China’s 
soft power. The Chinese economic model could never take place without 
emphasizing its political system. As Xuetong Yan (2007: 48) argues, “the core 
of soft power is not cultural power but political power, i.e., the government’s 
mobilization capability, including the internal and external political 
mobilization capabilities, which depend on the credit of the government.” His 
argument, as a nationalist,32 is centered on how the Chinese regard their rise 
as regaining China’s international status and as a restoration of fairness.  
With the rise of China, Sino-centrism also takes the forms of peaceful 
development and the revival of the “Chinese century.” The strategy of 
“peaceful development” seeks to reassure other countries, especially the US 
and neighboring countries in Northeast Asia, that a rising China will not 
become a power that threatens regional stability or world peace. In recent 
years, Sino-centrism, or Chinese nationalism, has been prevalent (Nyíri and 
Breidenbach 2005; Zhao 2004) and can be readily found online and offline 
(Breslin and Shen 2010). It is also manifested in China’s foreign policy and 
politics (Hughes 2011; Tang and Darr 2012; Zhao 2013). 
                                                                
32 Such characteristic is found in his work and interviews.  
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As China made rapid progress in its economic modernization process, 
the ascendancy of its hard power has aroused increased concern on the part 
of many other countries (Humphrey and Schmitz 2007; Lardy 2003; 
Ravenhill 2006). The “China Threat” theory is one of the outstanding 
examples. In order to reduce worries that China’s economic and military rise 
might bring to these countries, diplomacy is a key to minimize such alarms 
for China. In this regard, the guidelines for China’s diplomacy by Zhan (1998) 
are noted. They include (1) five principles of peaceful coexistence (especially 
putting aside differences and seeking common goals); (2) mutual beneficial 
economic contacts; (3) greater dialogue promoting trust and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes; (4) the concept of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful 
development,” i.e. to develop by taking advantage of the peaceful 
international environment and, at the same time, to maintain world peace 
through its development (Zhan 1998). According to a Chinese document 
(Zhan 1998), in a similar vein, there are five main objectives of Chinese 
public diplomacy: (1) publicizing China’s intentions to the outside world; (2) 
forming a desirable image of the state; (3) issuing rebuttals to overseas 
distorted reports about China; (4) improving the international environment 
surrounding China, and (5) exerting influence on the policy decisions of 
foreign countries.  
Diplomacy, as part of foreign policy, is often understood as a soft 
power instrument or resource (d’Hooghe 2011; Ding 2008; Cho and Jeong 
2008). In the realm of diplomacy, what is increasingly paid attention to and 
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more relevant to soft power is cultural and public diplomacy. Despite this, 
scholars and practitioners of such diplomatic policies and practices who use 
the terms soft power and public diplomacy have a tendency not to 
differentiate these or to use them interchangeably. Generally, cultural 
diplomacy (wenhua waijiao) is a proactive process of external projection in 
which a nation’s institutions, value system, and unique cultural personality 
are promoted at bilateral and multilateral levels. Cultural diplomacy is 
concerned with promoting a national image via the overseas expansion of 
national enhancements that utilize cultural values. Public diplomacy 
(gonggong waijiao) is a term that attempts to bring together the variety of 
programs not only to promote understanding, but also to shape public 
opinion. Cull has established a broad classification for public diplomacy that 
separates it into the following areas: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, 
and international broadcasting (Cull 2008: 32). In the discussion of public 
and cultural diplomacy, many Chinese scholars consider diplomacy as an 
implicit underlying resource of Chinese soft power (Wang 2011; Yan and Xu 
2008), while western scholars such as Nicholas Cull and Gary Rawnsley put 
more importance on diplomacy in projecting soft power (Cull 2008; 2009a; 
2009b; Rawnsley 2009).33 In particular, Cull (2009b) proposes that public 
diplomacy is “the mechanism to deploy soft power” (Cull 2009b: 15).  
All in all, previous research has focused only on the resources of 
                                                                
33 Some research is based on the assumption that public diplomacy is the tool of deploying a 
country’s soft power. For example, Byrne and Hall (2011) show such a tendency in their case 
study of Australia’s international education. 
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Chinese soft power (Cho and Jeong 2008; Ding 2008; Gill and Huang 2006; 
Huang and Ding 2006; Li 2009; McGiffert 2009; Tang et al. 2012). But these 
scholars have not examined empirically the effectiveness of the projection of 
soft power.34 
 
2.1.3 The “industry”- and product-based approach 
The industry-based approach to soft power engages ostensibly with “value,” 
“money,” or “economic gains.” In contrast, this study conceptualizes 
industries as “settings” and “fields of soft power.” In addition, products, which 
could be generated from soft power resources and also appear as final results 
of industries, will be highlighted on three accounts: First, it is important to 
consider the contributions of the creative, cultural, or media industries to 
China’s soft power effort as media culture can play a pivotal role in shaping 
its images abroad and gaining economic profits by doing so. Second, the 
Chinese economic developmental model (Zhongguo moshi) can be “exported” 
to developing countries (Y. Zheng 2010; 2011). For example, China’s 
increasing engagement in African and Latin American countries is not only 
seen as foreign aid, but also as an alternative model for their development. 
Joshua Cooper Ramo has suggested in his Beijing Consensus (2004) that China 
offers a possible economic model for developing countries. They include: (1) 
China’s developmental model is based on innovation and constant experimen
tation; (2) China’s developmental model considers sustainability and equality 
                                                                
34 An exception, in this light, is McGiffert (2009). The edited report by Carola McGiffert 
explores China’s soft power at a different national level. 
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as top priorities; and (3) China strives for self-determination as part of a 
foreign policy of peaceful rising (heping jueqi). These are viewed as necessary 
conditions for the “rising” of comprehensive national power. Third, there is a 
state agenda for China to internationalize its higher education (State Council, 
2010, National Plan for Medium- and Long-term Educational Reform and 
Development: 2010-2012).  The education industry35  can simultaneously 
enhance its soft power by recruiting international students who potentially 
are influenced by the host country’s culture and values or will be influenced 
as a result of studying in China. Academic exchanges of scholars and 
international students are important for as channels for the possible 
influence of soft power. In this regard, Nye (2005: 13-14) has argued for the 
importance of foreign students and the exchange of scholars in engendering 
soft power.   
So far, different approaches to conceptuzlating and clustering Chinese 
soft power have been considered. The following section presents the 
theoretical framework of the study from a sociological angle, which is also 
selectively based on the extant scholarly discussions of China and soft power. 
 
2.2 The theoretical framework 
In previous research, as explored earlier, soft power is often seen as either a 
binary reference point to hard power, or as a largely resource- or theme-
driven concept. Whereas relational accounts of soft power have been noted 
                                                                
35 Singapore’s “global schoolhouses” project is another example (Lee 2013). 
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(Nye 2004), the ways in which such accounts between the projecting and 
receiving sides or countries actually interanimate have yet to be articulated. 
They have yet to yield a full picture of how soft power might work. There is 
thus a need to conceptualize soft power within a broader setting, as the “soft 
power field,” in which different levels and actors and the soft-power 
mechanism are embedded. This research then will provide an understanding 
of Chinese soft power as an interactive process of the producer and potential 
receiving parties within the soft power field they mutually engender.  
 
2.2.1 Elements that constitute the soft power field: The macro-micro 
link 
 






The field of soft power, a construct/product of a process and the engagement 
of different actors, is surrounded by internal and external forces, as in any 
other marketplace. Invisible forces, such as those historical in origins or 
current foreign relations and domestic institutions, all contribute to the 
shaping of the field where soft power is played out. These structurally 
reinforced settings may make a country with a soft power ambition 
encounter difficulties in the process of the projection of soft power. Soft 
power, thus, does not only work with regard to the source country’s ambition; 
it also is affected by foreign stakeholders in the soft power field.  From the 
perspective of China as the soft power generator, its cultural and economic 
developments are internal forces that develop and restructure the cultural 
industries at home. On the other hand, markets, globalization, and 
international power dynamics can be regarded as external factors that shape 
the institutional and external field of its soft power ambitions. Finally, the 
historical and (international) relational settings and domestic environments 
of the receiving countries shape the ways in which the Chinese projection of 
its soft power may be played out. 
In order to build an analytical framework of a soft power field, this 
research adopts and modifies the theory of strategic action fields (SAFs) 
suggested by Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (Fligstein and McAdam2011; 
2012). Fligstein and McAdam’s approach is useful in the search for a soft 
power mechanism in the following ways: first, it links macro, meso, and 
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micro levels in the same framework of the soft power field. Second, events of 
actions such as contentions, challenges, changes, and continuities are well 
captured in the context of soft power field. Lastly, this approach focuses on 
what kind of actors may exist, how they perform, what kind of a broader field 
environment exists, and how such an environment may shape it.    
Each level of the soft power field has different roles in completing a 
soft-power circuit. At the macro level the interplay between soft power and 
culture is observed; at the macro-meso level the role of markets in embracing 
and resisting China’s soft power in terms of the recipients is important; and 
individual responses to China’s soft power through their consumption as well 
as reception occur at the micro level. The degree of engagement in the 
generation of soft power varies at each level. The tasks that are undertaken 
by different stakeholders at the three levels also show divergent patterns. 
These three levels structure soft power field. 
At the marketplace, “local” predominantly plays the role of 
incumbents and controls the inflow of foreign actors, while “dominant 
foreign actors” often function as challengers to the incumbents. Domestic 
institutions in the receiving countries of soft power can internally act as a 
restriction. But, more importantly, these institutions can also play a pivotal 
role in promoting soft power to their own society by negotiating and 
mediating between the local and foreign in the soft power field. Repertories 
of culture, contents, and perceived boundaries of “China” in the process of the 




2.2.2 The logic of how the soft power mechanism works  
Two pillars of soft power construct and shape the manner in which soft 
power works. One of the pillars is culture, the other is power. Conceptually, in 
order to explore soft power, it is necessary to see how culture and power are 
interwoven together, or how culture is translated into power, or vice versa. 
The core of this research, which focuses on “media as a channel of soft power,” 
requires consideration of the following. The media as a product of market 
and industry may offer “markets” for the study of soft power. While “the 
cultural” and “the political” aspects remain important, the logic of the market 
affords an explanation of the soft power mechanism. Thus, this section will 
investigate the two pillars of soft power, and the market vis-à-vis soft power. 
Two prominent ways of conceptualizing culture are as “culture as a 
tool kit” and “culture as a repertoire” (Swindler 1986).36 In the case of soft 
power, insofar as culture is referred to as a source and a way of projecting 
cultural and media products, it is a “tool.” At the same time, the way in which 
culture is utilized for such a purpose can be seen through its repertoires. 
Culture plays an important role in the projection of soft power. In developing 
Chinese soft power, traditional culture, which has potentials to be utilized 
and exported to foreign coutries, can generate and continue repertoires of 
certain values. But, from the perspective of a nation-state that aspires to 
                                                                
36 See relevant discussions on “essentially contested concept.” Abbey, Ruth. 2005. “Is 
Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?,” New Political Science 27(4): 461-480; 




exercise its soft power, power, which is often a masked component, is more 
important than culture, which functions as a means. 
The domains of culture and power are related, but this point has not 
been well developed in the discussion of soft power. If we go back to 
Gramsci’s idea of “hegemony” (Gramsci 1971), the “power” of the ruling elite 
is translated through “ideology” into civic culture. Hegemony is thus 
exercised not as coercion, but rather as a “softer” one, as “culture” of 
everyday life and rather consent. The interplay between culture and power 
mediated in soft power has two dimensions. The clear-cut boundaries 
between the two dimensions can be better explained by using the concept of 
“boundary work” (Gieryn 1983; 1999; Hoppe 2005; 2008) and “co-
production” (Jasanoff 2004). It is argued that, in terms of soft power, the 
boundary work and co-production have been carried out by different 
stakeholders, namely, the producing and receiving countries of soft power. 
Cultural intermediaries at different levels of the soft power field are 
configured through the boundary work and have intermediated effects in the 
co-production of soft power.  
Boundary work in the projection of soft power is also applicable as 
follows. The state, A, which attempts to project it through a variety of 
channels, actually wants to project a hegemony-like “power” to a targeted 
audience. The domestic institutions in the target society play an important 
role as a cultural intermediary or a gatekeeper to filter the “foreignness” that 
is generated from Country A’s soft-power sources. The two states—A and B—
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have possible contention or even conflict; A wants to “globalize” its 
characteristics, whereas B wants to defend itself from A. The differences in 
actions or reception are important. For example, when a country aggressively 
projects its soft power, it might reinforce the nationalistic sentiments that 
may bring resistance from the receiving country and competition between 
the source and receiving country or potential counterparters of soft power in 
the receiving country. Translating soft power from one level to another is 
contextual. The boundary work not only concerns the nature of soft power 
but also involves a translation or mobilization process, as Thomas Gieryn 
(1983) called it, from one form to another. Thus the soft-power mechanism is 
not only constructed by the producer, but more importantly, by the 
engagement of the recipients. Under such circumstances, there are 
differential understandings of soft power. For instance, similar sources of soft 
power and the way in which the soft-power policies of the projecting country 
are developed may not lead to a single route in terms of understanding soft 
power from the recipient’s perspective. Rather, the responses to soft power 
can be contingent on inter-state relations and the recipients’ domestic 
institutional environments.  
In the context of this study, it is argued that the important underlying 
meaning and latent function of the soft power mechanism is that it is a tool to 
aid the accumulation of the cultural wealth of the Chinese nation through the 
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projection of soft power. “The cultural wealth of the [a] nation,”37 a new term 
proposed by Bandelj and Wherry (2011: 7) “derives from the reputational 
attributes and cultural products of that nation.” They suggest two sets of 
considerations regarding the cultural wealth of a country: (1) “The 
government’s expanding resources to market the reputation and symbolic 
attributes of their countries to attract world tourists and foreign investment, 
for the sake of national economic development”; and (2) “the number and the 
significance of its cultural and natural heritage sites, its stock of art and 
artifacts in art museums, international prizes (Bandelj and Wherry 2011: 7).” 
The authors discuss converting cultural wealth into economic wealth by 
examining (cultural) tourism, impression management, 38  institutional 
practices, and the production of culture,39 but they do not explicate the 
reverse scenario: converting economic wealth into cultural wealth. For 
contemporary China, any interplay between cultural wealth and economic 
wealth is important and is manifest in its aspiration for developing soft power. 
In other words, economic wealth can be used as a tool for creating cultural 
wealth, and at the same time cultural wealth can be used a tool of economic 
wealth. 
It can be argued, then, that the Chinese state’s recent attempts at 
                                                                
37 In this book, four perspectives are presented in analyzing cultural wealth: (1) The political 
economy perspective, (2) the global value chain perspective, (3) the impression 
management perspective, and (4) the cultural sociology perspective. Cf. Bandelj and Wherry 
(2011: 10). 
38 This is a concept pilfered from Goffman in an American symbolic interactionism.  
39 The authors in the edited volume examine how cultural and symbolic capital/resources 
can be converted into economic wealth through (cultural) tourism, impression management, 
institutional practices, and cultural production. 
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developing in its soft power are an initial step in constructing and 
accumulating this “cultural” wealth of China. Such efforts to generate cultural 
wealth may not be explicit at the time Chinese soft power is in projection; 
however, as explained earlier, its soft power has potentials to generate 
cultural wealth. As China manages the level of its economic development it is, 
at the same time, seeking soft power by utilizing its cultural wealth with a 
long-term view. China realizes the importance of the arts and cultural 
products to gain international recognition, with both non-governmental and 
governmental efforts being made to boost this economic sector. A systematic 
consideration of the arts and cultural products of China as a part of national 
wealth has not yet been realized. However, applying for the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world heritage 
status, which largely is influenced by China’s South Korean counterpart, can 
be seen from this line of thinking.40 Taken together, this cultural wealth is not 
only useful; it is the underlying raison d’être behind China’s quest for soft 
power.  
 
2.3 Summary  
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework that will be used in 
this dissertation, the aim of which is to investigate the nature of Chinese soft 
power and how it works: its construction in China and reception in South 
Korea and Japan. Firstly, the existing academic research on soft power was 
                                                                
40 See page 154 for South Korea’s application for the dragon boat festival.  
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examined. Then, the substance, levels, structures embodied in the soft power, 
and the processes of soft power were explored. Accordingly, the soft power 
mechanism and the hidden objectives of projecting soft power as a state’s 
agenda were considered. Now the “external environments” of the soft power 
mechanisms will be presented in the next chapter, which explores the 





























The Manufacture of Soft Power in a Globalizing China  
 
 
At the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) 
held in November 2012, Hu Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of 
China, announced: 
 
 To complete the building of Xiaokang society41 in all respects 
and achieve the great renewal of the Chinese nation, we must 
create a new surge in promoting socialist culture and bring 
about its great development and enrichment, increase China’s 
cultural soft power, and enable culture to guide social trends, 
educate the people, serve society, and boost development.42 
 
The 18th Party Congress was not the first occasion for the CCP leader to 
mention the idea of cultural soft power in an official speech and to show the 
central government’s policy direction. Notably, in examining the country’s 
pursuit of soft power, the circumstances in China should be taken into 
account, to discern any features characteristic of China’s development of soft 
power that distinguishes it from similar processes in other countries. 
                                                                
41 This is a direct translation of Xiaokang Shehui, which refers to a “well-off society.” See 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, United Nations Development Joint 
Programme (2005).  
42 “Shibadazai Jing kaimu, Hu Jintao zuobaogao [The 18th Party Congress held in Beijing, Hu 




Unquestionably, the building of China’s soft power is aimed at maintaining 
internal stability and political legitimacy for internal and external purposes 
(Li 2008). The aim of this chapter therefore is to extend and enrich previous 
scholarship by further considering the development of China’s soft power. 
Based on the Chinese government’s thinking and use of soft power, this 
chapter analyzes how the idea of soft power has developed in Chinese polices, 
and how it becomes incorporated into the discourses of soft power over time. 
This includes its embracing of culture in its developmental path during 
different historical phases.43 In particular, this chapter explores the three 
areas of how the concept of soft power emerges alongside the country’s 
industrial development, the changing meaning of culture in different 
government plans, and the changing meaning of culture in the historical 
trajectory of post-socialist China.44  
Throughout the chapter, the historical path of the construction of 
Chinese soft power will be analyzed by examining a selection of the official 
documents published by various Chinese government bodies and the main 
speeches of key political figures of the particular periods.45 Using Nye’s 
                                                                
43 Analyzing Chinese soft power requires not only a comprehensive understanding of China 
from both the inside and outside but also a full grasp of its history in exemplary studies. For 
example, Ching Kwan Lee and Guobin Yang (2007), in the introductory chapter of their 
edited volume, discuss how the Cultural Revolution was dispersed through culture, memory, 
and power.  
44 The actors—who craft and implement policies at the government level—and the 
institutions would shape the development of China’s soft power at critical junctures and 
historical configurations in post-socialist China.  
45 The Chinese government’s publications are examined to highlight the role and power of 
the party-state in policy-making. Whereas the local government and other parts of Chinese 
society can be functioned as a tool for understanding Chinese policy, the government’s policy 
implementation remains as a key to interpret its policy. Accordingly, how the agency tries to 
construct soft power requires an examination of a number of the policies proposed by the 
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concept of soft power as a baseline, the way in which Chinese soft power is 
developed in the Chinese discourse will be highlighted with special reference 
to culture in the building process. Needless to say, different government 
bodies from the CCP to ministries have different interests in agenda-setting 
and different focuses in policy-making and policy implementation.   
Analytically, the Chinese government’s documents can be divided into 
three categories: (1) High-level: large-scale programs and plans 
(ganglingxing); (2) Medium-level: field-specific guidelines (zhidaoxing) and 
(3) Low-level: specialized and technical documents (zhuanmenxing). This 
classification is along the lines of Ju’s analysis (2011) of China’s cultural 
“going global” mechanism [Woguo wenhua “zouchuqu” donglijizhi yanjiu].” 
However, his examination does not specify actors—both institutions and 
political leaders (Ju 2011: 31).46 How an agency tries to construct soft power 
requires the examination of a number of policies that have been proposed by 
the government (see Appendices 3.A and 3.B). 
The discourse analysis of the Chinese government’s publications is 
useful in two ways. First, it provides a chance to make sense of the Chinese 
government’s policy implementation. Second, within different time-frames, 
particularly, under different political leaders, the rhetoric and discourses of 
Chinese soft power making can be highlighted. The three periods 
                                                                                                                                                                               
government. Inevitably, the organizational-based documents and the main-actor-based 
documents overlap. In this case, I will highlight the way in which the context of the 
document was in public. For the detailed documents used in this analysis, see Appendices 
3.A and 3.B. 
46 Documents mentioned in the article titled “China’s cultural going global mechanism 
[Woguo wenhua “zouchuqu” donglijizhiyanjiu]” are 21 without specifying actors; I only select 
19 documents for relevance. The documents are marked with an asterisk in Appendix 3.A.  
48 
 
investigated are: (1) Culture in post-socialist China, 1991-2000; (2) The 
cultural industry as a strategic source of cultural development, 2001-2004; 
and (3) the projection of cultural soft power, 2005-2012. 
 
3.1 Chinese soft power: Culture, history, and industrial path 
3.1.1 Bringing culture back in 
China’s economic and military growth—generally considered as hard power 
(Nye 2005; 2011)—is widely recognized internationally (Yan 2006; Liff and 
Erickson 2013). Between 2010 and 2011, the defence budget grew at 10.4 
percent, while GDP growth rate in this one year was 9.8 percent. The 
unprecedented economic growth, however, has strengthened the aspiration 
to develop its cultural sectors. Figure 3.1 shows the economic value growth of 
China’s cultural industry. In 2004 the economic value of industry was 3,400, 
which was 2.15 percent of China’s Gross Domestic Product and the country 
has continuously maintained more than 2 percent of growth rate in its GDP. 
In 2010 it surpassed 11,052 and in 2013 it was above 21,000 values with a 
3.77 percent of the whole GDP (Figure 3.1).   
 




Source: National Bureau of Statistics China  
 
This is not only in terms of the restructuring of its internal cultural system, 
but also extends to the projection and diffusion of cultural soft power globally. 
China’s cultural sector should be compatible with its economic power47 to 
achieve a high level of comprehensive national power. In the attempt to 
explore the varying uses of culture in the official discourse of China’s building 
of soft power, the following lines of inquiries will be highlighted. The first 
engages with industrial developments and policies. Here it will be argued 
that the process of the building of China’s soft power resonates with other 
forms of Chinese industrial restructuring and development since the advent 
of its economic reform in 1978. In a related vein, the second line of inquiry 
highlights the involvement of key political figures and government bodies in 
                                                                
47 In other words, the latter i.e. China’s cultural system reform and cultural influence 
projection needs to show its capacity with commensurable economic power. This discussion 
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generating the discourse of China’s soft power building. Both industrial 
developments and different stakeholders’ involvements help construct 
China’s ambition into becoming “a culturally strong country (wenhua 
qiangguo),” through soft power building and the projection of a “better” 
image. The question of why culture needs to be brought back into the analysis 
of soft power is responded to below.  
It will be helpful to understand how the idea of culture, which may be 
of possible instruments to influence locals and foreigners, varies at different 
points in China’s historical junctures. The issue of “what culture means in the 
contemporary historical development” needs to be understood as laying the 
foundation for the generation of soft power. To factor in Chinese history also 
encourages scholars to examine both the location of culture as part of a series 
of policies, as well as the role of culture in critical historical moments. This is 
apparent in the Chinese government’s treatment of culture at different times. 
In the late nineteenth century, when China “contacted” the West, culture 
signified a way of protecting the Chinese people from the external pressures 
that came with such interactions. Later, during Mao’s time, culture served as a 
means to mobilize people and ideology. Although culture still functions as a 
tool of national publicity (or propaganda) within and outside of China, the 
government has attempted to use culture in a subtle manner from Mao’s time 
up to Hu’s period. 
Secondly, it is important to consider how culture has been shaped 
and reinforced by industrial development, the path of which has been 
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reinforced and reshaped by the trajectory of China’s economic development. 
Immediately after China’s economic reform in the early 1990s, culture and 
cultural products were viewed as being consumed by the citizenry only. The 
cultural market then was for domestic purposes. As industrial development 
expanded, the cultural industry entered the spotlight strategically and 
became a recognized key pillar industry in 2001. This made it possible for the 
(cultural) industry to enhance its infrastructure and system for managing 
culture, primarily for domestic purposes, though there was further 
preparation made for exporting its cultural goods to external audiences. 
Third, how culture intersects with soft power is significant for 
understanding of China’s attempts at the building of soft power. The 
appropriation of culture in the official discourse of soft power is in line with 
the inclusion of the cultural industries as a platform to develop culture and 
project cultural influence. In this sense, the building of soft power should be 
considered as a continuous process, rather than be regarded as having 
commenced only during Hu’s era (2003-2012). Throughout the Jiang Zemin 
to the Hu Jintao years, the field of soft power was not merely a testing ground 
for the implementing of Chinese culture to internal and external audiences; it 
was also a period of its enhancement and its international influence.  
More importantly, in a historical juncture in which China is bound to 
rise economically and militaristically the country hopes to have a lasting 
cultural and “ideological” influence upon the world. As Thomas Friedman 
states, “China’s main goal is to restore its greatness, what it sees as its place 
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in history as a great economic power, a great cultural power, a great political 
and geopolitical power (Friedman quoted in Pienovi 2010).” As Chinese 
documents indicate the government is aiming for the economic and political 
revival of the Chinese people and nation. Nation building is a prevailing 
discourse that aligns with China’s infrastructure growth, together with a 
nostalgic longing for its glorious past in ancient times. On this understanding, 
then, the question needs to be posed: how does official discourse in China 
respond to the question of soft power vis-à-vis assisting its aspiration of 
becoming a strong cultural power?  
 
3.1.2 Three phases of policy implementation 
In this section, three phases of policy implementation, from the Eighteenth 
Five-Year Plan to the present (the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 12.5) (see Figure 
3.2), each characterized by its own notion of culture, are examined. Five 
threads in each period are highlighted: (1) A historical landmark; (2) Culture 
in the economy; (3) Culture in policy-making; (4) Soft power repertoires; and 
(5) the prevailing discourse of the period. Note that these threads do not 
always function as a reality, but are the predominant discursive ideal types of 
the particular period.48 Table 3.1 gives an overview of the analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 Trajectories of China’s Soft Power Discourse 
in the Government Sphere 
 
 
                                                                
48 I further argue that there might be discrepancies between reality and this discourse as an 
ideal type.  
53 
 
 Phase 1  
(1991-2000) 
Phase 2  
(2001-2004) 




















Cultural market as a 
developmental sector 
and globalization  











(chanyehua) or “go to 
the market” 
(zuoxiang shichang)  
Cultural industry 
inclusion as a 
strategic and one of 
the pillar industry  
 

















“Building a country 
with socialist 
civilization”  
The revival of Chinese 
culture and people  
Enhancing cultural 
soft  power and 
international 
influence 
The logic49 Party logic and 
market logic50 





The reasons for selecting the period from 1991 to 2012 are as follows: The 
Five-Year Plan offers a policy framework and gives a signal for proposed 
future directions. The year 1991 is generally regarded as a transitional one 
for China’s economy reflected, as it was, in Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour. 
2012 was an important year because the Eighteenth Party Congress of the 
CCP was held and major changes in the leadership of the CCP took place.51 
                                                                
49 The highlighted logic here is a leading legacy of the time, but it may concert with other 
logics, in this case, I mention them. 
50 On the media side, this line of discussion is made by Zhao (1999).   
51 Cultural development and soft power was discussed in the 18th CPC Central Committee 
(China Daily 2013). Such discussions were very much in line with its previous government’s 
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Within the period, three phases with reference to the location of culture in 
the economy and policy making can be delineated. Regardless of its first 
official appearance in 2005, the idea of culture can still be traced back in 
previous years. In particular, examining the way in which the idea of culture 
is appropriate sheds light on how the idea of culture translate into China’s 
discourse on soft power. The three stages are: (1) The domestic consideration 
of Culture, 1991-2000; (2) The cultural industry as a base for developing its 
soft power, 2001-2004, and (3) The building of an “imagined” China Soft 
Power Inc., 2005-2012 (see Table 3.1).   
 
3.2 Building soft power  
3.2.1 Stages 1 and 2: From cultural market to cultural industry 
Before the first historical period (1991–1999) is investigated, it is important 
to look back to the 1990s so as to get an overview of the development of 
culture and soft power in China. The year 1985 is important because it was 
then that the General Office of the State Council added “industry” to “culture” 
(General Office of the State Council 1985) in one of their published 
documents (MOC and State Administration for Industry and Commerce 1988; 
SC 1991; State Council Information Office 1992). In 1988 the government 
began using the term “cultural market” (wenhua shichang) (MOC and State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce 1988). At this time, culture not 
only had the attached values of industry but was also a means of entering and 
shaping the cultural market. This development was in line with China’s open 




reform policy set in motion from 1978, following which the series of state 
policies in the 1980s led to the marketization of the Chinese economy.  
Against this summary background, in the first period (1991-2000) of 
policy implementation over the whole period from 1991 to 2012, the Chinese 
government was starting to become aware of the value of soft power, putting 
attention on culture itself and making it visible in its industrial sector. In 
1991 it employed the term “cultural economy” (wenhua jingji) which 
replaced cultural market (The State Council 1991). This can be seen as a 
transition to a new understanding of the cultural industries (Hu 2006: 40). 
The 1992 CCP’s 14th Party Congress put the cultural economy at the forefront 
of policy (CCP, Making a Better Cultural Economy Policy 1992). This shows a 
preliminary understanding of the potential role of culture which could be 
exploited in the later stages for further purposes.  
There were certain influential actors during this period. The Deputy 
Head of the Department of Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of Culture Gao 
Zhanxiang 52  played a significant role in shaping the meaning of the 
development of the cultural industry in terms of economic reform.53 In 
particular, the Beijing Municipal Committee and Beijing Municipal 
Government emphasized that the cultural industry would play a role in 
making a newly developed industry that might lead to further economic 
development (wu ge zengzhangdian). Culture was introduced as a part of the 
                                                                
52 The name of his position is Deputy Head of the Sector of Commercial Affairs in the 
Ministry of Culture (Wenhuabu shangwufubuzhang). 
53 The record is on December 8, 1993. 
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third industrial sector; however, it did not serve as a vehicle for boosting the 
economy but was meant to engage the local population. As such, although the 
idea of culture was not yet fully part of any official documents, it existed 
during this period as a potential, with the groundwork being laid for its 
subsequent development in later policies.  
In the changing discourses from cultural market to cultural economy, 
the latter has to be understood as part of a system that involved transition 
from a socialist to authoritarian state capitalism. Just after the economic 
reform era, industry was classified into primary, secondary, and tertiary 
industrial sectors. All industries fall within one of these sectors. As a 
consequence of the economic transition, the role of the market came to be 
fully defined as the place where prices are set by the transactional exchanges 
of goods and services, involving sellers and buyers, producers and consumers. 
However, the government still had the role of guiding and planning 
the economy. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern China tour in 1992, the 14th 
National Party Congress in the same year officially used his “proposal for 
economic openness” and formally embraced the concept of a “socialist 
market economy” (Zhao 1999: 47). In particular, the transition to a socialist 
market economy is well presented in Deng’s speech that had “the effect of 
“re-energizing China’s capitalist revolution after Tian’anmen” and marked the 
“semiformal takeover” of capitalism” (Pei 1994: 84 quoted in Zhao 1999: 48). 
Deng’s drive led to media reform, reinforcing media commercialization in 
train. However, at the time, the government intentionally did not use the term 
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commercialization (shangyehua) (Zhao 1999: 50), but rather used 
“industrialization” (chanyehua) or “go to the market” (zouxiang shichang) 
(Chan 1993; Cheng and Brosseau 1993 quoted in Zhao 1999: 1).54 The party-
state was trying to avoid appearing as a country attempting to become a 
market economy. Rather, it chose to remain ambiguous. Embracing 
industrialization and not commercialization can also be understood as China 
being pragmatic (shiyong zhuyi).  
As industrialization developed, the cultural industry became 
strategically included in an official central government document in 2000—at 
the beginning of the Tenth Five-Year Plan—for the first time, indicating that 
the state aimed to seriously take culture and the cultural industry into 
account, treating them as “commodities”55 and thus as an important element 
in a market economy. With its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, China aspired to be a member of the world economy and began to 
prepare for globalization and moved its economy accordingly. This is evident 
in the country’s strategy of going global announced in 2003, and was 
reflected in its economic and cultural globalization and indexed in the start of 
the export of cultural products. The cultural industry became one of the 
eleven key pillar industries in the same year.56 As such, this period (2001-
                                                                
54 For further detailed analysis of this matter, see Chan (1993).  
55 Cultural commodification lies in: (1) a framework of cultural economy; (2) market 
formation; (3) the role of actors (i.e., sellers, buyers, consumers); and (4) a reflection of 
China’s open economic reform. 
56 The other ten key pillar industries (zhizhuchanye) are the followings: light industry 
(qinggongye), automobile (qicheye), communication (chuanboye), mafic metal (yousejinshu), 
machinery (zhuangbeiye), textile industry (fangzhiye), transportation (wuliuye), electronics 
and information (dianzixinxiye), oil industry (shihuaye), and steel industry (gangtieye). 
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2004) amounted to a “take-off” in terms of engagement with the global path 
taken by other countries. 
While scholars have argued that developing the Chinese cultural 
industries was an important part of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), 
they (J. Wang 2004; Flew 2012) also agree that, in the policy sphere, cultural 
policy and soft power policy did not exist before the twenty-first century.57 In 
retrospect, it can be said that an inclusion of the cultural industries in the 
Tenth Five-Year Plan was a way of formalizing the development officially. At 
another level, it is crucial to note that the cultural industry had been included 
as part of the “National Economic Plan,”58 although there was an early 
attempt in 1992 to mention the cultural industry—albeit there was no such 
recognition of this by scholars59—in the publication of the State Council 
(State Council Information Office 1992). This moment can be seen as a sign of 
the Chinese government adding additional meaning to “culture” and can also 
be regarded as preparation for the next stage. These previous attempts of the 
Chinese state to build up the industry and conceptualize the development 
model are able to illuminate the historical path of Chinese culture as a 
resource of soft power in the later stage at a macro level. Undoubtedly, the 
                                                                
57 For an examination of China’s cultural policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Pang  
(2012). 
58 Depending on the source used, the date when the phrase “cultural industry” first appeared 
in an official Chinese document is different. For example, most literature indicate 2000, but 
Hu (2006) argues that it first appeared in 1992 (A Decision made to develop the Third Sector). 
However, the term was clearly included before the Eleventh Five-Year Plan started. 
Furthermore, I would argue that the official inclusion of the phrase “cultural industry” was 
done in preparation for further development in line with the cultural industry argument in 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. 
59 This point is made here because most of the published literature, without taking account 
of any earlier attempts, informs us that the first inclusion of the phrase “cultural industry” 
was either in 2000 or in 2001.  
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timing with which the Chinese state deployed the cultural industry’s 
development—by cultural system restructuring and reform—is perfectly 
compatible with China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005). Why, then, was 
this particular industry highlighted around this time?  China’s ICT sector also 
experienced a similar industrial and structural transformation, and the sector 
aimed to enlarge the size of the economy in the same Five-Year Plan.60 
However, attention is now given to discussing the transformation of 
the cultural industry within the Chinese government’s policy. Domestically, 
the country has invested in a first step of developing a cultural system and 
expanding cultural affairs—infrastructure, in particular—in the less 
developed parts of the country. This is firstly documented by Jiang Zemin’s 
speech in 1992 in the context of constructing a socialist culture. A similar line 
of argument can be found in his speech in 2002 of “Building a Xiaokang 
Society, Starting a New Phase of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” 
Based on the CCP’s 16th Party Congress Report, the Ministry of Culture 
published The Cultural Market Development Plan (2003–2010) in 2003 and 
spelled out a number of cultural products such as choreography (yanchu), 
entertainment (yule), audio-visual  products (yingxiang), internet culture 
(wangluo wenhua), films (dianying), and artifacts (yishupin).61 Outwardly, the 
Chinese government was using its development of the cultural industry as a 
base for exporting its cultural products, premised on the belief that this 
                                                                
60 For a more detailed discussion, see Hong (2008).  
61 There is no specification on the field of international broadcasting yet, although the 
English CCTV channel was launched in 2000. The Cultural Market Development Plan specifies 
that the Ministry and government aim to “Wenhuachanye jibenfa” (The Basic Law of Cultural 
Industry) in the year 2010.  
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industry could contribute economically. By bridging both internal and 
external demands, China wants to export its cultural products and bring 
cultural performance to an external audience, with exhibitions of cultural 
products and cultural industry; for example, Shenzhen’s cultural industries 
forum and Shanghai’s exhibition are examples. In the meantime, like 
previous developmental paths to industrial sectors,62 China is willing to learn 
from others by looking at the UK, Japan, Singapore and South Korea’s cultural 
and media industry development plans.63 It is attempting to build its creative 
industries, creative economy, and creative society altogether.64  
In line with such developments, cultural industrialization 
(wenhuachanyehua) can be understood as articulated on three accounts: (1) 
Changes in the position of the cultural industry in the Chinese economy; (2) 
Changes and reform in the cultural system; and (3) The impetus to globalize 
Chinese culture. In a continuous line of industrial development,65 the Chinese 
government posited the cultural industry as one of the eleven pillar 
industries in 2003 (Wenhuachanye zhenxingguihua) and treated it as a 
strategic industry. “Creative industries emerged as a policy concept in 2004, 
gaining particular momentum in the major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, and Guangzhou (Flew 2012: 48)”.66 In 2005 “the concept of 
cultural creative industries (wenhua chuangyichanye) had gained acceptance 
                                                                
62 Media reform is an example of this.  
63 It is intriguing that it does not mention anything related to Hollywood.  
64 For a detailed discussion, see Wuwei Li (2011). 
65 For example, in terms of the real estate industry, its industrial upgrading has been 
followed a similar step to this configuration.  
66 This can be regarded as a result of the National Cultural Reform Testing Points Work 
Conference which was held in Beijing in 2003 (Flew 2012: 48). 
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and, by the end of 2006, the creative industries or cultural creative industries 
strategies were a part of the draft Eleventh Five-Year Plan for the cities of 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Nanjing, Shenzhen, Qingdao, and Tianjin (Flew 
2012: 49).” Scholars started to capture the relevant policies of individual 
cities, such as Beijing (Rossiter 2006). The relevant policies existed not only 
at the national level, but also at the regional level in different parts as testing 
points experimentally. What is more, China was emphasizing the move from 
a “Made in China” economic base to a “Created in China” paradigm (Flew 
2012: 48).67 In Phase 2, with the going global cultural strategy that started in 
2003, China intended to export its cultural products not only for profit but 
also to gain recognition for PRC-made products; Flew (2012) and Keane 
(2006) observed a desire of the government aspiring to move from “China 
fake” and “China manufactured” towards “China Created/China Inc.” This led 
to the third historical critical juncture (2005-2012).  
 
3.2.2 Stage 3: The “imagined” projection of China’s soft power through a 
globalizing Chinese culture  
This previous part of this chapter has looked at how the role of culture has 
been transformed in policy-making and in the development of cultural 
industry in the market economy. How, then, does the idea of soft power play 
out? In order to conceptualize soft power the international political sphere 
needs to be considered. Although there were several attempts to include soft 
                                                                
67 See also Keane (2006).  
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power in the journalistic and scholarly fields (see Chapter 2), the use of the 
term soft power in an official sense in China was recent. An initial attempt 
was the Ministry of Culture’s mention of “cultural power (wenhuali)” in 2005 
(Ministry of Culture 2005).68 In the same year, the State Council mentioned 
“cultural comprehensive power (wenhua zongheguoli).” In 2006 the general 
office of the CCP and general office of the State Council mentioned “cultural 
power” and “cultural influence (wenhua yingxinagli).” “Influence” has two 
related meanings; it is either used interchangeably with soft power itself or 
to mean achieving soft power.   
President Hu Jintao included the phrase “cultural soft power (wenhua 
ruanshili)” in his speeches he gave at the 17th CCP Congress in 2007 and the 
18th Party Congress in 2012. These bookend occasions can be regarded as 
setting the agenda for national policies. In documents from 2010, Hu 
emphasized the need for an increase of China’s competitiveness in cultural 
trade and cultural exports. He also highlighted the need for Chinese culture to 
be enhanced so that it will have international influence. Since then, 
enhancing “national (cultural) soft power”69 has been mentioned several 
times in the 2011 documents of the CCP and the Ministry of Culture. Li 
Changchun, the chief of the Department of Propaganda, explicitly mentioned 
“cultural soft power” in a leading magazine called Qiushi in 2011. But the 
                                                                
68 Ministry of Culture (2005; 2007), “Opinions on further strengthening and improving the 
export of cultural goods and services.” There are two versions using the same title. One is 
dated in 2005 and another is dated in 2007.  
69 In the Chinese official documents, China’s cultural power (Zhongguo wenhuali) is less 
observable than national cultural power. The latter appears as a different category because it 
further links to the function of the idea as a vehicle of nation-building (Zhonghua fuxing).  
63 
 
reluctance to use “soft power” in the official discourse can be seen in it slowly 
disappearing from Hu Jintao’s speeches (see Figure 3.2). 
 





Towards constructing soft power with Chinese characteristics: “Socialist” 
cultural power and repertories of being “Chinese” 
In constructing soft power, China not only seeks to enhance its influence 
internationally, but also to link all Chinese in the world to their ‘homeland.’”  
The soft power influence of a country can be expanded from inside to the 
outside, to broaden international influence. The Chinese “minzu” (ethnic 
group) can be from China or not from China, therefore, to bring all “Chinese” 
                                                                
70 To enhance the clarity of the figures, some abbreviated words are used. First, Five-Year 
Plans are abbreviated as follows: The Eighth Five-Year Plan (the 8th): 1991-1995; The Ninth 
Five-Year Plan (the 9th): 1996-2000; The Tenth Five-Year Plan (the 10th): 2001-2005; The 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (the 11th): 2006-2010 and the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (the 12th): 
2011-2015. Second, the political leaders present here are the followings: Deng Xiaoping as 
Deng, Jiang Zemin as Jiang, Hu Jintao as Hu, and Xi Jinping as Xi. For more detailed data, see 
Appendices 3.A and 3.B. 
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together (Zhonghua minzu/huaren) on different occasions (e.g., CCTV New 
Year’s Festival (Chunjie Lianhuanwanhui),71 shows as a concern not only with 
bringing people together inside China but also outside the country. 
The long-term objective is obviously to reinforce China’s soft power as 
part its comprehensive national power. In particular, the country has the 
ambition to become a “socialist” cultural power (Shehuizhuyi 
wenhuaqiangguo) and to revive the Chinese people (minzu fuxing) or even 
the Chinese nation. On both the short- and mid-term levels, it is important for 
the Chinese state to develop its cultural industry in order to achieve a better 
balance of the percentage of Gross Domestic Product earned by the cultural 
sector relative to other industrial sectors, and to reduce its deficit in cultural 
trade.  
 
Soft power in industrial development and with institutionalized targets: 
Envisioning the future 
According to the WTO’s (Doyle 2010) estimates of major exporters and 
importers of audiovisual and related services among fifteen countries, in 
2007, the leading exporter was the United States (15,043 million USD, 51.5 
percent of the whole share), followed by the European Union (9,962, 34.1 
percent), and Canada (2,021, 6.9 percent). China (316, 1.1 percent) was the 
fourth largest exporter. However, the three largest exporters took up more 
than 92 percent of the total share. China pushed forward to engage more with 
                                                                
71 On a slightly different note, China’s “One Country, Two Systems” policy can be interpreted 
in this regard as well. Bringing all ethnic Chinese into the program shows this. 
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cultural trade in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. One of the field-specific 
guidelines in this Plan was the document entitled the Ministry of Culture’s 
Plan (2011-2015) to Facilitate Globalizing Cultural Products and Services 
(Wenhuabu guanyu cujin wenhuachanpin he fuwu “zouchuqu” 2011-2015 nian 
zongtiguihua) (Ministry of Culture of China 2010).72 This was the very first 
attempt for any Chinese Ministries to explicitly mention different targets and 
plans in relation to cultural exports and cultural soft power. Furthermore, it 
clearly stated the way in which the Ministry of Culture aims to implement the 
relevant policy inside and outside China.  
Exporting culture and projecting soft power was understood in the 
following manner: “Domestically, we try to build our culture, and facilitate 
the cultural industry as a new development engine of the national economy; 
internationally, in the framework of diplomacy, we try to enhance national 
cultural soft power, and increase Chinese international influence73 (see 
Figure 3.3),” “. . . we try to enhance the influence of our Chinese cultural 
products and services in our neighboring countries, we make well-known 
brands in America and Europe, we do have an increased profit in emerging 
markets such as South Asia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Pacific, and we cultivate the African market (Ministry of Culture of China 
2010; 2011).”  
One section of the document needs to be highlighted Plans to promote 
cultural products and services in specific regions (Zhiding shishi chongfen quyu 
                                                                
72 This is a version released October 2010. 
73 See the Ministry of Culture of China (2010; 2011).  
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tuiguang jihua), which assumes the presence of Chinese cultural products in 
neighboring countries as the first “testing points”74 in building markets for 
Chinese cultural products and services. In Northeast Asia, “utilizing the 
governments of China-Japan-South Korea as a platform of cooperation, we 
strongly promote products such as entertainment, animation, and games, and 
the development of industrial partnerships among the three countries.” The 
logic behind these neighbors of China “share” a similar culture and thus 
might enjoy similar cultural and media products. In contrast, Greater China 
(Dazhonghua diqu)—Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan—is clustered into one 
and thus presented as an ambivalent region; a contact zone, but often also a 
conflict zone. Third, China sees South Asia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, 
Latin America, and the Pacific as emerging markets, and tries to “guide 
cultural companies to pioneer new markets in these countries (MOC 2010; 
2011).” Lastly, in Africa, China attempts to use cultural exchange and aid in 
an attempt to actively create a market for Chinese cultural products. 
Figure3.3 
The Contours of the Projection of Chinese Soft Power: 
Institutionalized Targets and Objectives / International influence and 
Cultural Products75 
 
                                                                
74 A “testing point” (shidian) is a common way in the Chinese government’s policy. In the 
cultural sector, National Cultural System Reform Testing Points (shidian) Work Conference 
which was held in Beijing in 2003 is an example. At the conference, 9 places and 35 cultural 
danwei (work units) were designated as shidian.  
75 This figure is based on the argument of the Chinese Ministry of Culture (2011). For the par




Source: MOC 2010; 2011; 2012. 
 
3.3 The institutionalized construction of Chinese soft power  
The aim of this chapter has been to rethink the institutional treatment of 
culture in China in the suggested timeframe. Discourse analysis of a number 
of government publications has highlighted the CCP, the Ministry of Culture, 
and Hu Jintao as main actors in generating discourse on soft power. This 
chapter has also problematized the emergence of soft power in the rising 
China. By analyzing the discourse of soft power it provides a perspective that 
its construction of soft power is better understood as a progression of 
multifaceted meanings of culture and the location of culture in its economy. 
This approach allows us to build upon the idea of culture that is rather 
loosely presented within the academic literature on soft power. It argues that 
culture is one of the resources in China’s soft power developmental plan and 
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is intertwined with the government’s management of culture, economy, 
industry and visions. 
At the end of this chapter three key finds can be presented. First, the 
changing role of culture has contributed to the development of the logic of 
soft power over two decades. In the 1990s culture was commonly regarded 
in the context of the “politicization” of government propaganda. In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, culture became interpreted as a strategic commodity 
for promoting domestic consumption and bringing capital into the Chinese 
economy. In recent years, culture has been used strategically to potentially 
enhance China’s image, project influence, and further develop economic 
growth. Culture is therefore not only a channel for soft power, but also a by-
product of soft power.  
Second, coupling economic development and culture reinforces the 
cultural logic of soft power. Locating culture in the economic sector helped to 
transform the cultural industry which emphasizes creativity. Following the 
stages of economic developmental—from commodification and 
marketization, to commercialization and industrialization—culture has 
played integral roles at the different historical junctures presented in this 
chapter.  
Third, this chapter has highlighted soft power in the evolutionary 
pattern of change in China emphasizing the progressive understanding of 
culture and its embedding in the envisioning of the future by the country’s 
political leaders. The conclusion that emerges is that the discourses of soft 
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power mirror and reflect the China’s path of industrial development. On this 
understanding the next chapter will specifically examine how China’s cultural 
























China’s Use of Soft Power in the Media Sector:  
Producing and Exporting Commercial Products and 
International Broadcasting 
 
The extraordinary rise of China has meant that the world is now paying 
significant attention to this emerging power. The country has also started to 
take its image more seriously, domestically and, to a greater extent, abroad. 
This has affected China’s policy orientation, resulting in the twin strategies of 
“bringing in” (yinjinlai, inward flow) and “going out” (zouchuqu, outward 
flow), which emphasizes the importance of both inward and outward foreign 
investment. 
As for China’s “going out” promotion attempts perhaps, most visibly, 
two Chinese publicity films were screened in Times Square, New York, in 
January 2011 (Pan and Zhang 2013; Y. Zhao 2011).76 One was a short 
commercial, People, and the other a feature film, Perspectives. The screening 
of these two publicity films, China’s first public diplomacy campaign at the 
state level, was organized by China’s official press agency, the Xinhua News 
Agency (Xinhuashe), to coincide with President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United 
States. In March 2012, two years after these two public relations “events” 
                                                                
76 Some Chinese studies have taken the publicity films of China into account. In China’s 
National Image Promotion film, Pan and Zhang (2013) analyze the film, Perspectives, from a 
linguistic point of view (rhetoric and metaphors). Yan Zhao (2011) examines the narrative 
styles of the same film. Qiong Liu (2011) explores how the film promotes China’s image. Yu 
Liu and Guojuan Wu (2011) discuss the role of the film in “external propaganda” (duiwai 
xuanchuan). And the People’s Tribune (2011) analyzes the rationale of deciding on the 
“people” in an attempt to represent such a story, while Jie Shen (2012) analyzes the 
strategies and effects of the film, which was designed for doing cross-cultural “work.” 
71 
 
(gongguan), “Cultural China (Wenhua Zhongguo),”77 a film produced by CCTV 
New Technology Animation Channel (Zhongyangdianshitai xinkedongman 
pindao), was screened at the same location in New York City (Shen 2012: 82). 
The aim in this instance was to promote Chinese culture to a foreign 
audience.  
These publicity films reflected China’s efforts to reinforce its soft 
power. They illustrate how internal reform of the Chinese media system is 
seen as crucial to enabling Chinese culture and media to “go global.” They 
also point up that domestic reform may facilitate the future export of media 
products. One reason for these efforts, acknowledged by observers, is that 
China’s commercial media products, in particular its TV series, are 
uncommon outside of Sinophone countries. For example, a Chinese costume 
drama, The Legend of Zhenhuan,78 which was aired in China in 2011, gained 
popularity in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and an abridged version is 
scheduled to be exported to the United States (China Youth 2013) and it will 
be broadcasted in the end of 2014 (Guangming Online 2014). Such exports 
are in keeping with China’s “going global” strategy.  
The previous chapter investigated the progress of China’s building of 
soft power at a macro level, through its cultural and industrial development, 
by analyzing government documents. This chapter takes a detailed look at 
how China’s media sector has developed in line with this “going global” 
strategy. In particular, it investigates state involvement with commercial 
                                                                
77 This screening was held from March 3-14, 2012, in New York’s Time Square. 
78 Another name of this drama in English is Empresses in the Palace. 
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media products, its approach to the production of television series, and its 
international broadcasting project within its cultural globalization policy. 
 
 
4.1 China’s going global strategy and soft power 
In a 2008 speech Li Changchun, the propaganda chief of the Communist Party 
of China (CCP) and a standing member of the Politburo of the CCP Central 
Committee, emphasized that the Chinese media needs to reinforce its 
communication capacity (chuanbo nengli).79 He also pointed out that it is 
necessary for China to integrate culture, science, and technology together, to 
utilize advanced technology in order to enhance its culture with creative, 
innovative, and communicative influence (chuangxin nengli).80 This message 
was reiterated during his visit to the Beijing International Film and TV 
Equipment Festival (Beijing Guangbo dianying dianshi shebei zhanlanhui) in 
August 2010 (The Chinese government August 2010). Since then, the Chinese 
government has attempted to use the media to develop a policy of 
“international communication,” essential to promoting Chinese culture and 
products abroad, especially the exporting of cultural products and services. 
In order to produce high quality media, it is important to have a profound 
infrastructure and technical capacity of the industrial system. To achieve 
                                                                
79 This often refers to chuanbo liliang as well. 
80 “. . . and communication capacity (chuanboli) as new engines, we need to develop our 
culture’s creativity (chuangzaoli), communication capacity and influence (yingxiangli)” is a 
literal translation of such statement. (“yao chongfen renshi keji jinbu dui wenhua fazhan de 
zhongyao zuoyong, jinjin zhuazhu xinxihua shenru fazhan de lishi jiyu, jiakuai tuijin wenhua he 
keji de ronghe, ba yunyong gaoxinjishu zuowei tigao wenhua chaungxin nengli he chuanbo 




their objectives, two options were available to the government. One is to 
export commercial Chinese television series and the other is to develop 
international broadcasting (see Chapters 5 and 6) with the explicit aim of 
reaching a large overseas audience (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 China’s Plan for Projecting its Soft Power: 






4.2 Globalizing Chinese media products: Policy, guidelines, and export 
Making Chinese media products in-country: Guidelines 
Chinese TV series,82 according to SARFT (2008), are categorized based on 
their placement of in Chinese history and their main themes (see Figure 4.2).  
                                                                
81 Hanban is the Chinese Language Council. 
82 By quantity, without a doubt, China is one of the largest TV drama producers in the world. 
In 2007 China produced 14,670 episodes (529 seasons), in 2008, 14,498 episodes (502 
seasons). China produced 14,685 episodes (436 seasons) in 2010 and 14,942 episodes (469 
seasons) in 2011 (SARFT 2012). 
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First, the timeline is divided into four distinct groups: (1) Ancient 
(Gudai): before the Xinhai Revolution of 1911; (2) Pre-modern (Jindai): from 
1911 to 1949; (3) Modern (Xiandai): from 1949 to 1978, and (4) 
Contemporary (Dangdai): since China’s economic reform from 1978 to the 
present.  
In terms of major themes, the following categories are considered: 
palace (gongting), martial arts (wuda), rural (nongcun) and urban (dushi); 
youth (qingshao); law (she’an); military (junlv); science fiction (kehuan), and 
others (qita). A third category can be noted: “Significantly important 
incidents (Zhongda),” which includes significant revolutions and historical 
events throughout the Chinese history.  
From the first two periods (Ancient to 1948) to the last three periods 
(1949 till now), there is a shift of focus from legendary, palace, and biography 
themes to urban, village, military, and law issues. Table 4.1 shows the key 
themes in each period.  
 
Table 4.1 What is Produced on the Chinese Side 
 
 Prior 



















V     
Martial arts 
(Wuda) 
V     
Legendary 
(Chuanqi) 
V V    
Biography 
(Chuanji) 





V V V V  
Urban (Dushi)  V V V  
Military (Junlv)   V V  
Village 
(Nongcun) 
  V V  
Law (She’an)   V V  
Science fiction 
(Kehuan) 
   V  
Revolution 
(Geming) 
 V   V 
History (Lishi)     V 
Etc. (Qita) V V V V  
 
Source: SARFT (2008).83 
 
Figure 4.2 Standard Themes of Chinese TV Series:  




Source: SARFT (2008).84 
 
                                                                
83 The blank areas remain as “Not Available” from the SARFT’s guidelines. Niedenführ (2013) 
argues that producing historical dramas is a result of both the state and market’s demands. 
84 The category of “Important” does not necessarily fall under the four historical 




Table 4.1 shows that the SARFT pays greater attention to different themes in 
different periods. Media products with the identified themes are likely to be 
accepted and encourage for production. Conversely, themes that are not 
compatible with those identified in designated periods may not be allowed to 
be produced. As Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 show, what is produced and what 
can be imported in the Chinese territory are likely to overlap.85 Obviously, 
when local Chinese products move beyond China as foreign commodities in 
South Korea and Japan, they are unlikely to have the same reception as in 
China.86 
 
Exporting Chinese media products and globalizing Chinese culture: Policy 
and professionals 
To pave the way for its building of the country’s soft power, the Chinese 
government has initiated a cultural industry with broader consideration (see 
Chapter 3).  
As one Chinese academic, CM 11,87 commented,  
 
“On the national level, the Chinese government wants to focus 
on the cultural industry. The 6th plenary session of the 17th 
                                                                
85 Although this is not the focus of this thesis, for comparative purposes, I collected several 
surveys among Chinese. The range of their consumption of Chinese media products is wider 
than foreign audiences. Relevant information will be added.  
86 It is noted that there is a burgeoning literature on the Chinese commercial media products 
(e.g., Zhu and Berry 2008). This has a tendency to focus on a single type or period. In part 
due to this, it may not be sufficient to present a systematic snapshot of the full picture of 
what kind of Chinese TV dramas (not) to be produced in the Chinese domain.  
87 Over the course of the chapter, these codes are codifications of informants for protect their 
identity. See Appendix 1 for further information on the interviewees. 
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Communist Party of China Central Committee (17 qi 6 zhong 
quanhui) is an exemplary example of what the government 
intends. This is surely also a means of making money, i.e. 
commercialization. On the other hand, it speaks of the control 
of culture (wenhua kongzhi) and cultural security (wenhua 
anquan) at home.”88 
 
It is important to note that, like Japan and South Korea, the Chinese state 
regards the cultural industry as a source of (sustainable) wealth for its own 
economy. However, it is important to know how and through what channels 
the Chinese products are exported.89 
 
Table 4.2 China’s Imports and Exports of Audiovisual and Film: 
1997-2010 
 























1997 0.4 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 
1998 0.4 -11.1 0.1 0.2 53 0.1 
1999 0.3 -13 0.1 0.1 -56.7 0 
2000 0.4 10.2 0.1 0.1 69.8 0 
2001 0.5 34.2 0.1 0.3 146.8 0.1 
2002 1 91.2 0.2 0.3 6.4 0.1 
2003 0.7 -27.6 0.1 0.3 12.7 0.1 
2004 1.8 152.9 0.2 0.4 22.6 0.1 
2005 1.5 -12.4 0.2 1.3 226.5 0.2 
2006 1.2 -21.4 0.1 1.4 2.3 0.1 
                                                                
88 For the implications of soft power in relation to cultural security, see Chapter 3 Section 5.  
89  Preference here is given to media products or commodities, instead of cultural 
commodities, because the scope of the latter is much broader than the focus of this research.  
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2007 1.5 27 0.1 3.2 130.9 0.3 
2008 2.6 65.9 0.2 4.2 32.2 0.3 
2009 2.8 9.2 0.2 1 -76.7 0.1 
2010 3.7 33.2 0.2 1.2 26.4 0.1 
 
Source: The Ministry of Commerce of China (2012). 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the data on “China’s Imports and Exports of Film and 
Audiovisual Products” obtained from the Ministry of Commerce of China 
(2012). It includes both film and audiovisual products and it is difficult to see 
how much each of the categories contributes to the total. Nevertheless, it 
shows an overall trend of the import and export of film and audiovisual 
products from 1997 to 2010; in particular, exports of audiovisual and film 
products have increased since 2000. The year 2006 is significant in that the 
balance of China’s export and import trade had turned positive but the 
balance was back in the red from 2009 to 2010.  
Regarding the import and export of TV products, annual official 
statistical data from the Chinese government has common categories 
including Europe, the US, Japan, South Korea, Africa, and other regions.90 
These categories are made by countries and regions. Nevertheless, if one 
considers China’s main trading partners in the cultural trade (South Korea, 
Japan, and the US), it may not be surprising to see these countries as a single 
category. Similar methods can also be found in the corresponding data for 
                                                                
90 Due to the availability and inconsistency of published data by the Bureau of Statistics of 
China, data on “imported and exported TV programs during the year (hour)” is not included. 
This is because TV programs in these categories include both TV series and cartoon TV 
programs. It is not possible to separate one from another.  
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South Korea (see Chapter 5). A significant difference between years from 
2006 to 2010 and 2011 is changes in the categories of countries or regions. 
For instance, data from 2006 to 2010 has Latin America as a category (see 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). The statistical data of 2011 in the Yearbook of 
2012, which is the latest available information, does not have information on 
Latin America, but more emphasis on the Asia and the Pacific region, i.e. 
Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Oceania as additional categories91 
(see Figure 4.5).92 Despite the fact that annual statistical data does not 
explicitly indicate what a category “Other” might be comprised of, it is 
presumable that “Other” may include “unspecified Asian countries” from the 
rest of existing categories in the data. In this regard, Southeast Asian 
countries, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, which are newly updated categories in the 
2011 data, are possibly included in “Other.” Similarly, Jiang et al. (2013) argue 
that “Major importers of our [Chinese] domestic TV series are Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia which take up about two thirds of the total 
amount of export (Jiang et al. 2013).” Along with the ethnic Chinese 
population in Southeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are easier targets for 
exporting Chinese domestic TV drama products, while the US and Europe are 
“forbidden areas” (jinqu) for such exports (Jiang et al. 2013). Likewise, there 
is a consensus in the regional disparity of and deficit in China’s cultural trade. 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia have been places where 
                                                                
91 This is the first appearance of such specific categories of the Asia and the Pacific in the 
corresponding annual data.  
92 Acknowledging such differences in the data, however, in order to make presentable and 
coherent figures, Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Oceania are incorporated as others.  
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Chinese TV series are exported, and in particular in 2011 (Figure 4.5). In 
recent years, the importing of TV series from Thailand to China has 
significantly increased. 
Some observe that Thai dramas could possibly replace South Korean 
dramas in China (Nai Niu 2009). In 2003 a Thai TV drama Qiaonvyong was 
broadcasted by CCTV-8 for the first time. Chutaode gongzhu, which was aired 
on Hunan Satellite TV (Hunan Weishi) in 2008, was a great success (Nai Niu 
2009). An increasing number of Thai TV series were shown on Chinese 
Televisions from 2010 to 2012. In 2010 eight Thai series were imported: 
Three were in CCTV-8, five in Anhui Satellite TV (Anhui Weishi). In 2011, 17 
Thai series were imported to the Chinese market. For example, two were in 
CCTV-8, nine were in Anhui TV, one in Jiangsu Satellite TV (Jiangsu Weishi), 
two in Zhejiang TV station (Zhejiang dianshitai), one in Yunnan Satellite TV 
(Yunnan Weishi), one in Hebei Satellite TV (Hebei Weishi), one on the 
Shanghai TV-Drama channel (Shanghaidianshitai dianshiju pindao). In 2012, 
15 Thai TV dramas were shown on Chinese TV stations. Two were on CCTV-8, 
seven in Anhui Satellite TV (Anhui Weishi, one in CCTV-1, one in Beijing 
Yingshi, one in Zhejiang TV station, one in Sichuan Satellite TV (Sichuan 
Weishi), one 1 in Hubei Economic TV Station (Hubei Jingshi), and one in 
Xizang Satellite TV (Xizang Weishi). In particular, on June 21, 2008, 
Huaxiashibao published a rather provocative newspaper article titled “Thai 
Wave sweeps over Korean Wave, Thai drama is going to take over Korean 
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drama (Tailiu laixi, Hanliu tuiwen, Taiju tiaozhan Hanju).”93 It shows China’s 
expectation of having a newcomer in the cultural market. As such, the 
increasing popularity of Thai dramas in China could be one of the reasons 
why Southeast Asia is included as a single category of the cultural export data 
in 2011.94  
Since 2006 the value of TV series imported from South Korea has 
significantly increased, whereas the amount of Japanese TV series has 
decreased during these years (see Figure 4.3). South Korea is now one of the 
largest exporters of media products to China and the Chinese state is 
concerned with the cultural trade deficit vis-à-vis South Korea; recent 
guidelines of SARFT show China’s regulation over popular foreign products.95 
The Chinese government not only deals with the cultural trade deficit by 
taking such actions, but its policy of developing China’s soft power also aims 
to avoid the imbalance in cultural trade. 
In line with Chinese soft power policy (see Chapter 3), “Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian regions are still China’s main 
export target, although the market has been expanding to Europe, the US, and 
                                                                
93 For a detailed discussion of a Thai drama in China, see Deng (2013). For a similar 
discussion, see Hua Chen (2010), Nai Niu (2009), and Ying Zhang (2008). 
94 However, it is not straightforward to argue that whether this will be continued in the 
subsequent data.  
95 A document of “No. 42 Provisions on the Administration of Import and Broadcasting of 
Overseas TV Programs (Article 18)” is important. The content of the document is as follows: 
“(1) The time for broadcasting overseas TV plays per day should be less than 25% of the total 
time for broadcasting TV plays in each TV channels; (2) The time for broadcasting other 
imported TV programs per day should be less than 15% of the total time for broadcasting in 
each TV channels and (3) During prime time (19:00-22:00) imported TV plays can only be 
broadcasted with the approval from SARFT (before 2004, it was 15% of the total 
programming during prime time) (Italian Trade Commission 2011: 21).” See also 
Globaltimes (2012).  
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some Middle East countries (Italian Trade Commission 2011: 24).” It also 
intends to export Chinese TV series to Africa, and this is reflected in Africa 
remaining as a single category in import-and-export trade data. Thus Chinese 
TV series have slowly been entering the African market (Figure 4.5). The 
United States, Japan, and South Korea are the three most regular buyers of 
Chinese TV series with monetary values fluctuating year on year. For example, 
in 2006, 234 wanyuan (10,000 RMB) Chinese TV series (5 seasons, 218 
episodes)96 were exported to the US; in 2007 they were 101 wanyuan (7 
seasons, 198 episodes) and in 2011 it dramatically increased to 6,501 
wanyuan (3,396 episodes). In 2006, 1,801 wanyuan Chinese TV series (23 
seasons, 735 episodes) were exported to Japan; in 2011, it was 939 wanyuan 
(573 episodes). In 2011, 2,203 wanyuan (4,851 episodes) of Chinese TV 
dramas were exported to South Korea.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 The Value of Imported and Exported TV Series:  
2006-201197 
                                                                
96 Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5 have two sets of data: The value of TV series and the 
number of episode. Rationales for the selection are the following: This is consistent with the 
South Korean data which will be discussed in Chapter 5. The latter is presented based on 
both episode and USD calculation, but not by seasons. It is also noted that the Chinese data 
uses 10,000 CNY (RMB), which is equivalent to about 1,950 USD, as of December 2013. As 
the South Korean equivalent data uses 1,000 USD, the original unit is preserved for both 
cases.  
97 For detailed information, see the following table.  
 Imported TV series (10,000 RMB) 
 Europe US Japan South 
Korea 
Latin America Africa Other 
2006 2183 219 70 1388 19.2 5 17007 
2007 8827 1097 0 0 927 0 0 
2008 452 145 2901 7572 324 0 12899 
2009 2266 0 1177 6713 560 0 16172 
2010 646 551 318 2092 0 0 17843 






Source: Annual data from Yearbooks  
 
 
Figure 4.4 The Number of Imported and Exported TV Series: 
2006-201198 
                                                                                                                                                                               
 
 Exported TV series (10,000 RMB) 
 Europe US Japan South 
Korea 
Latin America Africa Other 
2006 568 236 1801 321 111 N.A. 8050 
2007 7 101 N.A. N.A. 39 N.A. N.A. 
2008 1410 912 1273 140 105 97 3587 
2009 77 246 372 298 25 161 2404 
2010 77 690 676 407 156 32 5445 
2011 42 6501 939 456 N.A. 148 6286 
 
98 For detailed information, see the following table.  
 Imported TV series (season (bu)/episode (ji)) 
















































2010 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
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Note: Data from 2010 is not available. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Imported and Exported TV programs: 2011 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
 Exported TV series (season (bu)/episode (ji)) 






























































Note: “Other” in 2011 includes “Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Oceania.” In order to present a 
consistent data, I combine “Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Oceania” as “Other” for 2011 data. 
N.A. refers to such categories are not available, “0” indicates that relevant information is not available in 
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Source: Yearbook of the Statistics of China (2012: 897). 
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in Japan and South Korea (see Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). Imported and 
exported TV programs in 2011 are provided in the Yearbook of the Statistics 
of China: 9,487 wanyuan (10,000 RMB), equivalent to 24 seasons (767 
episodes) of Korean TV dramas, were imported by China; 575 wanyuan, 
equivalent to 1 season (23 episodes) of Japanese dramas, were imported. 
From this it can be seen that South Korean dramas were cheaper to buy than 
Japanese dramas. On the export side, 17 seasons (573 episodes) was 
exported to Japan, which corresponded to 939 wanyuan; while 17 seasons 
(682 episodes) were exported to South Korea, which were 456 wanyuan (see 
Figure 4.5). The number exported to Japan and South Korea was almost 
same99; however, Chinese TV dramas in Japan were sold at a higher price 
than in South Korea. Similarly, prices of Japanese programs are also higher 
for Chinese importers than that for South Korean importers, while Korean 
programs are cheaper for Chinese than for Japanese importers. Apparently, 
the relationship and pricing practices between two countries are reciprocal. 
 
The dilemma of Chinese media personnel and the “unexpected” export to 
its nearest neighbor(s) 
In contrast to the government’s strategy, many of media practitioners in 
China whom I interviewed were surprised to find that South Korean 
broadcasting stations have Chinese programs, despite the fact that official 
                                                                
99 The amount of money gained after China’s export to Japan and South Korea remains rather 
close; however, the actual number of episodes of such exported programs is quite far. From 
this, it can be tentatively concluded that Chinese TV dramas in Japan were sold at a higher 
price than in South Korea, which also resonates with interviewees who work at the media 
industries in China, South Korea, and Japan. 
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statistical data do not shows this. During my interview with CM10,100 a vice-
director and editor in a Chinese broadcasting company in Shanghai, I asked 
whether and how the station had been exporting Chinese TV products to 
other countries and, in particular, South Korea and Japan. He was perplexed 
and started to answer my question by repeating what I asked. “Exporting 
Chinese dramas to South Korea?” He paused and continued, “Well, Korean 
dramas are so strong now; many Chinese TV stations have Korean programs. 
I don’t think this—exporting our products to China—is the case.” I said, “Do 
you mean that you do not usually export them or that the number of your 
exports is not significant? But there are several media players in South Korea 
that import Chinese dramas.” This again astonished him and it is interesting 
to capture his reaction: “South Korea is like China. You Koreans use Chinese 
characters, right? And South Korea has a stronger element of Confucianism. 
With regards to these, don’t you think Korea is very much like China? Don’t 
you think Koreans’ taste can be similar to the Chinese one?” The informant 
implied that Chinese culture is superior to Korean culture, which makes 
Koreans want to watch Chinese media at home. However, his answer is 
contradictory in a sense that he was surprised to see that Korean TV channels 
often broadcast Chinese programs.  
The respondent’s astonishing reaction to this “unexpected”101 export 
                                                                
100 Interview with a Chinese TV producer, February 8, 2012, Shanghai, China. 
101 The reason this term is placed between inverted commas is to highlight how Chinese 
media practitioners are unfamiliar with even those who are at the managerial level of doing 
content exchange business for South Korean media players to import Chinese television 
series. It is important to note that this is not only CM10’s personal reflection, but my 
interview data with CM7, CM8, CM9, CM11, CM12, CM20, CM22, and CM23 also support this 
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of Chinese media products to its nearest neighbor(s) is intriguing. Apparently, 
Chinese media professionals, on the other hand, are not necessarily aware of 
how many and who buys their products on the overseas market. This is partly 
because it is contrary to a common belief that a (cross)cultural flow is usually 
from advanced to less advanced societies—from Japan and South Korea to 
China—in the region, but in line with China’s soft power strategy. 
How, then, does exporting in the Chinese context occur? The 
distribution of foreign media programs in China and the sale of Chinese 
programs to foreign buyers (overseas sales/distribution, haiwai faxing) can 
take a number of routes.102 First, deals are made through big companies, such 
as CCTV International Television Company (CITVC) (Angshi guojigongsi), 
which is affiliated with CCTV. With its government backing and advantages in 
channeling, the company is “the largest exporter (Italian Trade Commission 
2011: 24)” of TV programs. “Shanghai Wu’an Chuanbo,” a company based in 
Shanghai, is another example, according to CM20.103  Second, some deals are 
made with individuals through social networks (guanxi) and personal 
channels (geren qudao). CM 36104 said, “Guanxi is important to get things 
started and get things done, in particular, in the cultural and media sectors.” 
This is also found in the importation process in South Korea and Japan. Third, 
deals can also be made through departments or personnel within media 
companies that do marketing and the distribution of media products. Fourth, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
point. However, I did not use all the data as the point was already made by CM10’s interview 
excerpt. 
102 For a similar line of reasoning, see KOCCA (2009).  
103 Interview with a Chinese academic, February 28, 2012, Shenzhen, China. 
104 Interview with a Chinese academic, August 4, 2013, Beijing, China. 
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venues such as exhibitions and festivals105 of such goods are also important. 
On these occasions, media companies prepare for and show samples 
(yangpin) of what they intend to sell in their booths. In addition, catalogues 
that contain details of the products106 and audience ratings for potential 
customers are also prepared. Although big events are gathering points for 
buyers and sellers, the latter often visit potential customers at places like TV 
stations where they leave materials (liu ziliao) and contact details (lianluo) 
for them to consider; this was supported by CM22’s107 comments.  
How much, where, and how Chinese media products are placed in the 
South Korean and Japanese markets needs to be contextualized within the 
“domestic” media markets, the importation processes, and actors’ 
involvement in these countries. The local embeddedness of the Chinese 
media products in the two markets will now be explored. 
 
 
4.3 International broadcasting: Reaching “global” audience 
The Chinese government has been developing a “systemic” approach to 
establishing regular channels of international communication in order to 
                                                                
105 Such venues are held in China can be the following: Beijing International TV Week, 
Shanghai TV Festival, Sichuan TV Festival, and Quanguo guochan dianshijiemu zhanshi 
jiaoyihui (Domestic TV Programs Exchange) are examples. Venues outside of China are the 
following: Asia TV Forum& Market in Singapore, Tokyo International Film Festival in Japan, 
Banff World Media Festival (formerly, Banff World Television Festival) in Canada, BRITDOC 
Foundation (formerly Channel 4 BRITDOC Foundation), Celtic Media Festival (Celtic Film 
Media Festival) in the United Kingdom, DISCOP, burgh International Television Festival, 
Festival International de Programmes Audiovisuals, FesTVal in Spain, ITVFest (Independent 
Television Festival), Monte-Carlo Television Festival, New York Television Festival, MIPTV & 
MIPCOM in France.  
106 Details of the products include the number of episodes, famous actors or actresses, other 
similar products that were on the market, and potentially attractive points.  
107 Interview with a Chinese media professional February 28, 2012, Shenzhen, China. 
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manage its image through China-produced news media. For instance, an 
English version of The Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a daily newspaper 
published by the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), was launched in April 2009 
and cost a staggering 45 billion RMB (6.6 billion USD)(Global Times N.d.).108 
Another example is the introduction the international news channel in 
English, CCTV International.109 Considering the effort and cost involved, it is 
understandable that, in 2008, President Hu Jintao commanded the news 
agency “to make the utmost effort to establish CCTV as one of the top-ranking 
international media news channels. It should use advanced communication 
technology, provide detailed information, have extensive coverage, and have a 
strong media influence.” Responding to this call, CCTV International aims to 
spread China’s voice to viewers both at home and abroad in several 
languages. Today, CCTV has well and truly entered into the previously 
“unchartered territory” by broadcasting in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, 
and Russian, as well as Chinese. The target international audience consists of 
two distinct types amongst Chinese nationals living overseas 110  and 
foreigners. CCTV-4 is primarily aimed at the ethnic Chinese population 
around the world, whereas CCTV International’s objective is to reach “a 
global English-speaking audience, including foreign expatriates working in 
                                                                
108 The Chinese version has been published since 1993. 
109 In the course of this paper, in most cases CCTV International refers to CCTV News 
(formerly CCTV-9), which is the English broadcasting channel of CCTV. Other language CCTV 
channels are specified. Along with the English Channel, Chinese, and other language channels 
of CCTV are named with Guoji (“international”) in Chinese. Channel names such as CCTV-4 
and CCTV-9 are often used in the context.  
110 For instance, in Laos, CCTV-1, CCTV-4, and CCTV-11 are available as of August 2013. The 
channels are mostly aimed at Chinese workers in the country, according to a foreign 
researcher who stayed there. 
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China” (Xiaoling Zhang 2011: 62). The goal is that the state-governed media 
institution represents China positively and ensures that its audience gains a 
better understanding of the country and its people. In this way, international 
broadcasting plays a significant role in enhancing China’s national image. 
CCTV International is patently being used as a vehicle of soft power and is an 
integral part of the country’s state policy of cultural diplomacy. 
 
The Infrastructure of the channels: Centers, bureaus, and networks 
CCTV, the central TV station, is managed by two entities; the SARFT and the 
Department of Propaganda; the latter also controls other state-owned media 
players. These two institutions played an important role in setting up the 
infrastructure of CCTV’s foreign language channels. Global centers (overseas 
centers) are in charge of international (overseas) broadcasting of CCTV. “Each 
center is a programming department of CCTV programs the main tasks of 
which are the following: CCTV’s international broadcasting; channels in 
Chinese, English, Spanish and French; producing programs which are 
scheduled to broadcast overseas and programming such programs; 
producing and broadcasting mega-events programs; offering and sending 
Chinese and foreign language TV programs to Chinese diplomats, embassies, 
overseas-located TV stations, and ‘external communication (propaganda)’ of 
TV programs in local TV stations and international cooperation (Z. Lin 2010).” 
On December 28, 2009, CCTV formally launched China CNTV, which is 
the online platform. CNTV uses multiple languages to communicate with its 
92 
 
audiences and netizens under CCTV’s international strategy.111 In 2010 CCTV 
spurred continuous development in the international broadcasting market 
establishing broadcast centers (transmitting development centers) overseas. 
By the end of 2010, CCTV-9 channels were planned and the number of 
overseas dispatch bureaus reached around 50, along with establishing seven 
centers (Namgung and Song 2010). As part of the ongoing establishment of a 
new channel, CCTV-P, the Portuguese channel is expected to be launched in 
the near future. It is reasonable to speculate that the Chinese government is 
likely to use the colonial history between Macau and Portugal for promoting 
cooperation and exchanges with China and Portuguese-speaking countries 
(CCTV 2009d; CNTV 2014).  
CCTV has numerous bureaus to collect news and report from Asia to 
Africa (see Table 4.3). In the Asia-Pacific, bureaus are located in Australia, 
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, and India. In Europe there are 
bureaus in Belgium, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The London 
and Washington, D.C. bureaus have 12 reporters each, more than in any other 
bureaus. These worldwide bureaus demonstrate a wide distribution of CCTV 
channels in different regions. It corresponds with the number of the launches 
of different foreign language channels and centers in CCTV International 
initiatives. In addition, the channel is dedicated to establishing 70 more 
bureaus on a global stage to collect news and reports. 
 
                                                                
111 Four days later, the China Xinhua news TV network was launched and on January 1, 2010, 
the network started satellite broadcasting.  
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Table 4.3 CCTV’s Foreign Correspondents in Global Bureaus 
 




Hong Kong Hong Kong 8 
Macau Macau 2 
Taiwan Taipei 1 
Thailand Bangkok 2 
Japan Tokyo 2 
India New Delhi 2 
Europe 
(16) 
Belgium (EU) Brussels 2 
Germany Berlin 2 
France Paris 3 
Europe headquarters London 9 
Eurasia (2) Russia Moscow 2 
Australia 
(2) 
Australia Sydney 2 
America 
(17) 
United States (UN) New York 2 
United States Los Angeles 1 
America 
headquarters 
Washington, D.C. 12 




Brazil Rio de Janeiro 2 
Africa  
(4) 
Egypt Cairo 3 
South Africa Johannesburg 1 
Total   60 
 
Source: CCTV (N.d) and modified from Xiaoling Zhang 2011: 59. 
 
 
Developing CCTV International channels: From “Your window on China 
and the world” to “Your link to Asia” 
CCTV-9 (now CCTV News),112 with the slogan “China’s First English News 
Channel,” was launched on September 15, 2000. The name of the Channel 
was changed to CCTV News on April 26, 2010. It provides news and 
                                                                
112
 One reason why I keep both CCTV-9 and CCTV News is that my interviewees do mix them, 
as they do not necessarily know such changes. Also, the time they watched is often CCTV-9. 
More importantly, CCTV News may often mean news programs of other CCTV channels. In 
order to confuse with my informants’ wording, I keep it in this way.  
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information on China to a global audience. The channel has 45 million 
subscribers outside China,113 according to CCTV International Overview. 
Furthermore, “The English website is now handled by China Network 
Television (CNTV), a web streaming service of CCTV (CNTV 2010).” A recent 
development is CCTV News offering of two documentary channels. The 
channel has three broadcasting centers: Beijing, Nairobi (in October 2012), 
and Washington, D.C. (in November 2012) (Financial Times 2011; Kookmin 
Ilbo 2011). Along with CCTV International’s relaunch as CCTV News, the 
channel aimed to bolster its news-gathering abilities while voicing more 
“perspectives from China and Asia to the world”; its slogan is “Your link to 
Asia” (CCTV 2010b). CCTV Africa was launched in Kenya on January 11, 2012, 
and CCTV America began broadcasting on February 6, 2012. Dubai (CCTV 
Middle East), Sao Paulo (CCTV Latin America), and Moscow (CCTV Russia) 
have been selected for global studios (CCTV 2012). In the meantime, unlike 
other cases of CCTV International News launches, which are mostly on 
regional hubs, CCTV News was launched in Sri Lanka in 2010. Sri Lanka is 
chosen for possible South Asian audiences in the region. Perhaps, more 
importantly, it is a showcase not only having the channel but at the same 
time learning from China’s developmental experience (see CNTV 2013), 
which is in line with China’s model (see Chapter 3). Whereas foreign 
correspondents of CCTV dispatch to India, the channel has yet to enter the 
South Asian region. It could be seen as part of China’s global reach to launch 
                                                                
113 According to Mansuk Kang (2008: 28), CCTV-9’s overseas viewership household exceeds 
43.5 million households.  
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news satellite dishes or networks of CCTV News, but it also could be seen as 
CCTV’s future step to enter the South Asian market.  
 
Non-English channels: Reaching diverse audiences 
CCTV 4 (now known as CCTV-4 Chinese International [Zhongwen guoji]),114 in 
Mandarin, is the oldest among a series of CCTV International channels with 
an initial launch on October 1, 1992 (Y. Liu 2007: 69). It was established with 
a target audience primarily of overseas Chinese and “those who are 
interested in China,” (Brady 2008: 167). An overall reform of CCTV-4 was 
undertaken in January 2006. It started to broadcast its programs to Asia, 
Europe, and America (Y. Liu 2007: 69), with a slogan of “Transmitting 
Chinese civilization, Servicing to overseas Chinese” (Chuancheng Zhonghua 
wenming, fuwu quanqiu huaren) (Y. Liu 2007: 70). With such an expansion to 
reach different audiences, the Channel also highlights its engagement with 
America, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese mass media (G. Wang 2013). In 
mainland China, CCTV-4 is the channel which has the broadest range of 
coverage (Y. Liu 2007: 70). The 2012 statistics show that 171 countries have 
CCTV-4 channel coverage with around 52 million overseas subscribers. 
CCTV-4 became the choice of Chinese TV Channel for many overseas 
audiences (G. Wang 2013: 22). 
As mentioned earlier, to extend its influence and to shift public 
opinion in the international arena, CCTV channels in other foreign languages 
                                                                
114 CCTV-4 was renamed as CCTV-4 Chinese International (Zhongwen guoji) in 2011. 
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were also established. CCTV E & F, the Spanish and French channels, 
respectively, were launched on October 1, 2004. Three years later, on October 
1, 2007, they were relaunched as two separate channels based on language: 
CCTV E, the Spanish channel, and CCTV F, the French channel. With an aim of 
reaching 300 million people in 22 Arab countries and to strengthen 
communication and understanding between China and these countries in the 
Middle East, North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region, the CCTV International 
Arabic channel was launched on July 25, 2009 (CCTV 2009a). Celebrating the 
60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Russia, CCTV 
International Russia was launched on September 10, 2009 (CCTV 2009b).  
All in all, then, the international audience constituencies on the global 
stage have continued to expand. Till 2012, CCTV’s international development 
has set more goals in targeting the expansion of seven more languages and 
11 more channels.  
 
“Local” reception of CCTV International and CCTV-4 
CCTV’s numerous channels have some core programs in common but also 
their own programming targeted on regional audiences and specific language 
communities. CCTV-4 in Asia, Europe, and the Americas has different 
versions of programming, and prime time zones are different from region to 
region. Likewise, CCTV-4 and CCTV International are broadcasted and 
targeted to a wide range of audiences worldwide.  
The popularity of CCTV International among local Chinese people and 
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Taiwanese people deserves some comments. Information on local and 
Taiwanese audience, which is not the focus of this chapter, is only available in 
Chinese Yearbooks;115 such corresponding information on other types of 
audiences is not publically available.  
A local Chinese audience trend, as a point of reference, can be found 
from the weekly audience rating and trends of the CCTV-News English 
Channel of 2011. The rating of 2011 is basically consistent with that of 2010. 
The sixth week and twelfth week of the audience rating, which show almost 
the same results as each other, are the highest in 2011. The audience rating of 
the CCTV-News English Channel is stable for each day from morning to 
evening. The audience rating of a time zone between 7 pm to 8 pm is slightly 
higher than times such as morning and afternoon (2012 China Radio and TV 
Yearbook 2012: 275). 
 
 
Figure 4.6 CCTV-4 Audience Rate: By the Hour 
(CCTV-4 shoushilv fenshi zoushitu) 
                                                                
115 One of the biggest audience rating companies in China, CSM, even does not release such 





Source: Su, Furui from CCTV (G. Wang 2013: 23). 
 
 
Reaching and engaging with the Taiwanese audience is another important 
task of CCTV-4. The position of Taiwan in the Chinese all industrial sectors is 
rather peculiar due to its political relations with China and this is reflected in 
the way CCTV-4 is treated (Lee 2012a; Lee 2012c). The Annual Yearbooks of 
CCTV and China Radio & TV Yearbooks indicate that CCTV-4 has customized 
programs for and in Taiwan. For example, TV dramas in Hokkien, which were 
firstly made by the CCTV international broadcasting center (CCTV haiwai 
chuanbo zhongxin), were broadcasted in 2011 (2012 China Radio and TV 
Yearbook 2012: 47).  
Beyond the Chinese audience, CCTV’s aim is to develop into becoming 
the best TV station and media in the world (Z. Lin 2010: 53). This ambition 
resonates with former president Hu Jintao’s letter in celebrating the 50th year 
of the opening CCTV, “Transforming CCTV as the first-class international 
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media which has a strong influence with an advanced technology, 
information and a broader coverage (of audience) (Hu 2008 in Li and Wu 
2008).” Similarly, Jiang Zemin at the same event advocated, “Make CCTV as an 
influential news media at the world level (Jiang 2008 in Li and Wu 2008).”  
Reflecting on these circumstances, this chapter has broadened the 
understanding of a “diverse” range of possible CCTV audiences.116 
 
Producing CCTV’s internet platform: CNTV 
As a national web-based TV broadcaster officially launched on December28, 
2009, China Network Television (CNTV) provides users with a globalized, 
multilingual, and multi-terminal public webcast service platform. CNTV 
International offers five foreign language services (English, French, Spanish, 
Russian, and Arabic). CNTV International offers the United Nation’s 
languages, six local language services (Chinese, Mongolian in Mongol Script, 
Tibetan, Kazakh, Uyghur, and Chaoxian language)117 in tandem with CNTV. 
They also provide “viewers with a host of news and feature programs from 
China National Television’s foreign channels (CNTV 2010).” CNTV, CCTV 
Internet broadcasting, recently for the first time advertised to recruit Korean 
announcers for the CNTV Korean channel. This CNTV Korean channel is 
commissioned and managed by a Heilongjiang Newspaper, a Korean-Chinese 
media investment, in Ha’erbin (WRDP 2012). Given that the CNTV Korean 
                                                                
116 However, it is acknowledged that my own fieldwork data may not be “comprehensive,” as 
the research was conducted by a single researcher. What may limit my research and future 
research agendas are discussed in Chapter 8.  
117 Chaoxian language (chosun) is a language which is spoken by ethnic Koreans in China. 
This is a variation of Korean language and slightly different from Korean language.  
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channel is associated with the Korean-Chinese media, it is important to note 
that foreign nationals are to be hired rather than finding Korean-Chinese 
nationals. The target audience is South Korean netizens and Koreans 
overseas: The main Korean users will be high-ranking officials, research 
institutes, Chinese international students in Korea, and Korean-Chinese in 
Korea. The main China-based users are expected to be Koreans and Korean 
international students in China, Chinese who learn Korean, and Korean-
Chinese. Two phases have been outlined. First, CCTV news and 
documentaries in Chinese will be translated and broadcast in Korean. 
Second, after the successful establishment of the Korean broadcasting 
station, it will establish a studio in Korea to self-produce programs. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has explored China’s soft power policy through its “going global” 
strategy. Commercialized TV and state-coordinated news media channels 
have been highlighted and assessed in the context of this strategy. Research 
findings have indicated that the export of Chinese media commodities to 
South Korea and Japan is rather difficult. This reveals weaknesses in China’s 
soft power approach to its “going global” policy when dealing with these two 
countries. The cultural “trade deficit,” which China experiences in particular 
with South Korea, is likely to make it difficult for China to exercise its soft 
power policy there. The following chapter deals with the penetration of the 





The Media Markets in the Receiving Countries of China’s Soft 
Power 
 
This chapter explores the ways in which the local media markets play a 
critical role in facilitating the penetration of Chinese TV series. Processes of 
production, distribution, circulation, and consumption constitute the media 
market for media products (Peterson 1976: 672). The operation of the media 
market is constrained by regulations pertaining to the import and export of 
foreign products. Both state and private actors are involved in regulating the 
flow of foreign media products into domestic media markets. Some 
governments specifically provide regulations for the importing of such 
products. Others do not necessarily offer guidelines, allowing media 
organizations and professionals to control such flows.  
Situating South Korea and Japan as two different receiving markets of 
Chinese soft power, this chapter illuminates commonalities and differences 
involved in the process of importing Chinese products into these two 
countries (see Figure 5.1). The ways in which the media market is structured 
and the practices of media professionals in South Korea and Japan in 
importing Chinese media products can be analyzed as follows. The South 
Korean media market is nationalistic and protective towards foreign media 
players. One of the outstanding examples is the screen quota system which 
designates the number of Korean films to be shown each year. Despite this, 
Korean media professionals are rather willing to embrace “Chinese” media 
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products largely into their cable TV market. Such practices are in part due to 
the lingering popularity of Hong Kong media products in the 1980s and early 
1990s (H.S. Lee 2006), although media products from Hong Kong are less 
imported in recent years (see 5.3A, 5.3B, 5.4A, 5.4B). Also, this is a result of 
the economic rise of China, which has made South Koreans more open to 
learning the Chinese language and culture through such products.  
Despite this, Korean media professionals are rather willing to embrace 
“Chinese” media products largely into their cable TV market. Such practices 
are in part due to the lingering popularity of Hong Kong media products in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, although media products from Hong Kong are less 
imported in recent years. Also, this is a result of the economic rise of China, 
which has made South Koreans more open to learning the Chinese language 
and culture through such products.  
In contrast, the Japanese market does not usually show nationalistic 
sentiments in controlling the import of foreign media products except for the 
recent cases of Korean media products. However, Japanese media 
professionals are not open to importing Chinese media products but more 
willing to import South Korean products which appeals to Japanese 
consumers. In these two countries, there is a hierarchy in placing and 
importing media products from specific countries of origin that will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
Shaping media markets in the receiving countries  
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Media practitioners, i.e. producers and managers who work for media-related 
organizations, are crucial actors in the circuit of production and distribution 
of media products.118 They act as gatekeepers and cultural intermediaries 
about what to bring into the media market, depending on their taste and 
their companies’ guidelines. Gate-keeping refers to “the process by which a 
relatively small number of people control what material eventually reaches 
the audience” (Schaefer 2002: 153). “Cultural intermediaries,” which is a 
term coined by Pierre Bourdieu (1984), describe those involved in “the work 
of mediation in commercial cultural fields” (Bourdieu 1984). Their roles are 
reflections of accommodating market demands and market structures 
(Edwards 2012; Moor 2012; Smith Maguire and Matthews 2012). This can be 
also found in other types of cultural markets such as news media, arts worlds 
(Becker 1982), and the fashion industry (Mears 2011). They frame issues and 
impact society and consumers (Smith Maguire and Mattews 2012: 554).  
 
Figure 5.1 The Soft Power Mechanism of the Media Markets 




                                                                
118  This is redefined as producers at broadcasting stations, freelancers (producers, 






5.1 The dual media market in South Korea 
In order to understand the Chinese soft power field vis-à-vis media products, 
the dual Korean media market structures will be examined with special 
reference to what gets prioritized by terrestrial and cable stations. Terrestrial 
(Jisangpa) TV, Cable TV, Satellite TV (Wiseong bangsong), and Program 
Providers (Bangsong chaeneol saeopja), which have own channels in Cable TV 
or Satellite TV to produce products and programming and to give the 
programs to System Operator (SO) or Satellite TV providers, are key players 
in the Korean broadcasting system (see Figure 5.2). Terrestrial stations have 
started doing vertical integration by launching affiliated PP channels 
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(Jisangpa gyeyeol pp chaeneol), which have similar characteristics to cable 
channels. As a result (S.-W. Lee and C. Kim 2011), Korean Broadcasting 
Station (KBS) has KBSN; Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC) has MBC 
Plus media, MBC Sports, and the local MBC Superstation; while Seoul 
Broadcasting System (SBS) has SBS Golf, SBS Sports, SBS Plus, SBS Eplus, and 
SBS Business network (Korean Communications Commission119 2011: 30). 
For dramas all three broadcasting stations have established cable television 
stations; the affiliates are KBS N, KBS Media, MBC Dramanet and SBS 
Dramaplus. Like most cable stations, these TV stations seek profit through 
diverse advertising and subsidies from their parent companies.   
 
Figure 5.2 The Current Situation of Korean Broadcasting 
 
 
Source: Korean Communications Commission (2011: 3). 
 
Cable stations in South Korea generally broadcast foreign programs to some 
extent, although some are still committed to delivering mainly Korean 
programs. Overseas programs that are broadcast by cable stations include 
American dramas, American movies, Asian movies, Asian dramas, animation, 
                                                                
119  The English name of Bangsong Tongshin Wiewonhoe is Korea Communications 
Commission. However, it is not grammatically correct and it should be read as “Korean 
Communications Commission.” Thus, the latter is used throughout the thesis.  
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documentaries, fashion programs, and sports.120 On the Asian drama and 
movies channels, some deliver only Chinese programs, unlike other foreign 
products that rarely have such specialized channels. Chinese dramas and 
Hong Kong action movies are the two core genres.  
PRC121 Chinese dramas (which are predominantly historical), Hong 
Kong, Muhyeop (martial arts), Taiwanese dramas, and trendy dramas are 
usually available on Korean cable channels.122 The Jisangpa stations, on the 
other hand, occasionally, or during public holidays, air popular movies from 
Hong Kong and Hollywood. They also broadcast dramas and films co-
produced by a South Korean TV station and a foreign station. Examples of the 
former are Huangfeihong (Hwangbihong),123 and Jackie Chan movies. Co-
produced dramas and films are usually made by and shown in Fuji TV and 
KBS. Hong Kong movies produced in the 1980s and 1990s were very popular 
in South Korea and this is why TV stations have had to broadcast them; they 
are also relatively cheap to import. On KBS Baoqingtian (Pocheongcheon), 
which was broadcast in the 1990s, was very popular regardless of the 
                                                                
120 Here television channels that are available in South Korea through a linear method are 
not included. A linear service is one in which program providers determine the program 
scheduling. A non-linear service is one where program providers provide catalogues and 
viewers decide viewing time based on the catalogues. A linear method prevails on satellite or 
foreign channels, which directly broadcast from a source country to other countries. CCTV 
and TVB are the examples of a linear service.  
121 Throughout this chapter, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and China are used 
interchangeably to indicate China, without any specific connotation. Korea stands for South 
Korea.  
122 TVB has started to broaden its business to South Korea recently, where the company uses 
a linear method to broadcast the programs. CJ Entertainment, which has many different 
cable channels, has now moved towards China. 
123 The names of the dramas and movies mentioned in this chapter are as they are used by 
informants. If the names are in Korean, the English titles of these programs are provided. 
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viewers’ age or gender.124 On the same station, Genghis Khan (Jinggiskan) 
was aired in 2007 (KBS N.d), which was produced in Inner Mongolia due to 
the relevance of the topic. Figure 5.3A and 5.3B and Figure 5.4A and 5.4B 
show the current flows of export125-and-import TV series among terrestrial 
and cable TV stations. Data from 2003 and 2011 is used to track a trend and 
understand the dynamics of imported major Asian programs in South Korea 
by country.126  
Hong Kong and Taiwan are kept as separate categories in order to 
follow classification categories in the original data from the Korean 
Broadcasting Commission’s Annual Reports. Moreover, it is supported by my 
interviewees’ responses (see Chapter 6).  
In a nutshell, Figure 5.3A describes the number and value of imported 
TV drama in the Korean Terrestrial TV market. This implies that except for 
the years mentioned (2003, 2004, 2007, and 2012) from 2003 to 2012, these 
Asian players are not visible in Terrestrial TV. However, Figure 5.4A shows 
that that of in the cable TV market in South Korea. As argued earlier, 
terrestrial and cable TV markets do have different preferences and 
mechanisms to import foreign, Chinese TV programs to the Korean 
mediasphere. Thus, these two figures are not contradictory. The reason why 
these two markets operate or respond differently to foreign programs is 
largely because terrestrial TV markets are considered rather protective 
                                                                
124 For the response in relation to this, see Chapter 6.  
125 Given that the aim and focus of this chapter is to explore imported Chinese (foreign) TV 
series, not exported South Korean dramas, the latter are not included here.  
126 The annual report is available from 2002 which includes 2001; however, due to the lack 
of the corresponding data, the data for 2001 is not included.  
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towards its local Korean programs, hence, they are rather nationalistic. 
 
Figure 5.3A The Number and Value of Imported TV Drama in the South 






Source: Annual data from Korean Communications Commission. 
Note: I excluded the corresponding data for 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 
due to the lack of the existence of imported TV series from Japan, China, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan.  
 
 
                                                                
127 For detailed information see the following table (Terrestrial TV) 
 
Imported TV series (Episode) 
  
Imported TV series (1,000 USD) 
  
 
Japan China Hong Kong Taiwan US Japan China Hong Kong Taiwan US 
 
2003 23 94 0 49 243 52 293 0 102 601 
 
2004 61 0 0 0 146 151 0 0 0 759 
 
2005 0 0 0 0 142 0 0 0 0 440 
 
2006 0 0 0 0 184 0 0 0 0 744 
 
2007 0 31 0 0 306 0 98 0 0 1,409 
 
2008 0 0 0 0 262 0 0 0 0 853 
 
2009 0 0 0 0 176 0 0 0 0 633 
 
2010 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 123 
 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 5.3B The Number and Value of Imported TV Drama in the South 








Figure 5.4A The Number and Value of Imported TV Drama in the South 




                                                                
128 For detailed information, see the following table. 
Cable TV Imported TV series (Episode) 
  
Imported TV series (1,000 USD) 
 
 
Japan China Hong Kong Taiwan US Japan China Hong Kong Taiwan US 
2003 77 453 0 N.A. 331 220 320 0 N.A. 3,414 
2004 564 89 128 139 5,427 1,283 78 89 47 9,683 
2005 419 973 268 139 1,013 1,603 1,016 201 135 1,503 
2006 484 577 187 218 2,371 869 310 113 204 3,751 
2007 437 533 30 153 2,803 1,310 670 13 90 10,791 
2008 207 477 38 0 2,235 802 453 34 0 20,839 
2009 357 496 0 84 2,691 917 727 0 90 5,599 
2010 570 184 296 0 4,863 1,450 274 629 0 24,370 
2011 337 209 321 0 3,728 862 325 612 0 15,813 






























Figure 5.4B The Number and Value of Imported TV Drama in the South 



















Japan China Hong 
Kong 
Taiwan Japan China Hong 
Kong 
Taiwan 



















2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Imported TV series (Episode) US Imported TV series (1,000 USD) US 
111 
 
series trade in the South Korean market. The United States has always been 
by far the largest and the most expensive import source among other major 
players in both terrestrial and cable TV129 channels in South Korea. For 
example, in 2007 31 Chinese episodes (98,000 USD) were imported while 
306 American episodes (1,409,000 USD) were imported. More recently in 
2010, 24 episodes of American TV series were imported by terrestrial TV at a 
cost of 6,000 USD per episode, a much higher price than series from China or 
other Asian countries (see Figure 5.3A and Figure 5.3B).  
In contrast to American TV series, products from major Asian media 
players, Japan, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, were not imported into the 
terrestrial South Korean market from 2005 to 2012. The only exception 
during these years was a Chinese TV series Genghis Khan (Jinggiskan) in 2007. 
TV series from China and Hong Kong in these years were substantially 
imported to the South Korean cable TV channels. In particular, over the four 
year between 2005 and 2009, a large number of Chinese TV drama episodes 
were imported. However, similarly to the US case, Japanese TV series are set 
at the higher price than Chinese ones. One of the extreme examples is found 
                                                                
129 On a different note, the number of screenings of films and their market share in Seoul, 
from China (including Hong Kong) which were shown in cinemas, are as follows: In 1998, 20, 
0.8%; In 1999, 19, 2.2%; In 2000, 33, 3.4%; In 2001, 14, 0.9%, In 2002, 6, 1.4%; In 2003, 10, 
2.5%; In 2004, 9, 1.7%; In 2005, 3, 2.3%; In 2006, 12, 1.3%; In 2007, 13, 1%; In 2008, 16, 
2.9%; In 2009, 15, 2% and in 2010, 14, 1.4%. Screenings and first runs are different. The 
number of films and their market share in South Korea, from China (including Hong Kong) 
which were shown in cinemas, are as follows: In 2011, 17, 0.3%, in 2012, 30, 0.3%. It is noted 
that, “For several years now, the total market share of Korean and US films has been about 95 
percent. Now, films from countries other than Korea and the US films should be defined as 
minority films. In particular, 53 Europe films are shown in the film theaters, and the market 
share is less than 1 percent. This is contrast with that of the situation of Chinese and 
Japanese films where share a certain level of a market share,” according to M. Kim and D. Do 
(2006: 3).  
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in 2006 when 484 Japanese episodes were 86,900 USD, while 577 Chinese 
episodes cost 31,000 USD.  
Chinese TV series appear more frequently on South Korean cable TV 
than Japanese dramas because they are cheaper to import. Japanese 
programs remain second in the cultural trade in the South Korean market. 
South Korea’s gradual open-door policy to Japanese popular culture in the 
mid-1990s130 still constrains the import of Japanese products, but Japanese 
animation is the largest group of imported programs airing on Korean cable 
TVs. The number of imported animations from Japan is substantially larger 
than the combined figure of the rest of Asia as a whole.  
Annual data from Korean Broadcasting Commission shows American 
programs are the most frequently imported programs on both terrestrial and 
cable stations of South Korea. Asian programs are less frequently imported.  
Terrestrial TV markets do not import these Asian dramas but they 
can be found on cable TV.  
Imported programs on cable TVs had been predominantly from the 
                                                                
130 South Korea opened to importing Japanese popular culture ca. 1997. See Yasuhiro Maeda, 
2005. “The Historical Meaning of R.O.K. President Kim Dae-jung’s Policy for Japanese Popular 
Culture: From Anti-Japanese Feelings to be Adoption of Multiculturism (sic).” Otsuma 
Women’s University Annual Report (Humanities and Social Sciences) 37: 278-290, in Japanese; 
Jang, Yong-gul, 2002. “Negative Perceptions towards accepting Japanese Popular Culture: 
Manga and Anime.” Educational Theory and Practice 12(1): 208-219, in Korean; Jang, Yong-
gul, 2006. “A Study on the Media Nationalism in the Process of Accepting Japanese Popular 
Culture.” Japanese Language Education 37: 235-260, in Korean; Korea Cultural Policy 
Developmental Institute (now, Korea Culture and Tourism Institute). 2003. Japanese Popular 
Culture Opening: An Analysis of Influence and Plan, in Korean.]; Korea Cultural Policy 
Developmental Institute (now, Korea Culture and Tourism Institute). 1994. Reactions for 
Japanese Popular Culture Opening, in Korean; Kuroda, Katsuhiro (trans. Kang Dong-ho). 1998. 
“Prohibition and Opening of Japanese Popular Culture.” Japanese Studies 5: 3-28, in 
Japanese/Korean; Park, Jo-Won. 2006. “An Analysis of the Impacts of Import Liberalization of 
Japanese Pop Culture.” Studies on Cultural Trade 6(1): 121-139, in Korean. 
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United States, followed by China, Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, throughout 
years of 2003 and 2011, except for 2004, 2010, 2011, and 2012.    
 
5.2 The politics of importing Chinese media products to South Korea 
Importing Chinese programs into South Korea entails entangling with 
multiple institutions at each step in the process, ranging from regulation and 
decision-making to programming. The various actors in the process are 
interlinked. The circumstances under which the importing of Chinese 
programs is facilitated will now be considered. 
 
The regulatory scene  
The regulatory regimes and (in)visible barriers that foreign media products 
might encounter in the process of being imported into the South Korean 
market have two dimensions: state-coordinated regulation and market 
regulation.131 The government and/or the media institutions regard foreign 
media programs as damaging to their local products. Censorship, one of the 
main regulatory mechanisms in the process of state regulation, deals with 
characteristics of programs according to standards set by the state or media 
organizations. This plays a role in accommodating “political correctness” and 
the values of the society. The state functions and acts as a regulator of 
                                                                
131 Previous works on regulation investigated the state’s role in society with regard to 
reinforcing media. The discussion is often devoted to a single country in the context of Asia, 
such as Japan’s response to regulation (OECD 1999; Watanabe 2012), Hong Kong (Wu and 
Leung 2008), and Taiwan (Chou and Liu 2006). Conversely, a general discussion in this area 
often goes to law (Botero 2004; Chen 2007; Cooney 2012; Farmer 2009; Walden 2009; Yung 
2004) or other issues from a comparative angle (Kwak 1999, 2007; Liu 1999; Wu et al. 2011; 
Yung 2004).  
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television broadcasting in Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea (Kwak 1999).  
The media market regulates the flow of foreign media products by 
erecting structural barriers. A market is established on the basis of 
competition and generating profits. In the current market situation 
terrestrial stations have more resources and produce their own programs, 
which often air for a longer time domestically and could be sold to cable TV 
channels. They can also potentially be exported to foreign markets. 
Terrestrial TV channels thus have more flexible financial management, 
substantial audiences, and better sources of advertising than cable channels. 
As argued earlier, it is not common for terrestrial stations to import foreign 
programs or other TV stations’ programs. In contrast, cable stations have 
smaller audience sizes and often have insufficient advertising sponsors. In 
order to escape running a deficit, cable stations are keen on maximizing 
profits by broadcasting a large number of cheap programs. The market 
structure, as shown in Figures 5.3A, 5.3B, 5.4A, and 5.4B, present double 
barriers for non-Western products to enter the South Korean market. The 
established hierarchy of foreign media products in terms of to where, how 
often, and how many can be imported make it difficult for Chinese programs 
to enter the South Korean market. The dominant Western products—from 
the US and the UK—also shape the audience’s taste preferences about the 
types of products to import. 
As mentioned, media practitioners play an important role in bringing 
foreign media products into the South Korean media market. At the 
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individual level, this can be analyzed in two ways. First, individual 
gatekeepers as “early adaptors” “help trigger the critical mass when they 
adopt an innovation. They put their stamp of approval on a new idea by 
adopting it” (Rogers 2003: 283). KM9132 mentioned, “I personally like to 
engage with historical dramas. Given that my company is intended to reach 
those who want to consume Asian media products, I mostly deal with Chinese 
products and Japanese products too. In addition, as I am the only person who 
manages this importation works in my company, so I have room for what to 
choose and what to import.” The producer who works for the Asian Media 
Network in South Korea says that she is flexible in choosing products if they 
fall within the boundary of “Asia.” Second, the media practitioner’s personal 
taste is important. The senior practitioners often play a role in introducing 
“new” and “state-of-the art” cultures with the import cultural products to 
their society. However, they have to do this by giving due considerations not 
to cross the sensitive line which may provoke national sentiments.  
 
The distribution  
The routes for foreign media coming into South Korea are as follows: First, 
“official” occasions, such as film and television festivals, are the main events 
for trading media products. During festivals, dramas and movies are 
showcased either openly or at the fringe of the festival location. The booths in 
the festivals are places to meet people from the media where they can discuss 
                                                                
132 Interview with a South Korean producer, March 18, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
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and introduce basic information about the programs. Second, managers of 
stations exchange their products with each other without brokers or through 
unofficial channels where a broadcasting station uses a contact’s name to sell 
the product and do not have to pay a commission or introduction fee. KM5,133 
a Korean TV producer said, “As my company is one of the biggest TV network 
companies in South Korea, it is rather easier for us to find and use a 
connection to exchange our in-house produced programs.” He added, 
“Recently I went to Eastern Europe to discuss the selling of “Kyebaek”134 
which I directed. A government official was with us; it seems the government 
has great interest in this kind of activity. The stations in Europe contacted us, 
so that’s how we got the connection.” The present analysis suggests that such 
direct transaction is related to the expansion of departments135 in TV stations 
where the key business can be done in-house. A similar practice is found with 
Chinese programs imported to the South Korean market.  
Third are exchanges of the products by a “broker” (junggaein; an 
agent). This is considered the “traditional” transaction mode that was used 
mostly in the 1980s and 1990s, but less frequently today. KM1,136 who 
                                                                
133 Interview with a South Korean producer, January 25, 2012, Ilsan, South Korea. In relation 
to South Korea’s cultural export, he also mentioned, “With the unexpected success of the 
Korean wave, many Korean programs have been exported, and the number of importing 
countries of Korean programs has enormously expanded.” In 2001 the exported value of 
Korean terrestrial TV programs was 1090 thousand USD (12709 episodes). In 2012 it 
increased to 1.53 billion USD (55,758 episodes). In 2001 the exported value of Korean cable 
TV programs was 300 thousand USD (481 episodes). In 2012 the exported value of Korean 
cable TV programs was increased to 0.26 billion USD (12,048 episodes). For detailed 
information, see annual data (2002-2013) from Korean Broadcasting Commission.  
134 This is the title of a Korean drama. 
135 This related matter is often handled by the Global Business Department, although the 
actual name can vary. 
136 Interview with a South Korean producer, December 20, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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worked for a producer in Hong Kong, dealing mainly with Chinese and Hong 
Kong products for the South Korean market, explained: “That is why people 
like me have less chance to do business now. Nowadays, TV stations have the 
expertise or a special department to manage this issue; they are smart, and 
they do not give the opportunity for us to make money.” Others do their 
business on a “freelance” basis; transactions are worked through the social 
network of the person who has experience in distribution. These days those 
who know the import and export routes and have the products and 
information and approach directly TV stations to sell the products, using 
their existing social networks to maintain and rebuilt such business. Prior to 
the development of in-house departments, they benefited from finding the 
niche market. As the more institutionalized version of media product 
exchange becomes established, the role of brokers as cultural intermediaries 
with more face-to-face business format is rather limited. 
In South Korea producers and buyers are not clearly distinguishable. 
In TV stations, producers, who are referred to as “PD,” entered the company 
through open recruitment and are equivalent to directors and assistant 
directors of films. In production companies, producers are not the ones who 
direct or shoot products, but have more managerial roles. Thus, they are 
often referred to as “production producers” (jejak pidi in Korean, equivalent 
to zhipian in the Chinese media industry). Buyers can be media professionals 
such as producers or managers in TV stations, production companies, or 
freelance. To avoid confusion, for the purpose of the media products 
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exchange and trade, I use “buyers” for those who play an important role in 
buying and selling media products. They often include producers. 
In the case of South Korean buyers, the television buyers, as Kuipers 
noted, “are transnational cultural intermediaries, mediating between 
producers and consumers and transnational and national fields” (Kuipers 
2012: 582).137 The South Korean buyers create their own identity by 
selecting products according to their standards and tastes. They also 
introduce new foreign products and formats. Converting foreign formats to 
localized and customized programs is now frequent. For instance, Superstar K 
is a revamped version of American Idols (Cha and Park 2012: 528). Dr. Jin is a 
Korean re-make version of a Japanese drama with the same title. By doing so, 
the buyers become transnational professionals, operating within processes of 
globalization.138  
On the one hand, the program providers’ (TV stations) may prefer a 
station-to-station exchange format. In such cases, the companies tend to have 
an in-house division of doing program exchanges. However, this is only 
possible when the two stations have a “long” history of exchanges. On the 
other hand, for the distribution companies’ (who get contracts), this process 
often brings in parties who produce and deliver products (i.e., production 
companies), parties who sells products (i.e., the seller) and parties who 
                                                                
137 “Like all cultural intermediaries, television buyers mediate between culture and economy, 
and consumption and production (Bourdieu 1984; Negus 2002). Growing transnational 
cultural flows require selection, negotiation and translation by a new class of transnational 
professionals” (Ibid.). 




negotiates and manages contracts together.  
The three types of parties often overlap with each other. For instance, 
the CJ corporation,139 which has a same root as Samsung and is linked by 
family in that the leaders of these two groups are from the same family,140 has 
a big entertainment enterprise, CJ Entertainment and Media, and buys and 
sells in a type of a “package” that has a combination of Program A and B, and 
other audiovisual products such as DVD, and VCD.  
 
Media professionals embracing Chinese media programs in South Korea 
Some factors that are considered by media markets and professionals in the 
course of importing Chinese programs are common in the terrestrial and 
cable TV stations, while others are contingent on the distinctive 
characteristics and structures of each market. Media practitioners at their 
respective companies and fields vary in their procedures for selection pre-, 
during, and post-importation of such programs.  
In searching for foreign programs to import, buying and transferring 
copyrights becomes important. As KM1141 commented, “Phoenix TV has 
almost all the Hong Kong programs’ copyrights (pangwon) that were popular 
in the 1980s and 1990s to the best of my knowledge. They are sold in ten to 
20 programs as a package. As part of such packages, not only are these 
programs supposed to appear on TV but, more importantly, other additional 
                                                                
139 See Lee (2012b). 
140 Lee Kun-Hee is the CEO of Samsung and his brother, Lee Maeng-Hee, is the former CEO of 
CJ.  
141 Interview with a South Korean producer, December 20, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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forms (such as DVDs and VCDs) are included and thus appear on the market. 
However, since VCDs and DVDs are in small demand in South Korea, contrary 
to the Japanese situation, Korean media producers do not want to buy a full 
package, but rather purchase as a rearranged package.” Due to the relatively 
lax intellectual property rights and the development of the internet 
(including certain downloading sites) in South Korea, almost nobody 
purchases those products. The occasional purchases are for the collecting of 
goods of value (sojang gachi)—e.g., limited editions, famous artists, and rare 
items—or for educational purposes—showing them in class or during 
lectures. 
To accommodate the South Korean audience, terrestrial stations dub 
most of the foreign media products; subtitles or sign language are also 
provided for the hearing-impaired. Dubbing is a common practice for all type 
of programs in the main three broadcasting stations—KBS, MBC and SBS. 
KM4,142 a producer in KBSN, a cable station related to KBS, said, “We are a 
public broadcasting station. We, thus, usually dub.” For instance, weekly 
movies (jumal myeonghwa) and special movies for holidays (seolnal tekseon 
yeonghwa) are also dubbed. More recently, KBS imported two Chinese TV 
series based on historical novels—The Three Kingdoms (samgukji) in 2012 
with 95 episodes and The King’s Wars (Chohanji) in 2013 with 80 episodes. 
Both series are dubbed into Korean. 
In contrast, most of the foreign media programs on cable TV are not 
                                                                
142 Interview with a South Korean TV producer, January 19, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
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dubbed, but subtitled. Cable stations have a small target audience that 
subscribes to their services; dubbing would raise the operating budget, 
affecting profits. KM4,143 in answer to the question about the usual pattern 
and number of viewers, said: “For cable TV stations, profit is mostly from 
advertisements. Thus viewer ratings are not that important for them. Of 
course, in order to get some advertisements, the programs need to have some 
“ideal” average viewer ratings, but if the programs or the stations have some 
potential to attract advertisements, then the viewer ratings turn out not to be 
that important.” It’s clear, then, viewer rating may not be the most important 
factor in importing Chinese programs to the South Korean media market. It 
should be noted that recently Junghwa TV of South Korea offered Chinese-
Korean subtitling simultaneously as a way to let the audience experience 
learning Chinese while watching TV dramas.144   
Media practitioners are not only aware of the local tastes but more 
importantly they also “produce” some local preferences by bringing 
international, global or foreign elements that are in fashion in Western 
countries (usually) or advanced countries, such as Japan, into their 
productions. “We clandestinely used some elements of Japanese media 
formats such as plots and characters. South Korean media practitioners think 
Japanese culture is close to our [Korean] culture, but due to the former 
                                                                
143 Interview with a South Korean TV producer, January 19, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
144  Junghwa TV blog. Retrieved January 29, 2013 
(http://www.interest.me/content/origin/224779). This is a blog that is operated by 
Junghwa TV. “Junghwa TV not only provides historical or wuxia big programs, but we also 
provide trendy dramas which were popular in China and Taiwan. This helps you learn 
practical, usable, conversational expressions.” As one of the largest importers of Chinese 
programs in South Korea, Junghwa TV is worth further investigation in future. 
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colonial relation, we could not openly talk about the fact that we are open to 
or like the Japanese culture and products,” according to KM3.145 Disputes 
over oscillating lines between being copied (or copying) and original were 
common between South Korea and Japan in 1990s and between China and 
Japan in 2000s.146 In the process of copying the formats and contents of the 
Japanese programs illegally, local elements were reflected in newly generated 
products based on the Japanese programs. Here, the producers function as a 
group of people that cater to local tastes, creating more content in the 
process.  
Program scheduling is important, particularly after the import of 
foreign programs. First, Special occasions and foreign programs: As 
mentioned earlier, South Korean terrestrial TV stations generally air 
American programs147 not Chinese ones; however, some Chinese movies are 
screened on terrestrial TV stations on special occasions like national holidays. 
During the Lunar New Year and chuseok, TV stations have a “package” only 
for these days. The package includes entertainment, variety shows, dramas 
(mostly for old or once very popular Korean dramas/films, co-production 
dramas), foreign films that are rated very highly (such as those nominated at 
international film festivals), and documentaries. 
                                                                
145 Interview with a South Korean TV producer, January 4, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
146 It is also noted that recent changes in practices from copying to buying formats are 
important. Recent programs like “X factor,” “Britain’s Got Talent,” and dramas are examples. 
A recent Chinese TV drama Home Temptation (Huijia de youhuo) made in 2011 used the 
basic format of a South Korean drama Wife’s Temptation (Qizi de youhuo) by Seoul 
Broadcasting Station.  
147 In this sentence, American programs, which are the most popular foreign programs both 
in terrestrial and cable TV stations, serve as a reference point.  
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On cable TV stations, American, Chinese, and Japanese programs are 
the three largest groups of programs; 50 percent or more of all the imported 
programs are from the US. This clearly shows and assumes that a 
hierarchical structure in which American programs are preferred, a 
consequence of their popularity and usual high quality.  
Although not the most popular foreign media programs, Chinese 
programs are imported to South Korea due to their cultural and historical 
proximity. In the 1980s, when the Hong Kong film industry swept over Asia, 
many Hong Kong films and TV dramas were available in South Korea not only 
on terrestrial TV stations, but also in video rental shops. Along with the 
popularity of pop-cultural products, Hong Kong muhyeop (wuxia) novels 
were also widely read (see Chapter 6). On the legendary status of Hong Kong, 
a South Korean producer, KM1, who worked in Hong Kong for many years 
responded, “Pocheongcheon (Justice Pao), Taiwan TV series, and Chinese 
movies and dramas were often available at terrestrial stations, whereas some 
are still shown by terrestrial stations though less frequently. Except for 
Pocheongcheon, which was successful during the time, most of the 
“Chinese”—including Hong Kong and Taiwan—programs are cheap to buy 
and easy to show on TV, due to its numerous episodes; thus they are regarded 
as a “replacement” and “substitute” (dachaejae) for other programs.”  
One of the important practical considerations in the media industry 
is meeting budgets. Chinese products are considered “competitive” not in 
quality but in price, which allows them to used for “filling a space” in the 
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market and TV schedules. KM4 commented, “Chinese programs function as 
substitutes because they are the best value for money—cheap, but with bulky 
episodes.”148 KM4149 argued, “Chinese programs do not always vouch for 
good quality. However, the lower quality may give us a benefit. What I mean 
by that is as they are not of good quality, you can buy them at a lower and 
reasonable price.” He added, “We need to at least wait for at least a few years 
to get Chinese programs of better quality.” This is the prevailing feeling of 
both for producers and audiences in South Korea, given Chinese industrial 
development and current situation.  
In principle, producers of South Korean TV stations assume that they 
need to import better quality of products that are beneficial150 to the stations 
or the audience. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, as the 
producer elaborates, “Price matters before quality. If the products are likely 
to be watched by or attract a mass audience, they can take the risk of 
showing not-so-good products. In contrast, American programs guarantee 
you a good quality, for sure. They could be a guaranteed box-office hit.”151 
However, quality costs. Other than the market and prices of the products, 
South Korean media professionals consider issues of how many viewers they 
expect to get and what the audience ratings of the previous (more likely in 
China) places are. In order to get financial support from sponsors, media 
practitioners calculate how many advertisements could be expected. These 
                                                                
148 This is a prevailing idea both for producers and audiences in Korea.  
149 Interview with a South Korean TV producer, January 19, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
150 “Beneficial” here means to be profit-oriented from a company’s point of view. 
151 Anjeonppang in Korean.  
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three factors shape another part of the importation process. As long as it 
would get “enough” and/or “substantial” number of viewers, the media 
practitioners could play with the viewership and rating issue. As long as they 
are able to get sponsors, viewer rating is not the most important factor in 
importing programs.  
With regard to contents of programs, the following factors should be 
taken into account. First, celebrities matter: As Koreans do not know much 
about Chinese celebrities, it is more effective to sell products which include 
South Korean celebrities than ones with no Korean actors. This was echoed 
by many Korean media practitioners as well as Japanese media 
practitoners.152 Second, characters matter: Well-known characters, or some 
stories taken from traditional Chinese novels (gudian xiaoshuo)153 or martial 
arts novels (wuxia xiaoshuo)154 are preferred by media practitioners and 
audiences (see Chapter 6). Finally, scale matters: Like Hollywood products, 
Chinese commercialized products or blockbusters (shangyepian) are warmly 
welcomed in South Korea, but only in the case of films.  
In the search for Chinese culture, programs do not have to be made in 
China or by Chinese; they need only be “thematically” Chinese. A cable TV 
station producer KM4155 said, “China-based themes are not always produced 
by mainland China. In an attempt to find some “China” programs, we do not 
                                                                
152 Informants including KM1, KM3, KM13, JM1, and JM13 share this view.  
153 For the phenomenon of Three Kingdoms in South Korea see Chapter 6. Three Kingdoms, 
Huangbihong and Shuihuji are examples.  
154 See the phenomenon of muhyeop novels in South Korea (see Chapter 6). Jin Yong’s novels 
have been popuar and famous in South Korea.  
155 Interview with a South Korean TV producer, January 19, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
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look for Chinese media products per se, but we would rather look for 
program quality. The BBC also produces programs with Chinese-related 
themes. China also produces non-Chinese-themed-programs such as Wall 
Street.” This response shows how a TV producer negotiates the needs of the 
TV station (i.e. interesting programs on China) and what the company could 
possibly get from programs made by Chinese stations. The current Chinese 
programs may have their “authenticity,” but this is not enough to be 
considered for import by South Korean TV producers. This emphasis on 
quality reflects the South Korean government’s encouragement in producing 
Korean programs to higher standards for export, especially after the 1997 
Asian economic crisis (Cho 2005; Shim 2002).156 Given this context, it is 
difficult for low quality Chinese programs to gain entry to the South Korean 
media market.  
 
5.3 The dual media markets in Japan 
Similar to South Korea, Japan has terrestrial and Broadcast Satellite (BS) and 
Communications Satellite (CS). Like the cable channels in South Korea, BS 
and CS channels are charged by on a monthly basis.157 Considering the way 
                                                                
156 On account of these developments, South Korea has distanced itself from the negative 
image of “the divided country” and become one of the most important players in the popular 
culture sphere. This may also be as a consequence of state policy: in the 1990s, Kim Yong 
Sam’s government proposed “sekyehwa” (globalization) to make the country part of the 
international community. The Kim Dae Jung government continued its predecessor’s film 
promotion efforts with measures such as the Basic Law for the Promotion of the Culture 
Industry in 1999. At a press conference to announce the Basic Law, Park Ji-won, the head of 
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, stated that the South Korean government had a strong 
commitment to “develop culture as a key strategic industry in the knowledge-based society 
of the future.”  
157 If viewers want to watch channels such as HBO and Discovery Channel, they need to 
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these channels are managed and used by consumers, Japan’s media market 
can be considered to have its own dual market structure. In the Japanese 
broadcasting system, the stations are owned by same owners of the 
newspapers they are affiliated with and vice versa. Accordingly, BS, 
terrestrial and newspapers are closely linked. Apart from NHK, the public 
broadcasting station, Fuji TV, Nippon TV, TBS, TV Asahi and TV Tokyo are 
respectively owned by Sankei Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, 
Asahi Shimbun, and Nikkei.158 The terrestrial station-newspaper nexus does 
not end here. These terrestrial stations, which are closely linked with 
newspapers, also have BS systems (see Figure 5.5).  
The other part of the Japanese dual market structure comprises BS, 
Cable Satellite (CS), and cable television (see Figure 5.6). Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai 
(NHK) has its own BS channels, such as BS1, BS2 and BS Digital (BShi). For 
free broadcasting, there are BS Nihon, BS Asahi, BS Japan, BS Fuji, BS11, Twell 
TV, and Broadcasting University (hōsō daigaku). For paid broadcasting, there 
are WOWOW, BS-FOX, and J Sports 1/2.   
 
 
Figure 5.5 The Japanese Media System 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
subscribe to an extra service which includes these channels.  
158 Besides NHK, as a public broadcasting station, the other five major broadcasting stations 





Source: Ekyo chizu (2012: 86-87). 
 
 








According to a survey, which was carried out in the Kantō region of Japan in 
2010, the audience of BS watches such programs as a hobby and in their 
spare time. Respondents answered that NHK-BS gives them knowledge and 
culture, whereas private BS channels are for killing time (KOCCA 2011: 14). 
One of the paid cable channels, such as WOWOW, is both for digital and 
analogue-type broadcasting, while movies take up over 50 percent of the 




5.4 The politics of importing Chinese media products to Japan 
The regulation 
Like the South Korean media market, whether or not and how foreign 
programs are broadcasted in Japan give us an understanding of the situation 
of Chinese programs; besides American products, South Korean products 
have been popular in Japan due to the success of Winter Sonata in early and 
mid-2000s (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008; Hayashi and Lee 2007). Like all media 
markets, formal regulations and regulation-related practices function as a 
protective shield of the Japanese cultural identity and market (see Chapter 4 
on the discussion of cultural security). The institutional, structural, and 
market levels in which the Japanese market operates will now be examined in 
greater detail.159 
The Japanese producers who I interviewed commented: “There are 
no such regulations to prevent foreign products from [entering] the Japanese 
local market.” To verify this, I surveyed a number of Japanese institutions, 
including the government, and found out that indeed detailed regulations are 
not available.160 However, does it mean the Japanese media market is 
completely “free” in that foreign media programs can be traded easily? In 
principle, as the systemic prevention of foreign products is not present a 
large amount of exposure of foreign media programs in the Japanese media 
                                                                
159 Institutional regulations in this regard are the Japanese government’s regulation at the 
state level, and the media market at the institutional level.  
160 However, receiving subsidiaries for co-production films with Japan entails regulations. 
This is in line with a usual form of joint business when the local party should own more than 
51 percent of a company. 
130 
 
market is possible. However, consideration of what happens on the media 
market, might point up the practices to be different. To figure out how the 
media market is structured in accepting and rejecting foreign programs, the 
Japanese broadcasting service providers will be documented in detail.  
The Japanese media market is largely dependent on BS and CS 
channels. NHK, as a public broadcasting company, has its own BS channels—
NHK BS1, BS2, and the five private broadcasting companies also have their 
own BS channels—BS Nihon, BS Asahi, BS I, BS Japan, and BS Fuji. Parallel 
with the South Korean market, foreign programs are predominantly located 
on the BS and CS channels, with the exception of Korean-related programs.161  
In Japan products like DVDs, VCDs and Blu-ray are categorized into 
two parts: One is “Products for Sale” and the other is “Products for Rental.” 
The following graphs, based on data from 1998 to 2011, show the trends of 
gross sales of these two products. Except for Japanese anime, other domestic 
products—TV dramas and films—are undersold, whereas overseas TV drama 
and films sell well (see Figure 5.7). 
 
Figure 5.7 The Trend of Gross Sales of “Products for Sale” by Genre162 
                                                                
161 Korean-related programs not only include dramas, movies, and variety shows from South 
Korea, but also entertainment and variety programs that are made in Japan. 
162 Data included here varies between the years. Up to 2003, the data consists of cassettes, 
DVDs and LDs; from 2004 and 2006, the data includes cassettes and DVDs; in 2007, DVDs, 
etc. are included. From 2008 to 2010, DVDs, Blu-ray, and UMDs are included, 2011 data 
consists of DVDs and Blu-ray.  In this figure, foreign films and dramas include those from Asia. 
The fluctuation of the category of foreign film and TV drama is in line with changes of Korean 
wave in Japan. For example, the Korean wave’s popularity from Winter Sonata in 2003 and 




Source: JVA (2012). 
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The rental culture is another characteristic of Japanese society,163 unlike 
South Korea. Figure 5.9 shows that from 1984 to 1991 rental shops were at 
their height, but since 1992 the number has dramatically declined. Despite 
this, it is noteworthy that the rental shops in Japan are still firmly established.   
 
 










Figure 5.10 The Trend of Gross Sales of “Products for Rental”  
by Genre164 
 
                                                                
163 See Culture Convenience Club (2012)   
164 Data included here varies with years. Till 1999, included data is for cassettes, etc.; from 
2000 and 2006, data of cassettes and DVDs is included; in 2007, DVDs, etc. is included. From 








































































































































































As Figures 5.7 and 5.10 show, the amount of selling and renting of foreign 
films and TV dramas among DVD-related products in Japan heavily 
outnumbers Japanese TV dramas and films. The only exception is in the case 
of Japanese anime, which sells more than other Japanese programs and often 
better than foreign programs. 
These findings are in line with two distinct Japanese consumer 
traits—buying and collecting DVDs frequently and having multiple editions of 
the same product. A reporter who works for a Japanese magazine told me 
that “There are different versions of the same dramas. The basic plot remains 
similar, but some additional elements are added in accommodating the 
special needs of attentive viewers. Then, with these different versions, the 





Regarding buying DVDs, JM9,165 a Japanese media professional who 
manages the production side in a Tokyo-based company said, “Japanese 
movies have the largest amount of renting, followed by anime and Korean 
dramas.” He also said, In the case of buying DVDs, people choose to buy 
Hollywood movies rather than Japanese movies. They think Japanese movies 
are not worth preserving.” His knowledge about the Japanese market informs 
us that the behavior and rationales behind the buying and renting of DVDs 
are different. Whether this market is gender-linked and age-specific is not 
known, but his comment in a similar matter may give us a clue. He said, 
“Japanese middle-aged woman like to watch South Korean dramas, but, 
traditionally they do not necessarily buy DVD products. However, they 
purchase some DVD packages when it comes to their favorite Korean stars—
Yonsama and Geunsok. They want to buy a full package from dramas, 
interviews, and still photographs.”  
The above discussion about the volume of foreign programs both in 
terms of sales and rentals is in sharp contrast to the conventional belief166 
that Japanese people only watch Japanese products. If this is so the question 
arises, “Will China then be able to sell its products well in Japan”? That there 
are sales and rentals of imported foreign programs does not necessarily 
mean that there are opportunities for all kinds of foreign products to enter 
into the Japanese market. The foreign products that attract Japanese 
customers are obviously Western products. In the case of films, Western 
                                                                
165 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 15, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
166 They are (a) language issues and (b) the exclusiveness of the Japanese people.  
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movies (youga) are placed in opposition to Japanese movies (houga). In the 
case of dramas, overseas dramas (kaigai no TV dorama), as “Drama 
International,” often refers to foreign dramas which excludes Asia, only Asian 
Dramas (Ajia no TV dorama), as “Drama Asian (sic),” includes dramas from 
“Korea, China, Chinese-Taipei and Hong Kong” (Japan Video Software 
Association 2011).167  
As a consequence of this classification, Asian products are 
overshadowed by Western programs. Most of the films available in Japan are 
either from Hollywood or the small number from Japan. Other foreign media 
players on the scene impede Chinese media products from entering the 
Japanese market. They are structurally constrained by both American and 
Korean products. Considering the complicated relationship between Japan 
and South Korea, the dominant presence of Korean products in Japan is 
surprising.168 In contrast, South Korea has maintained an appearance of 
systemically controlling the flow of Japanese programs into the country.  
In importing foreign products, Japanese producers take the following 
elements into account: salability, budgets, quality, time, and local tastes. First, 
salability considers the original location of the product, audience ratings, 
                                                                
167 In this classification, it is necessary to pay attention to the Japanese original source in 
comparing the English translation that is released by the same institution, JVA. It is also 
noted that Taiwan appears as “Chinese-Taipei,” the name used during the Olympics. One 
could argue that the way in which the data indicates that Japan reluctantly uses this over 
“Taiwan.” However, considering it as a separate category, one could also see that the 
Japanese data is consistent with the South Korean data, as shown in the earlier part of this 
chapter. Due to the close and friendly relationship between Japan and Taiwan, largely as a 
result of their colonial history, such relations are formed closely. A similar line of reasoning 
can be seen from informants (see Chapter 6). In this regard, Japan maintains ambiguity at 
the official and political level.  
168 See the discussion on the sentiment towards each other in Chapter 6.  
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whether it has won critical acclaim, and who are the celebrities in the 
products. The issue of how to sell engages with the use of mixed 
actors/actresses, which is important to attract enough viewers. For example, 
Takeshi Kaneshiro (Jin Chengwu, in Mandarin) is both Taiwanese and 
Japanese as he has a Japanese father and Taiwanese mother. Another famous 
actress, Vivian Hsu, who is originally from Taiwan (with an aboriginal 
background), performed in Japan for a long time since she was young, which 
makes her popular among both Japanese and Taiwanese. However, according 
to JM14,169 “I cannot think of any Chinese celebrity who is popular in 
Japan.”170  
Second, the balancing of budgets: Financially, Companies exist for 
profits and therefore they need to enhance profits over costs. JM5171 said, “In 
general, foreign products (except for American and Hollywood products) are 
cheaper than producing a Japanese program in Japan in the first place; that 
was the reason for Japanese production companies to buy Korean products.” 
 Once products of a country of origin are established and they can 
guarantee a certain level of quality, then Japanese producers will consider 
that option, rather than explore new options such as importing media 
products from elsewhere. In the past, broadcasting companies in Japan did 
not have to consider the budget issue seriously as they had enough capacity 
to utilize money for producing programs; however, nowadays they have to 
                                                                
169 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 22, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
170 This consensus is made not only among media practitioners, but also with the Japanese 
audience. For a more detailed explanation, see Chapter 6.  
171 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 10, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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manage money and resources as they plan what to make and how to sell.172 
Given this situation and the exporting “doldrums” of Japanese cultural 
products, Japan offsets its profits by importing overseas programs.  
Third, quality matters. As JM11,173 a producer at Nippon TV, said, 
“There are Rank S, Rank A and Rank B products and so forth in the Japanese 
media market. From Rank B to Rank S, the price will go higher, but they’re 
less risky. Yet, if one goes for Rank B, instead of Rank S, it can be much 
cheaper, but with lots of risks.” Price in general price vouches for a certain 
quality; quality and cost is a double-edged sword.  
Fourth, filling time: As in the South Korea, foreign media programs 
often function as a substitute in Japan; this is evident when the products are 
not from a country that produces popular media products. As KM2,174 a 
journalist working in Japanese media, said, “Terrestrial televisions, Korean 
dramas function in filling the available time.” This corresponds with the 
previous two points in that filling available time is akin to the saving of 
money in order to enhance profits. Once a media product is bought, it can be 
circulated over time, especially when it has a ready audience.  
Finally, learning from others and manufacturing local tastes: The local 
media market always constructs its own logic of the market and culture; 
however, it is influenced by foreign media markets to some degree, especially 
                                                                
172 In this line, see Korea Creative Content Agency, 2010. “Japan’s Contents Industry.” Issue 
Paper 27.  
173 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 16, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 




in this globalized and digitalized era. JM4,175 a Japanese interviewee who 
works for a media company commented, “In other parts of Asia, some Asian 
dramas have been popular among some people. In China or Taiwan, they 
watch Korean dramas. Why do they watch them? Why are they interesting? 
Japanese producers have this in their mind when importing them.” The 
reason why they import foreign media products is not just because of the 
Japanese audience’s taste, it is also a response to what others watch.  
 
Importing Chinese programs into Japan: Routes and distribution   
The routes for importing products into Japan are as follows: First, agents buy 
copyrights of products and then contact Japanese producers who they think 
might be interested in the products. The producers then buy them with 
royalties from companies that own their copyrights. Thus, the products are 
considered as sold. Secondly, distribution companies participate in “film 
markets,” such as festivals (Tokyo International Film Festival and Drama 
Festival) and exhibitions, to promote, exchange, and trade their goods. 
Miffcon, one of the largest format markets in the world, is the place for 
Japanese film and TV producers and managers to go to, as was told by both 
JM5176 and JM14.177 
Third, every broadcasting station and company has relevant 
departments, such as an overseas sales team that sells and buys media 
                                                                
175 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 8, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
176 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 10, 2012, Tokyo, Japan; Interview 
with a Japanese media professional, May 22, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
177 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 22, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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products.178 They can also have overseas copyright teams (haeoe pangwon 
team), according to a staff member from KOCCA. In addition, the format of 
sale varies. JM7,179 a manager in KOCCA based in Tokyo, suggests, “In many 
cases, programs are sold in broadcasting rights (hōsōken) and DVD.” In 
Europe, “it is usually sold in a package form. What I mean by package is the 
right to circulate products to terrestrial, BS, CS, Video on Demand (VOD) and 
DVD,” he added. Lastly, there is a chain of trading copyrights. JM6180 
elaborates that, “Agents buy copyrights in an exchange of money to royalty, 
and agents can resell the copyrights to distribution companies. Then, the 
distribution body goes to a film market to exchange the goods.” 
 
Locating and dislocating Chinese programs in Japan: Local preferences 
and market demands 
Thus far in this chapter what kind of challenges Chinese products might face 
on the Japanese market have been examined. Next, the focus is on where 
Chinese media programs can be found in terms of channels, places, or ways. 
As such, the following are the location and availability of Chinese programs in 
Japan.  
“There is a possibility that many Japanese have never heard about 
                                                                
178 Stations like KBS media or SBS contents hub have overseas sales divisions (haeoe 
youngopteam, haeoe suchulsaup team). This is also mentioned in an interview with KM3. 
Interview with a South Korean journalist who works in Japan, January 4, 2012, Seoul, South 
Korea. 
179 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 11, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
180 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 10, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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Chinese dramas that are broadcasted,” said by JM1,181 a Japanese freelance 
producer. This surprised me, as South Korean producers had not conveyed 
this idea to me. JM5182 also adds that, “BS and WOWOW can be the most 
prevailing locations where one can find Chinese products on Japanese TV. Or, 
if one subscribes to Sky Perfect TV, one can also find quite a few Chinese 
programs there, too.” Japanese media professionals indicate that there are 
not many places where you can find Chinese programs, unlike South Korean 
programs which can readily be found on TV. As with South Korea, BS or CS 
are the main channels for Chinese and other Asian programs; Chinese 
programs are not strong enough to be able to enter the terrestrial market.  
Unlike South Koreans, the Japanese are less likely to visit internet 
websites to download illegal programs.183 JV45184 responded by saying, “I 
met quite a few South Koreans when I studied abroad in Canada. They taught 
me where I can watch and download Korean and Japanese programs. As I am 
married to a Chinese, I realize that I need to speak the language. My husband 
and I often watch Chinese dramas and films by using those Internet sites.” 
Nowadays, as smart phones and other electronic devices are widespread and 
convenient to use, people often have various application on their phones. 
                                                                
181 Interview with a Japanese media producer, April 9, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
182 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 10, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
183 In relation to an obtained channel of the products downloading matters. Although the 
development of the internet has opened a new chapter in ease of access to other countries’ 
products, the process is an “invisible” loop, which may not be easily spelled out in the in- and 
outflow of media products, for importing content. In other words, in the age of information 
technology, although governments attempt to prevent people from downloading contents 
illegally, this illicit practice happens and matters and especially for young consumers.  
184 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 27, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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JV40,185 a Japanese viewer, said, “I have an application called PPTV, which is a 
paid application, on my iPhone, with which you can watch Chinese programs. 
I usually watch them on my phone when I commute from Chiba to Tokyo.” All 
in all, it is hard to find out if and how much Chinese programs are circulated 
on the Japanese media market.  
As JM14186 said, “The bottom line is […] the chance of Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong films being imported to Japan is pretty small. Red 
Cliff is kind of an exception in recent years”; Red Cliff is an international 
blockbuster which was directed by John Woo. The comment is line with the 
responses of Japanese audiences and non-audiences to watching Chinese 
programs (which are considered in Chapter 7). 
Considering that there are no formal regulations on inflows, in 
principle, it should be easy to find Chinese media products. However, in 
reality, this is not the case. Unless a consumer is already exposed to Chinese 
products, the chance to engage with them is unlikely. Although some 
channels offer Chinese programs, they are marginalized and only a few 
people watch them. Even Japanese producers assume that an audience is not 
aware of the fact that Chinese programs are available on their TV. JM1187 
noted, “Many Japanese people may not be knowledgeable about the fact there 
are some PRC programs on TV, whereas some of them often watch 
Taiwanese dramas.” This is in part due to the Japanese ambiguous or even 
                                                                
185 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan.  
186 Interview with a Japanese media professional, May 22, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
187 Interview with a Japanese producer, April 9, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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negative perception of the Chinese and thus the closing of their minds to 
China-related things. For example, a Japanese respondent, JV31,188 informed 
me that “This year (2012)’s Tokyo Film Festival does not have as many films 
as usual due to the political issue [between China and Japan]”, on the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Political issues prevail even when it comes to such a 
cultural event. This becomes the most difficult barrier for China to deal with 
in terms of extending its soft power.  
 Finally, China’s celebrities are unknown to Japanese consumers, as 
JM1 said, “There are no famous Chinese celebrities.” He added, “The reason 
why Red Cliff was able to enter the Japanese market was in part due to both 
Japan and China’s capital and staff being involved. In the case of Taiwan, it is 
a slightly better, but not that much. Vivian Hsu, Lin Chi-Ling . . . .” Unlike 
South Koreans, Japanese people tend to have less difficulty in differentiating 
between celebrities from China and Taiwan. This is in part due to Japan’s 
colonial past with Taiwan. The nexus often clearly shows differences 
between China and Taiwan in the media and cultural markets; distinctions in 
the origins of products and celebrities are usually identifiable. JM1189 
elaborated, “We Japanese producers are aware of the differences between 
these [Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese] products. PRC programs are in 
general not good. Hong Kong is famous for kungfu and Taiwan is trendy. We 
know the importing routes of these are different, especially for those who are 
in the field.” 
                                                                
188 Email communication with a Japanese interviewee (JV31), November 13, 2012. 




The roles of media practitioners in the Japanese media market  
This section will take a closer look at the roles of Japanese media 
professionals as actors in the importation process. As Japanese media 
professionals acknowledge that Japan does not have a substantial market for 
Chinese programs they also take it upon themselves to reject the importing of 
Chinese products. Most Japanese consumers are inclined to consume 
Western popular culture, largely American, aside from their local Japanese 
media products. The reluctance to consume non-Western culture and cultural 
products makes it difficult for Asian programs to enter the Japanese market, 
with the exception of South Korean media products.  Given the popularity of 
the latter in Japan, it is common practice for Japanese broadcasting stations 
to buy such programs. 
Despite the lack of explicit written guidelines or restrictions,190 
Japanese media professionals are generally not inclined to import foreign 
programs. They accommodate to “market logic,” rather than “bureaucratic 
logic.” By following the market principle, Japanese media practitioners take 
local consumers’ preferences for Japanese, American, and South Korean 
media programs into account. American and South Korean programs are not 
only popular among Japanese consumers, but they are generally credited for 
having good quality or being interesting to watch.  
This shows a safer path for media practitioners to take because it 
                                                                
190 There is no written document for practices or regulations but the way in which practices 
or regulations play out among media professionals are a different matter. 
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involves less risk. In contrast, as explained earlier, South Korean media 
practitioners do consider getting profits from two actions: on one hand, they 
import popular programs such as American programs. On the other hand, 
they import cheaper products (such as Chinese programs) in large quantities, 
taking greater risk.  
As explored earlier, DVDs and VODs are important sources and 
interesting characteristics of the Japanese media market. There are many 
DVD and VCD rental shops in Japan, unlike in South Korea. Among them, GEO 
and Tsutaya, which has more 1,400 stores, are among the biggest. Japanese 
and Western movies and dramas exist in a separate section. South Korean, 
Chinese and some other Asian products are classified under the “Asia” 
section, taking up around 15 percent of the shops. They are indicators of 
marketability and salability. Producers tend to buy a single program in a 
“package,” which makes it easy for them to explore several combinations of 
products from only one program. Broadcasting rights in terrestrial, satellite 
and cable channels remain as one, while producing and circulating VODs and 
DVDs remain another. In the process of combining what to sell to the general 
audience, media professionals manufacture local tastes by giving local people 





5.5 Summary: Domestic institutions as filters or facilitators of Chinese 
soft power  
This chapter has shown how the receiving countries manage their markets 
for China’s media products. Three aspects of this process can now be noted. 
First, there is the fact that the South Korean and Japanese states 
exercise power through the explicit guidelines they issue on the importing of 
foreign media into their markets. The Korean market manifests attitudes of 
protectionism and nationalism, whereas the Japanese market shows less 
protectionism. The state’s regulatory regimes for importing foreign media 
products into their markets obviously play a role in filtering out Chinese 
media.  
Second, the market structures of South Korea and Japan are similar 
with regards to terrestrial, cable, and satellite stations. The South Korean 
market is inclined to be more profit-driven market and is willing to 
incorporate all kinds of foreign programs in cable channels. On the other 
hand, the Japanese market only gives way to local products and secure-
enough-to-be-imported programs from foreign countries. This shows that 
differences in state regulation for foreign media products do not necessarily 
translate into the similar level of rejection or purchasing for the media 
market players in the country.  
Third, in a related manner, the process of importing and the roles of 
media professionals are important. South Korean media practitioners are 
rather open to importing Chinese programs as they tend to be cheaper in 
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bulk and relatively easy to place with cable stations market, while Japanese 
media producers tend to play it safe by choosing quality South Korean 
programs popular with viewers over Chinese programs.  
Media products have potential soft power influence because they 
reflect the source country’s culture and lifestyle. This applies in the case of 
China as the themes are produced and guided by the state agency SARFT (see 
Chapter 4) Attractiveness of the products can shape the attitudes of potential 
audiences to the source country, engendering soft power for the latter. 
Consequently, the inflows of foreign media products are controlled by the 
regulations of the importing state, by its media industries, and by the 
practitioners and local market demands. As the South Korean case shows, the 
importing country regulates foreign media products so as not to give 
“unnecessary” exposure in the society; this is done in the name of cultural 
security attentive to nationalistic sentiments.  
The importing of media products is not only constrained by market 
structures and media practitioners, but also must accommodate to the 
market demands of the importing society. Priority is generally given to 
domestic media products, as in the cases of South Korean and Japanese 
terrestrial TV systems. On the other hand, cable TV stations are often venues 
for imported foreign media products. Annual data from the Korean 
Broadcasting Commissions show that market demands encourage South 
Korean media professionals to import profitable foreign programs. By the 
same token, cheaper Chinese programs with a large number of episodes have 
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been exported to South Korea. In the case of Japan, media professionals do 
not have overt control over the inflow of Chinese programs as these do not 
have a broad-based audience.  
The next chapter will analyze the audience reception of Chinese TV 
products in South Korea and Japan and in the process show that the 
institutional dimension of the importation of Chinese media products and 
consumers’ choices can influence China’s ability to accomplish its soft power 























The Consumption of Chinese Media Products and the 
Reception of Chinese Soft Power 
 
There was a debate within academic circles and the journalistic field in the 
early 2000s in South Korea and Japan as to what lay in store for the media 
scene. In South Korea people were concerned about the loss of popularity of 
their Korean cultural products, which is also referred to as the Korean wave 
(Hallyu). Note that Hallyu, the Korean wave, and Hwaryu (华流, hualiu), the 
Chinese wave, have the same pronunciation in Korean. In order to avoid 
confusion, I use Hanryu for the Chinese wave, since Hallyu usually refers to 
the Korean wave. As an alternative to this, the Chinese wave (Hanryu in 
Korean, Karyū in Japanese) was discussed, coinciding with China’s emerging 
soft power policy. In Korean discourse, the following terms such as Hwaryu, 
Hanryu (汉流, hanliu), and Jungryu (中流, zhongliu) were used to refer to the 
Chinese wave. These three terms are used interchangeably. But the situation 
was ambiguous because, notably, South Koreans and Japanese do not usually 
differentiate between Chinese-language media products from China, Hong 
Kong, or Taiwan.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, South Korean and Japanese 
media institutions play a significant role in the importation of Chinese media 
products. Here, in this chapter, In order to understand Chinese soft power as 
it interacts with its target audience, three dimensions will be discussed: (1) 
how their interest is initiated; (2) what kind of products they can access; and 
149 
 
(3) how they consume the products. Based on the responses of individual 
South Koreans and Japanese, often considered as an aggregation or reflection 
of collective behavior, this chapter explores the varieties of consumption and 
the reception of Chinese media products qua soft power in these two 
countries. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to uncover a hidden link 
between these three dimensions and to extend the discussion of Chinese soft-
power making in the two quasi-Sinophone countries at the audience level. 
 
6.1 Interests, images, and boundaries 
Media products contain language, content, context, and messages. In the 
action of consumption the audience encounters the values and messages 
embedded in the media products, and either identifies (absorbs) or rejects 
them.  
Before considering the audience responses to any media product an 
often neglected fact needs to be taken into account: how and why audiences 
get to consume media products? This question is particularly important 
regarding the consuming of China’s media products, in part since most 
foreigners acknowledge that they are ideology-laden. This chapter argues 
that “locally-embedded consumption” shapes China’s soft power field. By 
“locally-embedded consumption,” the following is meant: First, the local 
institutional setting: consumption is contingent on the domestic institutions 
and market structures as discussed in the previous chapter. Second, the local 
audience cultural logic: the external audience has its own mechanism which 
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is embedded in the trans-local setting. Third, meaning mediates the 
perception and reception of imported products and the exporting country: 
existing perceptions and images of China in the two reception countries 
contribute to the making of the soft power field by manufacturing certain 
consumer tastes towards media products. The conversion of audience 
perceptions during the process from consumption to reception is the key to 
understanding the mechanism and reception of soft power. 
 
Shaping interests in China with the advent of its rise 
Nye’s model of soft power offers an interesting starting point for exploring 
locally-embedded consumption. His model that deals with the “conversion of 
soft power resources to behavior (outcomes)” (Nye 2011: 100) explicates the 
process by which resources are turned into policy tools, reach target 
audiences, and generate soft power. Figure 6.1, which is based on Nye’s 
model, shows the implementation of soft power policies which relate directly 
to media or cultural products that are based on both traditional and 
contemporary cultural sources. In the current context, the rise of China is 
important as it influences the shaping and transforming of interests in and 
experiences of the country, potentially contributing to China’s soft power. In 
Figure 6.1 an inter-relational model for this process is proposed as South 
Korea and Japan involuntarily, or unintentionally, act as the gatekeepers and 





Figure 6.1 Reception of Soft Power: 




Source: Modified from Nye (2011: 100) 
 
 
The general observation of “a rising China, since 1998, explicitly since 2003,” 
(L. Zhang 2011) by major European media192 is consistent with perceptions 
in East Asia. How different nation-states perceive this rise varies based on 
their experience, history, geopolitics, and, importantly, relations with China. 
In South Korea discussions on China’s rise are mostly centered on economic 
and diplomatic aspects. For example, B. Park (2004) highlighted that Asia’s 
exports to China would significantly increase and an intense economic 
cooperation between China and South Korea would take place with the 
country’s rise (B. Park 2004).  
Examining survey data on China’s influence, from a 2004/2005 BBC 
World Service Poll and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) carried 
out in 2006, Seo and Kang (2008) analyzed the military, economic, and 
                                                                
191 This is based on Nye’s model of the “conversion of soft power resources to behavior 
(outcomes)” (Nye 2011: 100). 
192 The Economist and Financial Times are examples of the book.  
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diplomatic perspectives on the rise of China.193 Rejecting the “China Threat” 
or “China Opportunity” theories, they concluded that the most important 
thing is how much influence China is seen as having. Unlike Seo and Kang 
(2008), Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh (2008) measured the 
economics, diplomacy, and political soft power of China, as well as taking 
aspects of culture and human capital into consideration.  
Overall, China’s economic power is highly rated and other countries’ 
view of Chinese soft power varies. For instance, Indonesia and Vietnam 
perceive Chinese soft power as being greater than the US, South Korea, and 
Japan’s perception.194 As Whitney and Shambaugh (2008: 4) also put it, “The 
CCGA/EAI survey indicates that China’s growing economic and military 
might have not yet been fully translated into the elements of soft power that 
help a nation wield indirect influence in its region and the world.” 
Most of my informants in South Korea and Japan were born in the late 
1970s to early 1990s, and are in their 20s and 30s now (see Appendix 2 for 
their socio-demographic information). The informants’ experiences and 
perceptions of China were largely shaped by a rapidly changing and 
                                                                
193 A more recent version of the survey, see CCGA (2008). It is a public opinion survey that 
was conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) and the East Asia Institute of 
South Korea in 2008. 
194 This figure “Ratings of China’s Soft Power: The View is Better from the South” is obtained 
from Whitney and Shambaugh (2008: 5).  
 Economic Human 
capital 
Cultural Diplomatic Political 
US 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.40 0.34 
Japan 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.44 0.41 
South Korea 0.57 0.64 0.54 0.51 0.48 
Indonesia 0.73 0.74 0.62 0.69 0.71 
Vietnam 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.67 - 
Note: Average level of influence on a 0 to 1 scale when soft power questions are combined for 
five key areas. 
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developing China, although generational differences in perceptions do 
exist.195 The rise of China is thus a valid reference point.  
The potential target audience’s interest in the country which aims to 
generate soft power is what matters when trying to explain its workings. 
Such interest is determined by many factors, including geopolitics, economics, 
and individual’s tastes and interests, as well as constructed boundaries. 
 
Attracting: Images, perceptions, boundaries 
Tu Wei-ming’s book, The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese 
Today (1994), argues that the concept of “Cultural China” results from the 
interaction of three symbolic universes: (1) mainland China, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, (2) overseas Chinese communities throughout the 
world, and (3) the international communities of scholars, students, officials, 
journalists, and traders who provide a global forum for China-related matters 
(Tu 1994: viii). Such a definition of Chinese cultural boundaries affects how 
South Koreans and Japanese perceive and think about China and the Chinese. 
To understand how Koreans and Japanese respond to China, the following 
factors need to be considered. 
First the cultural resources of China, i.e., culture, cultural belonging 
(proximity), entitlements, traditions, and ideology, are all important. Both 
South Korea and Japan are influenced by China in terms of traditional culture 
and customs; the cultural proximity of these three countries therefore 
                                                                
195 Intergenerational analysis will be studied in the near future in order to find out 




potentially gives the South Koreans and Japanese a better understanding of 
the Chinese culture. On the other hand, this cultural intertwining/similarity 
may give rise to possible cultural conflicts due to the obscuring of the 
boundaries of each culture. One example is the Duan Wu festival, which the 
three countries celebrate every year. The cultural and traditional practices of 
the festival in China and South Korea share a greater similarity as compared 
to the practices of Japan. In addition to difference in meaning and practice, 
the Chinese and Korean Duan Wu festival is held on the 5th day of the 5th 
month in the lunar calendar while the equivalent Japanese festival, which 
shares the same name, is held on May 5 of the solar calendar. The similarity 
of this festival as celebrated by China and South Korea has hindered the 
attempt of a province of South Korea to register the Duan Wu festival as a 
UNESCO World Heritage festival for itself. 
Second, the perceptions and images of China and the Chinese people 
are reflected in how South Koreans and Japanese see China. Both the South 
Koreans and Japanese are likely to associate China and its people with 
connotations of being dirty, low quality, uncultured, and underdeveloped.196  
Significantly, such characterization and impressions do not apply to 
Taiwan. The Japanese often consider Taiwan a place with friendly people, a 
country to visit, and the preference is mutual as the Taiwanese also like the 
Japanese. This two-way relationship is largely due to their interlinked 
historical trajectory and mutual affinity. The history of the colonization of 
                                                                
196 See, for example, KV21, interview with a South Korean respondent, December 11, 2011, 
Seoul, South Korea. 
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Taiwan by Japan gives a better position for Japan to develop a good 
relationship with Taiwan, or vice versa. Similarly, South Koreans perceive 
Taiwan differently from China. This difference comes from the fact that both 
South Korea and Taiwan were democratic allies in the Cold War era. 
Ideological differences between the North and the South on the Korean 
peninsula play a critical role in the perception of South Koreans towards 
China, along with North Korea, as an ideological “enemy.” Politically, South 
Koreans and Japanese generally think of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as 
different political entities. Some South Koreans and Japanese show their 
ambivalence to the fact that Hong Kong has been part of China since its 
return in 1997. They do not support this fact on a practical or emotional level. 
South Koreans and Japanese have similar views about Taiwan, with the 
Japanese response being more marked than that of the South Koreans; again, 
this is so because of friendly relations between Japan and Taiwan that are 
tied to their colonial experiences. 
The way that the various perceptions of different Chinese societies 
translate into acts of consumption is significant. Even different Chinese 
accents are adopted by South Korean and Japanese learners of the Chinese 
language; Mandarin spoken with a PRC accent is thought to be more 
authentic relative to Taiwanese-accented Chinese. In terms of media products, 
most South Koreans do not generally find it easy to differentiate between 
media products from China and Taiwan. Culturally, the South Koreans and 
Japanese readily associate traditional culture with China.  Hong Kong is an 
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exceptional case because the South Koreans equate media products from 
Hong Kong with the kungfu series. 
 As will be argued in a later section, many of my Korean informants 
failed to distinguish between the different Chinese societies. More 
importantly and surprisingly, South Koreans exposed to the Chinese language 
and knowledge about boundaries of these locales were confused as well 
when asked to differentiate between the Chinese societies and to identify the 
origins of various Chinese media products. For the Japanese, the close 
Japanese-Taiwanese relation meant that Taiwanese products are viewed 
more positively than Chinese products. Hong Kong media products again 
performed exceptionally because the Japanese are very familiar with movie 
stars Jet Li and Jackie Chan.  
In summary, the boundaries and images of China as constructed by 
the South Koreans and Japanese reflect their cultural proximity, traditions, 
and the management of the cultural, political, and commoditized spheres. 
The multi-faceted “China” and other Chinese societies are well-captured in 
the images and perceptions of the people of South Korea and Japan. 
 
6.2 The South Korean audience of Chinese media 
Consuming China: From consumption to the reception of Chinese media 
products in South Korea 
Based on the typologies of media products produced in China, as documented 
in Chapter 5, the following section will explore what Chinese media products 
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South Koreans consume, and examine how their consumer behavior relates 
to the reception of Chinese soft power. 
A large proportion of South Korean history textbooks contain Chinese 
history, largely because of the country’s rich history and civilization as well as 
its interactions with the other countries in East Asia. This has resulted in 
many South Koreans taking an interest in Chinese history. KV81197 said, 
“History was my favorite subject in school. To me, history is like a story. My 
friends were tired of memorizing details from our history textbook but I liked 
it. Maybe this is why I often watch historical dramas. When I visit my parents 
in my hometown, I watch historical dramas on cable television. Unfortunately, 
I do not have a TV in my rented room near the university so I watch 
downloaded programs on my laptop. I understand Chinese history after 
watching dramas and films. Having done this for many years, I am well-
versed in Chinese history after many years of watching historical dramas.”  
This response indicates that China’s rich culture and heritage are 
represented in Chinese dramas. Chinese culture and history play an 
important role in attracting Koreans to be more willing to learn about China. 
And notably the mass media play a role in giving them exposure to the history.  
One of the most famous Chinese historical novels is the Three 
kingdoms (sanguo), different versions of the story having been told through 
novels, films, and dramas. KV21198 said, “Since young, I have liked Chinese 
history. Have you ever read the Three Kingdoms (Samkukji)? Most likely yes, 
                                                                
197 Interview with a South Korean respondent, July 4, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
198 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 11, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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right, if you are a South Korean who grew up in the country? Or you may even 
have come across the South Korean version in the form of Lee Munyeol’s 
novel. We are all familiar with or have heard of the idiom Samgochoryeo,199 
and characters of the novel like Yubi, Kwanwu, Jangbi. . . . Many Chinese 
dramas tell historical stories. I watch them because they help me understand 
history better.” A South Korean producer told me that his TV station imported 
and broadcast the latest version of Three Kingdoms200 not for its length—it 
has 95 episodes—but for its quality.201 This series brings together elements 
of history (lishi), costume (guzhuang), and war (zhanzheng). KV67202 told me, 
“I learnt about the latest version of Three Kingdoms through an online club 
where you can share information about Chinese dramas and media products. 
I looked for this version of Three Kingdoms on one of the P2P sites and 
downloaded several episodes. I started to watch them but there were 95 
episodes.203 So, I could not see all of them. Though I did not finish watching 
the episodes, I find this version of Three Kingdoms the best of the different 
versions.”  
Historical themes are popular with some South Korean respondents 
not only because of their content, but also because of their accessibility and 
familiarity. Although this study is qualitative in nature, the data suggests that 
                                                                
199 Its meaning is  “After several attempts to . . . finally . . .” 
200 It started being aired in May 2010 and consists of 95 episodes. Retrieved March 13, 2013 
(http://video.baidu.com/tv_intro/?page=1&id=17428). This series is also available in 
Cantonese. 
201 Interview with a South Korean producer, January 19, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
202 Interview with a South Korean respondent, June 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
203 Unlike American and Japanese TV series, Chinese dramas do not usually have many 
seasons with a smaller number of episodes. 
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the men interviewees are more inclined to enjoy Chinese history than women 
informants. However, this gender division in consumer behavior may not 
apply to the Muhyeop (martial arts) genre. 
 
Phenomenal modern/contemporary historical themes: Justice Pao vs. The 
Return of the Pearl Princess 
Of the available Chinese media products, historical or martial arts media 
products are relatively widely available and well-known. In particular, Justice 
Pao (Pocheongcheon) and The Return of the Pearl Princess (Huanzhugege)204 
were very much in fashion in the early and late 1990s in South Korea. Both 
dramas were based on novels by Taiwanese writers. Demographically 
speaking, there is a slight divide between the cohorts who watched these two 
popular programs. An earlier cohort, born between 1976 and 1980,205 
watched Pocheongcheon while in secondary school or on Fridays with family 
members. The next cohort, born between 1981 and 1985, watched The 
Return of the Pearl Princess while in (junior) high school. Each cohort had 
different levels of familiarity and popularity with of the programs. 
Pocheongcheon was phenomenally popular with South Koreans, regardless of 
age and gender, in the early 1990s. It was produced in Taiwan in 1990 and 
aired on KBS2 in 1993 with a 20 percent audience rating on average. 
Watching it brought family members together and the word “cheora” (Chop!), 
                                                                
204 They are two most famous, well-received, and popular Chinese TV series in South Korea. 
205 For this cohort, they might have a chance to watch The Return of the Pearl Princess when 
they were in college. 
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which appeared in the program, became a popular catchphrase. KV4206 noted, 
“I happened to tune in to Pocheongcheon on TV while I was flicking through 
the channels when I was in the fifth grade in primary school. I really liked 
Jeonjo, the main character. It was the first time I ever liked any actor, and he 
made me think about marrying him. The drama’s theme song was in Chinese. 
I liked it although I did not know the language back then. A classmate who 
liked me gave a gift of a figure of Jeonjo. That’s because he knew that I liked 
the drama and the character very much, and it was the most popular foreign 
TV drama at the time.” 
The Return of the Pearl Princess, on the other hand, was first broadcast 
on iTV (Incheon TV), one of the regional private TV channels in the Seoul 
metropolitan area. It had a six to seven per cent of audience rate on average, 
which is remarkable for a “Chinese” (Taiwanese) drama (Shim and Min 
2011). It was produced by E TV in Hunan Province (Choi 2002; 2003), with 
two PRC castings and two Taiwanese castings. The two main characters—
Ziwei and Prince Wu, were performed by Taiwanese actors and their voices 
were dubbed. Perhaps, the dubbing was why it was difficult even for Chinese-
speaking (or Chinese-learning) Koreans to know that the actors were 
Taiwanese.207 The first two seasons were originally broadcast in the late 
                                                                
206 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 28, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
207 In this regard, some may argue that it is not important to distinguish their origin of 
country or place because “Chinese” media products are highly mobile and intertwined with 
Greater China. However, it is important to find out in the course of China’s making of its soft 
power whether or not some of China’s soft power resources benefited from the “inseparable” 
“Chinese” connection. I will revisit this issue in a later section of this chapter.   
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1990s and early 2000s, and then repeatedly broadcasted in the 2000s (Busan 
Ilbo 2008).  
During the third season, New Return of the Pearl Princess, was 
broadcast in 2011. Some of the views expressed by interviewees on the 
change in cast in the third season included, “I think Seasons 1 and 2 were the 
best. I liked the cast, song and story. After the cast changed in the newer 
version, I lost interest in watching it.”208 KV41209 said, “I watched dramas on 
Junghwa TV with my mom. She watched The Return of the Pearl Princess 
before and has a good impression of Lin Xinru (Ruby Lin), the main character. 
She also likes to watch Meirenxinji (Schemes of a Beauty).” KM39210 said, “I 
watched some dramas on cable TV or online. One of my favorite programs 
was The Return of the Pearl Princess.” 
The unexpected success of The Return of the Pearl Princess prompted 
iTV to broadcast a series of Chinese dramas, such as Shin Pocheongcheon 
(New Justice Pao), Hoeokgongju (Huaiyu Gongzhu, Princess Huaiyu), 
Nohbangyuhui (Laofang youxi, Old House Has a Joy) and Angaebiyeonga 
(Romance in the Rain, Qingshenshen yumengmeng). Some of them are 
historical, others can be categorized as pre-modern (1911-1948) (see 
Chapter 4). These were well-received in South Korea as captured in some 
informants’ accounts. KV46211 said, “I watched Angaebiyeonga (Romance in 
the Rain), Hoeokgongju (Princess Huaiyu) and Nohbangyuhui (Laofang youxi). 
                                                                
208 Such views were also found interviews with KV2, KV3, KV4, KV5, KV7, KV9, K39, K41, K43, 
and K45. 
209 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
210 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
211 Interview with a South Korean respondent, January 10, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
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Lin Xinru (Ruby Lin) and Zhao Wei, the main actresses in The Return of the 
Pearl Princess, also appeared in these programs. That was why I became 
interested in the programs in the first place.” Such a response was also 
expressed by KV40,212 KV41,213 KV43214 and KV45.215 As argued earlier, 
besides content and storylines, the role of celebrities is also important when 
people make decisions to consume Chinese products. 
 
Muhyeop, martial arts, or kungfu 
In the decades before the new century one of the popular themes of dramas 
was martial arts, kungfu, or muhyeop in Korean. Most of the South Korean 
academic literature focuses on muhyeop novels and movies,216 such as the 
structure of Hong Kong muhyeop movies (C. Yeom 1997), Zhang Yimou’s 
muhyeop movies (K. Yu 2007; S. Yun 2008), mainland China’s muhyeop 
blockbusters from the 2000s (H. Moon 2011), and Chinese kungfu movies 
from Hollywood (Jai 2006). Muhyeop dramas have yet to be examined. 
Although muhyeop dramas hail from both China and Hong Kong, many South 
Koreans believe that muhyeop is a product only of Hong Kong. This is due to 
the recognizable success and characteristics of Hong Kong muhyeop films. 
KV4217 said, “I don’t like historical dramas. It does not mean I never watch 
them. I watch dramas with historical themes when they have many action 
                                                                
212 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
213 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
214 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 24, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
215 Interview with a South Korean respondent, January 2, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
216 It is important to note that South Korean novels also have the muhyeop genre, which is 
largely influenced by Chinese muhyeop novels, such as Jin Yong.  
217Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 28, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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scenes. The main characters can fly, hang on to cliffs, draw and use swords.” 
Her interpretation of the attractions of these products shows that she finds 
the visual effects, embodied actions and techniques enjoyable.  
Muhyeop dramas and films that were made in Hong Kong were much 
more popular in South Korea in the 1980s than now, as explained earlier. The 
so-called “Bruce Lee generation”218 is another interesting example. A female 
respondent, KV5219 had a favorite “Chinese” actor. She said, “I have an elder 
brother. He was an extremely big fan of Bruce Lee’s. Because of my brother, I 
had to strike poses seen in the dramas and movies with him, and practice 
Chwigwon (Drunken Master). Yeah, it might sound crazy, though I actually 
liked to do it with him. This sums up my childhood. I think that’s why I used 
to listen to Hong Kong songs and, later, further develop my interest in the 
Chinese language.” Obviously, dramas or other media products can play an 
important role in shaping a person’s thoughts and interest in the language 
and even the country.  
 
Contemporary themes 
While it is largely true that Chinese history and martial arts themes are most 
popular, as attested by the majority of the interviewees, there are some 
intriguing examples of other genres. The Chinese drama, Dwelling 
Narrowness, which was set in Shanghai, has been analyzed from the 
perspective of China’s neoliberal development policy (Liang 2010; Yu 2011). 
                                                                
218 This is included in a book title by Yoo (1995). The author is a South Korean poet and film 
director.  
219Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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KV39220  said, “I happened to watch a drama entitled Woju (Dwelling 
Narrowness)221 when I was in China. My Chinese friend went to buy DVDs 
with me and suggested it. She said it reflects the reality of China, what we, 
Chinese, in our 20s and 30s, are concerned about. When I watched some 
Chinese news and drama programs, the first thing that came to mind was that 
this did not seem to be the China I had visited and where I had lived. But 
Woju felt like China. Later, I learnt that it the State had banned its broadcast 
because the drama was seen as harmful to society.” She later realized that the 
drama was not available either on TV or on the Internet. As a student of 
Chinese Studies, KV39222 wanted to know about the “real” China and every 
aspect of China.  
In the contemporary thematic TV dramas, Beijing and Shanghai are 
the major background locations. The Modern Family of China (Jiayou’ernv of 
Beijing),223 which was broadcasted by Beijing dianshitai (BTV), is a 20-minute 
sitcom (qingjingxiju) about two divorced couples and their families. In China 
season 1 aired in 2005 and the series has ended after four seasons. There is 
also an animated sister version (Jiayou’ernv xinzhuan) that does not relate to 
the four seasons. The first season of this drama (Motmalrineungajok in 
Korean) was also aired in Junghwa TV of South Korea in 2008. KV52 said, 
“Since this was a sitcom, it’s short and situational and easy to understand. It 
made me keep watching it.” What mattered for the respondent was not about 
                                                                
220 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
221 The English title is Dwelling Narrowness, which I adopt from what the Chinese 
broadcasting station uses. Woju is the Chinese title.   
222 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
223 Retrieved March 13, 2013 (http://baike.baidu.com/view/246459.htm). 
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the “Beijingness” in the drama, but rather the type of the media products. 
iPartment (Aiqing gongyu)224 is produced by the Shanghai Film Group Co. Ltd. 
(Shanghai Dianyingjituangongsi).225  
This series consists of four seasons and will be turned into a movie. 
Season 1 aired in August 2009, Season 2 in January 2011,226 Season 3 in July 
2012227 and Season 4 was aired in the summer of 2013. “iPartment makes me 
understand the joys and sorrows of the young people in Shanghai who are my 
age,” according to KV40 who studied in China. She also added, “I like Shanghai 
very much. It was also enjoyable to see the scenery of Shanghai when 
watching this drama.” Obviously, people consume media products selectively.  
 
Taiwanese dramas as an alternative 
KV38228 elaborated, “Dramas I watched among Chinese (jungkuk) dramas? I 
can only think of something like Liuxing Huayuan (The Meteor Garden). It is 
very childish, but it becomes very interesting after watching a few episodes.” 
While she studied a China-related subject as an undergraduate student as a 
result of an interest in the Chinese language, like many consumers and 
audiences, she did not choose mainland Chinese media contents. Rather, she 
sought out an alternative to meet her standards in the consumption of media 
products. When asked what their primary reason was to watch Taiwanese 
instead of Chinese dramas, some of my informants said that the Chinese 
                                                                
224 Retrieved March 13, 2013 (http://baike.baidu.com/view/221103.htm#1). 
225 Retrieved April 2, 2013 (http://www.sfs-cn.com). 
226 Retrieved March 13, 2013 (http://movie.douban.com/subject/4707205/). 
227 Retrieved March 13, 2013 (http://movie.douban.com/subject/6312211/). 
228 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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media products lack celebrities. They could not think of Chinese actors or 
actresses they liked. On the other hand, “I like Joseph Cheng. I started to 
watch any media products that he took part in. Playful Kiss is like The Meteor 
Garden, it is for teenagers.229 It is funny and it often does not make any sense,” 
said KV1. Finally, respondents tend to agree that Taiwanese Chinese may not 
be the authentic language. This is in line with the mainlanders’ point of view, 
as the following interview with KV51230 illustrates: “The Chinese language 
that Taiwanese people speak is not authentic; I also feel the same way. I don’t 
want to learn that Chinese, but Taiwanese dramas are easy to watch, easy to 
understand and funny. I don’t need to think a lot when I watch them.” She also 
had this to say: “I went to Ha’erbin to learn Chinese. People say the Chinese 
sound there is clean and haoting (pleasant to listen to). I am inclined to the 
accent.” 
It might be suggested among some Korean Chinese-language learners 
that one should visit China, rather than Taiwan, to learn Chinese. It is usually 
perceived that the PRC Chinese language is the only authentic one. However, 
for them, Chinese dramas do not necessarily mean that they are only 
originated from China. Indeed, the way that South Koreans delineate the 
boundaries of what constitutes “China” and such boundaries of what 
“Chinese dramas” are does not necessarily correspond to each other.  
 
Ambivalence between “Chinese” dramas and boundaries of China 
                                                                
229 These are Taiwanese dramas that are based on Japanese manga or novels. Both have also 
been reproduced by South Korean production companies in Korean-language versions. 
230 Interview with a South Korean respondent, February 4, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
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As stated previously, when informants were asked “Have you watched 
Chinese (jungkuk) dramas?” their answers varied. No matter whether they 
have experienced China through travel, language, culture, or media, some of 
the South Korean informants have not watched Chinese programs. However, a 
substantial number of those who majored in China-related studies at 
university or secondary school have often consumed these programs. 
Although the question during my interview sessions was precisely phrased to 
ask “Jungkuk,” which refers to China,231 what I immediately heard from these 
informants then was beyond this category. In other words, their immediate 
answers were always about another Chinese society, not China, in spite of the 
fact that unlike in English, where the word “Chinese” refers to: (1) the 
language of China, and (2) a native or inhabitant of China, or a person of 
Chinese descent. Chinese as an adjective means relating to China or its 
language, culture, or people, in Korean China/Chinese, Hong Kong(ese) and 
Taiwan(ese) in Korean are different words and indicate different things. 
Furthermore, the interviewees were very conscious of the political 
differences. KV37232 said, “I am very angry when I hear Chinese people argue 
                                                                
231 In order not to give any confusion to the informants and to be faithful to the aim of this 
study, I consciously use “China,” instead of using “Taiwan” or “Hong Kong,” unless their 
answer contains certain elements of the other two Chinese societies—Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. It is important to note that, when it comes to culture and cultural/media products, 
the three Chinese societies—China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—have different developmental 
stages and histories. Hence, my usages of these terms or boundaries reflect on the 
development, rather than delivering my political stance of how to make boundaries among 
them. On a different note, in Korean, China/Chinese, Hong Kong(ese) and Taiwan(ese) are 
apparently different words, unlike when they are contextualized in English, “Chinese” often 
conveys not particularly China, but Chinese. 
232 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 20, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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that Taiwan is part of China. Even Korea seems a territory of China to them,233” 
and, “Isn’t Taiwan just Taiwan? I never had a chance to visit Taiwan, but the 
people seem so different from mainland Chinese. The language sounds 
different to me.”  
Another informant KV33234 shared the same opinion as KV37235 on 
this matter and reflected: “I know Hong Kong was returned to China officially, 
but, to me, Hong Kong and China are still so different. They cannot be one 
country from my perspective. Hong Kong, to me, is the “hometown” of Leslie 
Cheung. But China is unordered and has a wide range of disparities within 
the country.” Obviously, South Koreans perceive Taiwan and Hong Kong as 
individual countries. In terms of culture and media Taiwan/Hong Kong is one 
group and China as another; some viewers do not support the political stance 
of the Chinese government, in relation to Taiwan and Hong Kong. The 
“disparity” in their responses showed that they do not equate “China” with 
dramas from China. 
In line with this perspective, a small debate over constructing the 
boundaries of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in an internet community 
named Muhyeop Jungguk (China), the name of an internet community in 
South Korea gives us a good illustration. This started with a question, “What 
is Jungguk?” posed by a netizen with the user ID 1peaceyo: “Making 
                                                                
233 This is in line with a comment I received at the end of my presentation on South Koreans 
in Singapore which was held in Beijing on August 2, 2013. A Chinese audience member 
shared his opinion of how Chinese think of Singapore. He continued that, “We, Chinese 
people, think that Singapore is part of China (Xinjiapo shi Zhongguode).” 
234 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 17, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
235Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 20, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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boundaries of China/Hong Kong/Taiwan,” which was published on November 
5, 2011. There were 31 replies to the post on the same day. Most of the 
responses elaborated that Taiwan is not part of China. One reply by Qianhao 
indicates that Taiwan and Hong Kong are not countries; they are respectively 
an island and a city that are part of China. Interestingly, a subsequent reply to 
this particular comment asks: “Are you Chinese (Junggukin)?” Qianhao said, 
“Differentiating dramas and movies of Taiwan, China and Hong Kong are 
quite easy. Hong Kongese dramas and films are produced in Cantonese; 
products of China and Taiwan are mostly in Mandarin.” No matter how 
accurate the responses of the debate are, it shows the scope of the debates 
over the boundary issue in a Korean public sphere.  
Significantly, in contrast, to the Korean media practitioners, “China” is 
only for PRC. “In the Department of Global Business in our company, there are 
sub-divisions of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,” said KM7.236 Some stations 
do not have departments according to country, but only according to region. 
They see China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong as part of the Greater China, but they 
perceive the three differently. The differences in the viewers and media 
practitioners’ perception can be explained by the boundaries that are drawn 
between the professionals and the ordinary. 
 
Chinese language majors as predominantly exclusive consumers 
Among Chinese major students some do not watch Chinese dramas. One 
                                                                
236 Interview with a South Korean media professional, January 25, 2012, Seoul, South Korea. 
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insistently explained, “It is not interesting,” and “I am not interested in the 
culture or media of China, but interested in the Chinese language. China is the 
neighbor of South Korea and has been important to the country, especially 
during this era of China’s rise. That’s why I learn Chinese and major in 
Chinese studies. In the process of learning Chinese, there is no need to watch 
uninteresting programs.” To them, China and the Chinese language are only a 
“means” for job-hunting or the future, and the programs of China are not 
enjoyable. This is the “opposite” in the case of American and Japanese dramas, 
which are commonly watched, even by students do not major in the language, 
to learn English or Japanese, or for interests in the cultures.  
It is clear, then, that Chinese dramas are less of an attraction to South 
Koreans. KV39,237 a Chinese language major, shared her view about the major 
consumers of Chinese media in South Korea: “You only watch Chinese media 
if Chinese is your major [. . .] People do not watch them except those who 
really like China. That’s partly because Chinese media commodities are not 
sophisticated or interesting.”  
In nine out of ten cases, my informants said, “That we watch them 
does not necessarily mean they are popular, but rather unpopular.” This 
rather contradictory response shows that Chinese culture and media 
products have gained the attention of students who major in Chinese studies 
not because they are popular. KV1238 said, “Most people who have an interest 
in Taiwanese trendy dramas (ouxiangju) are learning Chinese. Otherwise, 
                                                                
237 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
238 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 19, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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ordinary people do not have any interest in Chinese culture. There is a 
prevalent view that they are of bad quality.  
People generally think of programs in which Jackie Chan, Jet Li, or 
Stephen Chow appear as “Chinese” (jungguk).” This is the most frequent 
answer that I encountered when I asked who (among their peers) watched 
them and whether they are popular. However, from the interview data, I feel 
that this attitude is largely confined to specific groups of people with 
knowledge of Chinese. To put it differently, Chinese media products are only 
accessible to those that majored in Chinese.  
KV9239 commented, “Chinese major students or people who already 
have an interest in China are the only groups of people who consumed. I 
made a great effort to know more about China, and conducted research by 
having an interest in China. By way of doing this, I made considerable 
endeavors to encounter Chinese culture. But, actually, if I, including people 
like me, do not deliberately devote myself to do so, I do not always feel like 
watching them. In South Korea there is no such Chinese mania. We prefer to 
rather watch Korean programs.” She also added to her earlier response, 
“Besides someone who had lived in China, giving them a stronger interest in 
China, most South Koreans’ feelings towards China are negative.” 
In contrast to KV9’s240 response, there are some people who are 
considered as “maniac.”241 Comparing to those who love foreign cultures and 
                                                                
239 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 30, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
240 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 30, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
241 Jungd(rama) pein describes Chinese drama mania in Korean.  
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frequently consume their media commodities, the number of people who are 
into Chinese drama (i.e. Chinese drama mania) tends to be small. Hong Kong 
programs were undoubtedly popular among some South Koreans who were 
young in the 1980s and 1990s. Hong Kong celebrities were their ultimate 
superstars and idols and the adoration is very much reflected in their 
definition of “popular”. KV8242 said, “Back then, some people even wore the 
so-called “Chow Yun-Fat style,” which is a combination of a white shirt, black 
suit and trench coat. It was fashionable at that time. Yun-Fat Chow and Jackie 
Chan movies, for example, Drunken Master,243 were popular.” However, 
attitudes towards them have changed. Some informants reflected on Hong 
Kongese programs in terms of teenage nostalgia. KV7244 said “In the past, 
Hong Kong’s programs were popular in South Korea. There are a lot of 
friends who like Leslie Cheung. However, the situation has somewhat 
reversed now. If I watch Chinese programs, I feel the background and setting 
in these products lag behind. I feel that actors only read scripts, instead of 
acting nicely. Their performance is limited. The content is even copied from 
somewhere else. Of course, some of our programs also were copied from 
Japanese ones, but in the case of China, it is worse. When I watch them, I feel 
that they are full of cut and pastes from this drama and that drama. As a 
consequence of this, they do not well fit into the whole drama.”  
                                                                
242 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
243 The Korean title of this movie is Qwigwon. 
244 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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Similarly, KV6245 commented, “In the old days, Hong Kongese movies 
were well developed, which made people to watch them very often. 
Nowadays, we are better than China and, in other words, China is below us.” 
The change in attitude obviously has much to do with the 
phenomenon of the Korean Wave. KV9246 also shared her view, “The Korean 
wave is popular in China. The cultural flow from Hong Kong to South Korea in 
the old days is now reversed. Now, the South Korean cultural level is high,” 
and, “what ‘popular’ means to transnational audiences is having famous 
celebrities that the PRC is currently lacking. In South Korea, there is no point 
in differentiating PRC Chinese dramas or Taiwanese dramas; this is because 
neither of them is that popular and they do not have to be classified into 
different categories. 
 Interestingly, some “Chinese” celebrities’ fan communities have 
formed: Joseph Cheng, Jay Chou, and Mike Ha. . . .” The response of KV9 is 
intriguing in that her classifications of dramas are rather contradictory to her 
above-mentioned views of the Chinese. In particular, she turned these three 
actors into “Chinese” (jungkuk) celebrities, not Taiwanese ones. Although she 
consciously tries to separate China from Taiwan and vice versa, it is difficult 
for her to completely make sense of the boundaries between China and 
Taiwan in terms of cultural commodities. 
Apparently, South Korean viewers and non-viewers feel that, 
technologically and culturally speaking, the Chinese are inferior to them. The 
                                                                
245 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
246 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 30, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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quality of Chinese programs and a shortage of celebrities negatively affect 
their attraction to and consumption of Chinese cultural commodities. 
Perceptions of China influence South Koreans to not choose to watch Chinese 
programs. KV6247’s comment is interesting: “Mainland Chinese movies that 
are shown in movie theaters tend not to be very popular. They either earn no 
profit or fail to gather enough moviegoers. Perceptions towards China that 
South Korea has are generally not good. The prevalent viewpoint is that 
China is a backward country; as a consequence of this line of thinking, we do 
not want to know and learn about the Chinese culture.”  
Under these circumstances, Chinese efforts in generating soft-power 
among these Koreans must be said to have failed.  
As shown earlier, “Chinese” media in South Korea is not a late-comer 
but one of the existing foreign players. While it may not be the most 
predominant foreign media products in South Korea, it could suggest the 
possibility of a Chinese wave. Since Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, the 
pattern of producing Chinese dramas has changed. Hong Kong culture and 
cultural products has diminished while that of China has grown. Accordingly, 
the pattern of importing Chinese dramas has changed. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, a number of cable stations carry Chinese programs on a 
regular basis. More importantly, unlike other foreign programs, there are 
cable stations committed to delivering only Chinese programs.  
The consumption of Chinese media products in South Korea and how 
                                                                
247 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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responses vary depending on their personal engagement with China and the 
Chinese language havae been examined. Although ambivalent attitudes 
between PRC Chinese and Hong Kongese and Taiwanese may not be the 
intended outcome of the Chinese government’s “going global” strategy, it is 
reinforced by Korean viewers’ perceptions, which may be based on the 
relations between these three places. The “complicated” relationship makes 
South Korean viewers see the boundaries of these Chinese societies 
differently. Also, for the case of Hong Kong, it does not correspond with the 
“One Country, Two Systems” policy as a coincidental response.  
In summary, it is worth revisiting the reactions of both the South 
Korean media practitioners and viewers’ reception of Chinese cultural 
products. For the media professionals, the Chinese media-export-as-soft-
power strategy has not influenced their decision instead their company 
practices play the important role in importing overseas programs. The 
reasons why Chinese programs are visible in South Korea are as follows: 
availability, reasonable price, and the fact that the programs tend to run 
longer. The media professionals’ practices are also significantly shaped by the 
local market. Such invisible power relations between local and foreign 
products, in turn, shape the consumption patterns of South Koreans for them 
to incline to South Korean products. Inevitably, there is a tug-of-war contest 
between the local and the foreign. It intertwines with the process of 




From viewers’ responses, we find: First, there are diverse motivations 
behind why viewers watch Chinese dramas, among them are those with 
living experience, including studying and traveling to China, or who enjoy 
other facets of China, such as culture and history; they become interested in 
Chinese media because of these non-media interests. Second, the experiences 
of Korean viewers in watching Chinese dramas and constructing boundaries 
for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan largely depend on their interpretation. 
Transferring Chinese values, which are at the core of such media programs, to 
a culturally proximate and ideologically different group, is not easy to do and 
makes expanding the market for Chinese media in South Korea difficult. 
Especially since South Korea’s own products prevail domestically and in 
other countries, thereby giving South Korean media practitioners confidence 
in their products.  
Third, for non-viewers, China may be just a means of future job 
stability, not as a country having cultural power or a globalized culture. Non-
viewers of PRC Chinese dramas also tend to prefer to watch programs from 
other parts of Greater China, namely Taiwan and Hong Kong. Overall, the 
global media strategy of the Chinese government is only partially successful. 
From the Chinese government’s point of view, Hong Kong and Taiwan are, 
inherently part of China, so it sees these two societies as falling within the 
category of Chinese media. In this light, the Chinese government is 
unintentionally successful, with the help of cultural products of Hong Kong 




6.3 The Japanese audience of Chinese media  
Consuming China, Experiencing China: From the consumption to 
reception of Chinese media in Japan 
Finding audiences for Chinese media in Japan is not an easy task because of 
the limited range of Chinese programs that are imported into the country. 
Consequently, it was difficult to find attentive viewers; those who watch “PRC” 
Chinese media products in Japan were few among my interviewees. Many of 
the pre-modern and modern Chinese TV programs portray anti-Japanese 
sentiments and revolutionary themes, making them difficult to export to 
Japan. Thus, these thematic Chinese media products were by-and-large 
missing not only from my fieldwork data, but also in Japanese TV schedules. 




As in South Korea, historical themes are the most popular types of Chinese 
media in Japan as well. JV10248 mentioned, “I encountered every type—books, 
games and manga—of Three Kingdoms.” JV12249 also mentioned, “I watched 
the drama Journey to the West.” Both are regionally famous Chinese novel-
originated cultural products and were also mentioned in interviews with 
                                                                
248 Interview with a Japanese respondent, February 13, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
249 Interview with a Japanese respondent, March 28, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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Koreans, such as KV19250  and KV67251.  
Given the limited thematic range and restricted distribution of 
imported Chinese programs in Japan, their consumption by Japanese 
audiences over PRC Chinese programs is inherently constrained. 
Acknowledging this situation, the following informant, JV42,252 who studied 
in South Korea, has somewhat different experiences in his consumption than 
other Japanese viewers in general: “The Chinese dramas that I have watched 
so far were all in South Korea when I was on an exchange program there for a 
year.” He continued, “Justice Pao and The Return of the Pearl Princess were the 
ones that I watched in South Korea. In South Korea there are some Chinese 
programs on TV, but I cannot get them in Japan.” Although he was in South 
Korea in the late 2000s, decades after the dramas were produced, many 
South Korean cable TV channels re-run these famous and popular Chinese 
dramas. In virtue of this, the Japanese’ soft power experience of China can be 
mediated by and in another country, as in the case of JV42. 253  
Notwithstanding the limited importing of PRC Chinese media products, 
JV23254 conveyed her experience of consuming PRC Chinese products. She 
said, “Through watching dramas, movies or singing songs, I can learn some 
Chinese.” For her, as a student of Chinese, such consumption is for language 
learning. For the purpose of enhancing Chinese language ability, she 
alternatively chooses Chinese, not Taiwanese products. Such situation is also 
                                                                
250 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 10, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
251 Interview with a South Korean respondent, June 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
252 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 25, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
253 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 25, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
254 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 17, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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observed in the case of South Korea. 
 
Consuming Hong Kong: Martial arts or kung fu 
Kungfu is one of the salient themes of Chinese cultural commodities. The 
meanings of particular words (Chin 1996) and the interpretation of the 
Chinese chivalrous novels (jianghu/martial arts) (Pei 2010), particularly the 
novels of the Chinese writer Jin Yong have been a spotlight for scholars. Jin 
(1996) explored the attractiveness of Jin Yong’s wuxia novels and the culture 
of Hong Kong. B. Cho (2003) linked Jin Yong’s Chinese Martial Arts Novels to 
nationalism (B. Cho 2003), using Ludingji (The Deer and the Cauldron), one of 
the outstanding works of Jin Yong as a case study (B. Cho 2005). It is widely 
known to Japanese people that kungfu is the main theme of media products 
from Hong Kong and kungfu films and wuxia novels have received academic 
attention (Okasaki 1996; Yamamoto 2007). Wu (2005) investigated how Jin 
Yong’s martial arts novels are received in the context of Japan (Wu 2005). If 
Jin Yong, as frequently documented in the Japanese academia, is the most 
well-known Chinese novelist, his equivalent in media products is Jackie Chan. 
“Jackie Chan is famous in Japan” was one of the frequent phrases among 
Japanese respondents. Except for Jackie Chan, there was no recurring name 
that I heard of during my interviews with informants. 
JV48,255 who has involved in translating subtitles and programs into 
Japanese, commented, “As far as I am concerned, recently oldies (gulao) are 
                                                                
255 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 7, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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often on TV. Shaolin, wudapian, films and dramas of Cheng Long (Jackie Chan) 
and Liu Dehua (Andy Lau) are examples. I used to work as a translator of 
subtitles, for dubbing purpose, from Chinese to Japanese. Some of the above 
programs are my translation.” Due to the rich experiences of his involvement 
in producing media products and crafting local tastes, he felt particularly 
drawn to Chinese dramas. He shared his memories: “There was another TV 
station that broadcast programs directly from Xianggang Meiyadianshitai 
(Hong Kong Meiya Broadcasting Station) some time ago. It seems that it went 
bankrupt due to management reasons.” This implies that it is rather difficult 
for Chinese media programs providers to survive in Japan. The discontinuity 
and absence of such providers in the country allows us to reasonably 
speculate that there are only a limited number of fixed audiences because of 
the limited content and inaccessibility of the programs and a general lack of 
recognition from the wider viewing public.  
 
Consuming Taiwanese dramas 
Trendy and modern Taiwanese dramas like Playful Kiss and The Meteor 
Garden were frequently mentioned by female viewers. As the story of The 
Meteor Garden originated from Japanese manga, many Japanese were familiar 
with the story. They thus felt the series to be accessible and easy to 
understand. 256  Interviewees all concluded that Taiwanese dramas are 
modern, urban and trendy, compared to the PRC Chinese ones that are 
                                                                
256 There is a Taiwanese version as well as a mainland version. 
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considered as backward, boring, and unattractive. JV23257 said, “I have two 
purposes in watching media products generally. For enjoyment: Taiwanese 
dramas are the example. I watched some Taiwanese dramas which have 
teenage sentiments, but if I watch them now I don’t feel like they fit my style. 
Of learning language: By watching them, I could be exposed to more Chinese.” 
Karyū258 literally refers to the cultural flows from China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong but, in reality, it only refers to Taiwan and Hong Kong. JV39’s259 
response was typical of Japanese informants: “Hong Kongese is different from 
Chinese; Taiwanese programs are different from Chinese too.” Some of the 
Japanese respondents are not aware of the term Karyū; however, the 
following account articulates and defines the term from the viewpoint of a 
Japanese audience. JV33260 said, “People who are now in their twenties or 
thirties tend to like the Korean wave but, to some extent, it seems that some 
of the people who are in their forties and fifties like Taiwanese culture and 
media (karyū). Among them, there are quite a few who like Taiwanese idols 
or dramas, for example, the dance group F4, dramas, or singers.” Apparently, 
Karyū may not be the most popular foreign culture in Japan but there are 
                                                                
257 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 17, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
258 There is only a limited amount of documentation on this. Yet, there are records on news 
media discussions on the Chinese wave on the basis of a South Korean Integrated Newspaper 
Database System (KINDS) search of newspaper articles. The discussions, which are 
concentrated on the rise of Taiwanese and PRC Chinese media products, go as early as 2006. 
See E. Kim (2006). This indicates a fear and worry about the loss of the Korean wave as the 
prevailing force not only in South Korea and countries such as Japan and China. Discussions 
from 2007 to 2008 are focused on PRC Chinese media products, as well as traditional culture 
by acknowledging China’s going global strategy. It is interesting such discussions have not 
been visible in South Korean newspapers since 2008, which China pushes further forward 
such strategy. 
259 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
260 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 22, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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some who still consume them (E. Kim 2006).261 However, Karyū exists as a 
Taiwanese wave, rather than a PRC Chinese one, which is absent.  
JV39’s262 response was typical of Japanese informants who believe 
that the three societies are different from each other: “Hong Kongese is 
different from Chinese; Taiwanese programs are different from Chinese too.” 
JV23263 provided an extensive account of her views on watching Taiwanese: 
“We—or I—like Taiwanese, or overseas Chinese actors or singers. I cannot 
think of any Chinese singers or actors . . . nor do I like them.” She also added, 
“Taiwanese dramas are childish. I watched some, although they were for 
teenagers. I have never watched Chinese (PRC) dramas. Although PRC 
dramas are often shown on TV, Japanese people prefer to watch more 
Taiwanese dramas.” Among the platforms for Taiwanese-produced products 
are: “Tokyo Max has a corner and program to introduce Taiwanese films and 
drama.” Also, “Nihon-TV usually has Taiwanese too. Meteor Garden was 
shown in Nihon TV.”“BS has Taiwanese as well as (PRC) Chinese programs.” 
The existence of Taiwanese programs in the Japanese media market impedes 
PRC Chinese programs from attaining success. In terms of sources and 
channels, “There is neither special contact, nor information [on it].” 
 
Configuring preferences and perceptions towards another “China” 
                                                                
261 See Kim, Eunjin. 2006. “Hwaryue jjogineun “Hallyu Drama”…ilbon TV bangyeong jeolban 
“dduk” [“Hallyu Drama, now Only Half of the Usual Broadcast, is Run after the Chinese 
Wave.””] March 8, 2006. SekyeIlbo. Retrieved May 20, 2013. 
262 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
263 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 17, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. JV23 is a PhD student 
majoring in Chinese Studies at Tokyo University. 
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In linking the responses among interviewees, more attention is now given to 
the underlying rationales why the Japanese are not keen on consuming PRC 
Chinese products. To begin with, for Japanese audience PRC Chinese 
programs have no distinctive character, whereas Hong Kong and Taiwan 
programs do have salient characteristics. JV39264  said, “Hong Kongese 
programs are famous for action, in other words, have some characteristics. I 
cannot think of this sort of thing for Chinese ones.” Similarly, JV48265 who had 
lived in Harbin until age 10 (due to his parents having a business there) said, 
“For Chinese entertainment and dramas, Hong Kong and Taiwan, respectively, 
immediately came into my mind. For PRC China, I would firstly think history-
related themes.” The clear division themes, which is consistent with the case 
of South Korea, shows that there is limit to possible Japanese consumers’ 
exposed to Chinese programs. He said, “At home, I have a subscription of Sky 
Perfect TV.266 The Sky Perfect TV is not a free channel. This channel has quite 
a few of PRC Chinese dramas, and occasionally has Taiwan and Hong Kong 
dramas and movies.” He is one of the devoted Japanese audiences. His stay in 
China for several years when he was young contributed to the maintaining of 
his interest in China and the Chinese language. He holds a very positive view 
towards China and Chinese, he said, “Many Japanese people think “I don’t like 
China or I don’t like Chinese.” I do not have such a strong sentiment. There is 
its own way of life in China. Of course, it is different from Japan’s way of a 
                                                                
264 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
265 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 7, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
266 Sky Perfect TV. Retrieved May 7, 2012 (http://www.skyperfectv.co.jp/). 
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living. It’s for sure less clean than Japan. After some time living there, I could 
adapt to the way of life in China. I felt comfortable being there.” The 
antagonistic perception of Japanese people in general towards China that he 
alluded to is very frequently observed in the case of Japan, as well as in South 
Korea. 
JV23267 only chooses Taiwanese media products, not PRC China’s 
products when she wants to have fun while watching TV. For the purpose of 
enhancing Chinese language ability, she alternatively chooses PRC Chinese 
products, rather than Taiwanese ones. This is also common response among 
Koreans who are learning Chinese as these foreign audiences think that the 
PRC Chinese accent is the authentic one. Consumer preference over PRC 
Chinese and Taiwanese products varies. In terms of learning language, PRC 
Chinese accentuated programs are preferred, but for content and pleasure 
Taiwanese programs are chosen. These compartmentalized choices of 
products from different origins showed the way in which Chinese cultural 
commodities are consumed. Thus, as such, China’s soft power in Japan is 
reconstructed.  
 
(Re)Making and contesting boundaries of “China” for the Japanese and 
for configuring the Chinese soft power field 
This section will focus on how boundaries, images, preferences, and relations 
shape the Chinese soft power field in Japan whilst noting that Taiwan, Hong 
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Kong, and the PRC remain as individual countries in the Japanese mindscape. 
JV40,268 an avid viewer of “Chinese” media products and a frequent visitor to 
Taiwan, commented, “There is no good image about China. China ignores 
Taiwan, China prevents Taiwan from gaining de facto independence. There is 
an ongoing territorial issue. China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are different.” 
What is consequential is that this is not just a personal view limited to JV40. 
JV48269 revealed, “The Chinese and Taiwanese are not good in relationships—
this might mean they are not good at making friends [. . .] Hong Kong people 
and Chinese are different. Hong Kong people dislike Chinese. They don’t want 
to be Chinese.” Of Hong Kong and China, JV45270 commented, “PRC Chinese 
people have a desire to want to become Hong Kongese. Hong Kong is different 
from China, but it is getting closer or even similar to China after its return to 
China.” And on a cultural similarity, JV23271 commented, “Taiwan and Hong 
Kong are culturally close. China is different from them.” On the political 
position of these three societies, she also mentioned, “The three are 
politically different entities.” 
 JV51272 said, “What I like about China, well, I and we—Japanese 
people—like Chinese food, movies . . . but, Chinese people argue so strongly.” I 
asked why she seems to have a problem with their argument style and 
whether she has experienced it before. She said, “I don’t have Chinese 
colleagues or friends. But, I heard many people said that to me. If you look at 
                                                                
268 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
269 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 7, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
270 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 27, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
271 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 17, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
272 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 13, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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Chinese students in Japan now, they don’t speak Japanese or mingle with our 
culture.” No matter whether what she has heard and observed is true, 
unquestionably, it is a shared view of the Japanese.  
Reciprocity, connection, and interaction also matter in constructing 
images of China. JV35273 shared her views on the cultural influence of China 
on Japan: “Clothing, fashion: US, Europe. TV, drama, music: Korea (from 
recent years). Why is there no influence of Chinese culture on entertainment? 
The Japanese think that culture is equal to entertainment.” Furthermore, “We 
never hear that in China there are people who like Japan (in China, Japanese 
products are popular, they import many Japanese products) from the news or 
media of Japan. We don’t know much about the situation in China. On the 
other hand, I heard that in South Korea there are some people who like the 
Japanese male groups of singers Arashi, SMAP or their songs, or that they 
have held performances there. From this, I know that Japanese culture is 
popular in South Korea.” She further elaborated, “Chinese culture and 
Japanese culture are similar, in my opinion.” Despite such cultural similarities, 
this Japanese informant still claims not to know China. She selectively and 
consistently does not embrace China by any means because her 
predetermined perception of and view towards China.  
When it comes to the Taiwan issue, Japanese informants share their 
strong feelings towards Taiwan. This is a common practice of Japan to 
delineate a boundary of China. Thinking of Taiwan as a foreign country which 
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has an “intimate” relationship with Japan is largely reflected in a collective 
identity that ties Japan and Taiwan. In particular, JV18274 told me, “Hong Kong 
belongs to China, but not Taiwan.” Another informant, JV58 275  said, 
“Taiwanese like Japanese people. I met a Taiwanese couple when I did 
trekking before. They told me that they want to visit Japan sometime, they 
like Japan so much, and are interested in Japan.” She added, “On a different 
note, we received the biggest donor amount for the 3.11 earthquake in 2011 
from Taiwan.” Similarly, JV23276 said, “Japanese think that Taiwanese like us, 
while Chinese dislike us. . . .”  
Both the responses of JV23 and JV58 and the latent use of “mutual 
likeness” implies this line of sentiment matters and is shared by not only the 
informants, but also other Japanese respondents in general.  
In East Asia history and geopolitics matter. JV33 277  reflected, 
“Recently the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue was one of the hot issues but not many 
people knew about it or were interested in it [. . .] I don’t talk about it with my 
girlfriend—Chinese.” He added, “The Dokdo/Takeshima issue was also the 
same. I knew that because I had a Korean friend; before I had no interest in it 
at all.” “Koreans have naembi geunsong—easy to be stirred and easy to 
remember—while the Japanese do not act (kanjouteki).278 We don’t have any 
interest in other things and other people. In this regard, the Chinese reaction 
seems similar to that of the Koreans.” He expressed the Japanese indifference 
                                                                
274 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 13, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
275 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
276 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 17, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
277 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 22, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
278 The Japanese word is being easy to sentimental and getting stirred. 
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to sensitive historical issues is unequivocally, “I don’t have an interest and 
many Japanese feel the same.  
There are not many people who know about Dokdo/Senkaku issues. If 
they know about them, they don’t want to know why they happened, where 
they originated from and what the issues are,” and, “Even in the news, when 
it’s like, “Today it will be raining in the region of Hiroshima,” this has no 
impact at all. We don’t learn about the Nanjing issue. I personally don’t know 
about it either.” 
As a whole, there are several obstacles in the embracing of Chinese 
media in Japan. The Japanese perception of China and Chinese media, as 
argued earlier, on the one hand, and the Japanese media structure, as 
explained in Chapter 5, on the other hand, are constraints in bringing Chinese 
media products into the Japanese media market. This resulted from general 
perceptions of Japanese culture as being “superior” in the Japanese mindset, 
the continuous strength of Hong Kongese and Taiwanese products, and the 
Korean content act as a hindrance for China to enter and compete in the 
Japanese market in a way that may result in a competition over soft power in 
the region. As Korean media products perform well in China and Japan and 
other parts of Asian countries, China, as a latecomer, who wants to further 
develop its export market, feels the pressure. This is well captured in the 
discussion of a popularity of a Korean TV drama My Love from the Star in the 
People’s Congress of China early 2014, which led to an inquiry into why China 
cannot make such programs (Long and Lee 2014). 
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This section has highlighted the roles of cultural, political, and 
national boundaries of “China” for Japanese consumers to consume Chinese 
media products. The reciprocity and connection between Japan and Taiwan, 
in particular, shape the Japanese to be more inclined towards the Taiwanese, 
rather than the products of the PRC Chinese. Also, history and geopolitics 
between China and Japan, and between Taiwan and Japan, are influential in 
affecting the degree of which the Japanese consume the respective media 
products. 
 
6.4 Discussion and Summary: Byproducts of soft power, unintended 
consequences of soft power 
This chapter has examined the consumption and reception of Chinese soft 
power through media products as a vehicle of soft power in the two reception 
countries of South Korea and Japan. It has investigated the variations in 
response to soft power making via media consumption when different 
factors—culture, the boundaries of China, image, and perceptions—are 
managed among South Korean and Japanese audiences. Likewise, the soft 
power translation process takes place when such products are consumed by 
the audience. This final section will revisit issues of interest and byproducts, 
cultural boundaries, and taste making which are embedded in the South 
Korean and Japanese consumption of Chinese media products and also as 
factors to construct the soft power field that shapes the consumption and 
reception of soft power.  
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The ways in which interests evolve, and the kinds of byproducts that 
are generated in the course of the making of Chinese soft-power in South 
Korea and Japan, are often entangled with each other. It also has to do with 
the rise of China. This entanglement, on the South Korean side, is linked to 
potential economic gains. On the Japanese side, this has to do with 
antagonism over China, which prevents the further gaining of knowledge 
about and exposure to the country. Many South Koreans and Japanese think 
that learning the Chinese language offers work and business opportunities; 
they consider China as an opportunity for their own career development. 
While studying the Chinese language and visiting the country can function as 
a starting point in which interest in China may begin, as byproducts, they are 
simultaneously also the end in itself.279 
In delineating the boundaries of “China,” most South Koreans see 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China in political terms. However, as individual 
consumers, they do not necessarily differentiate the boundaries of China, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong when it comes to the consumption of media and 
cultural products. In other words, South Korean consumers do not know or 
mix the origin of the product within the boundaries of “China” without 
clearly differentiating one from another. Interestingly, in contrast to the 
South Koreans, the Japanese people tend to treat these two societies (China 
and Taiwan) as individual countries. This is particularly prevalent when it 
comes to Taiwan’s independence or political boundaries. Most Japanese 
                                                                
279 See Chapter 5 for similar reasoning. 
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respondents also show their strong support and emotional engagement with 
Taiwan as a separate country, and hence Taiwanese products are the ones 
they are most likely to consume.  
The cultivation of tastes for the enjoyment of Chinese media products 
is highly structured. The example of Hallyu in Japan shows the way the 
markets are structured may affect consumers and thus control the inflow of 
Chinese media products into the Japanese media market. In South Korea the 
rise in popularity of local Korean programs and the fall of interest in Chinese 
programs matters. From what informants convey, the loss of popularity of 
“Hong Kong” programs in a narrow sense and the less importation of good 
“Chinese” programs by the Korean media in a broader sense (more 
institutional) are significant to the exclusive group of consumers-to-be. In 
this sense, KV36’s280 comment is compelling: “In previous years, when iTV281 
broadcast some good Chinese programs, people seemed to have an interest in 
the Chinese content. Now the quality of Korean programs has improved and 
the programs are diversified.” The loss of the golden days of “Chinese” media 
has, to some extent, given way to South Korean programs locally. On the 
Japanese media market, South Korean media products often function as a 
reference for the provision of Chinese programs. The Korean Wave in the 
Japanese media market reduces opportunities for alternative products from 
                                                                
280 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 24, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
281 Unfortunately, due to profit and management issues, iTV was closed. Its successor, 
Gyeongin Broadcasting, whose name changed from iTV, does not provide a similar range of 
broadcasting programs and now only operates only radio programs. 
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other places, such as PRC Chinese products.282 The way in which Korean 
media products are consumed by Japanese informants’ experience of the 
Korean Wave is patently different from their consumption of Chinese media 
products. Thus the lesson is that the effectiveness of Chinese soft power 
through its media products could be projected and consumed throught the 
effort to engender a unique “China wave.” 
For the Korean wave, learning the Korean language is a byproduct of 
its influence; thus it is an outcome of Korean soft power expressed through 
the popularity of the Korean media and pop culture. In contrast to this, from 
what this study shows, Chinese soft power, which is still weak and developing, 
might gain some momentum from people learning the Chinese language for 
study, business, future job searching, interest, or or just plain enjoyment. In a 
nutshell, expected outcomes of soft power in these two cases are seemingly 
similar—to win over the foreign audiences, whereas the mechanism of the 
two varies.  
In the consuming of Chinese products, South Koreans and Japanese 
negotiate and oscillate their choices between acceptance and resistance. In 
South Korea people that have a background majoring in the Chinese language 
or Chinese Studies actively consume Chinese media products but their 
answers vary. As argued earlier, many South Koreans do not clearly delineate 
the origin of the products, unlike their political boundary-making of Chinese 
societies. To them, it is not meaningful to make such distinctions as to the 
                                                                




origins of the products; rather, the themes, historical background, and 
locations of the products play a significant role. This leads them to show an 
ambivalence regarding Chinese soft power. In contrast to the South Korea’s 
response, in Japan, fewer people consume Chinese media products or know 
about their existence in the domestic market. This is in part because the only 
Asian products that are prevalent in the Japanese media marketplace are 
South Korean ones; Japan’s experience of PRC soft power products is eclipsed 
by the power of Hallyu. However, South Korean and Japanese preference for 
Hong Kong and Taiwan’s media products has helped China to build upon the 
Greater China relations as a means of cultural intermediation for audiences.  
To summarize, this chapter has argued that locally embedded 
consumption shapes the experience of South Koreans and Japanese in their 
understanding, consumption, and reception of Chinese soft power. The 
locally-embedded consumption plays a critical role in the making of soft 
power by shaping interests, perceptions, and boundaries. Similar accounts 
have also been found in the domestic institutions and mechanisms in South 
Korea and Japan in bringing in Chinese media products, and configuring 
media marketplaces for a Chinese soft power field. The differences, which are 
captured by informants of South Korea and Japan, lead them to deliver two or 
even multiple stories when revealing their responses to Chinese soft power. 
In turn, a tug of war between China and other “Chinese” products is well 
represented in South Korean and Japanese consumers’ ambivalent and 
complicated attitudes towards PRC Chinese media products.  
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The following chapter will offer a case study of Chinese international 
broadcasting, CCTV-International, to explore further China’s soft power 




























China’s International Broadcasting as Soft Power:  
A Case Study of CCTV International  
 
This final main chapter explores the ways in which one of the highly state-
coordinated media, CCTV, operates as a medium for projecting soft power to 
reach overseas audiences in South Korea and Japan. It aims to examine how a 
market for Chinese-produced international news is constructed and received 
in the two neighboring countries.  
 
7.1 International broadcasting as a soft power maker  
This section offers a brief overview of international broadcasting in general 
and China’s international broadcasting in particular. The development of 
international broadcasting can be summarized as follows. First, it started in 
the 1940s in the context of World War II propaganda (Garber 1942; A. M. Lee 
1945; Berreman 1948; Rowe 1939). In the post-Cold War era, the function, 
style, organization, and transmission of international broadcasting were 
transformed, with new communication technology, the Internet, and the 
World Wide Web. International broadcasting currently means “a complex 
combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertainment 
directed at a population outside the sponsoring state’s boundaries” (Price, 
Haas, and Margolin 2008).  
China’s use of media to reach both internal and external audiences is 
often situated in the context of propaganda. Brown (2008) has delineated 
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two views of propaganda. The first “tends to argue that propaganda can 
control behavior and manipulate entire populations without their being 
aware of it, as is the case in Orwell’s 1984.” The second gives more emphasis 
on the “limitations of propaganda as a tool of policy, and as a rule is more 
skeptical about what propaganda can actually achieve and how its influence 
works” (Brown 2006; 2008). He further suggests that public diplomacy has 
elements of propaganda, but it is not the same as propaganda (Brown 2006; 
2008). International broadcasting is understood in public diplomacy an 
indirect way of conveying a message to target audiences. Recent academic 
discussions in the field, including about public diplomacy (Cull 2008) and 
new technology (Price et al. 2008), have largely concentrated on the Western 
context. A recent attempt has focused on the diffusion of international 
broadcasting within ethnic and language boundaries by exploring diasporic 
communities283 (Ishi 2011). Despite this, non-Western channels have largely 
been ignored in the academic discussions even though, in East Asia Japan’s 
NHK World has a long history. South Korea also has Arirang and the KBS 
World network for the domestic and international audience, along with 
China’s CCTV.  
To reiterate, China’s use of media to reach both internal and external 
audiences is often situated in the context of propaganda. Shambaugh (2007) 
examined China’s propaganda system, and Brady and Wang (2009) discussed 
the role of propaganda in China as “Popular Authoritarianism.” China’s 
                                                                
283 Among immigrants or overseas communities satellite TVs play an important role as a 
conduit of receiving and keeping up with information and forming communities. 
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propaganda and US national security have been discussed from the US 
viewpoint (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2009). 
Dotson (2011) analyzed China’s propaganda narratives as a Confucian revival. 
Edney (2012) and Youling Liu (2011) both argued that external 
communication is a disseminator of soft power. Liu (2001) argued that print 
and electronic media play an important role in projecting soft power.  
On this understanding of the propagandist character of the use of 
external communication systems by the Chinese state, CCTV will now be 
examined in detail. 
 
Two voices of CCTV in the “foreign” domain: A case study 
There are two strands of discussion of CCTV in existing academic works. The 
first is on CCTV News (CCTV International), which is mostly written in English; 
the second is on CCTV-4, which is mostly written in Chinese. Such a division 
in the academic domain may lead to a “perceptual gap” and reflects a division 
of expected audiences. China-based Chinese academics, for example, have a 
tendency to think of CCTV-4 as a channel for overseas Chinese (Fan 2013; 
Yang Liu 2007; Guangling Wang 2013). Conversely, foreign-based academics 
tend to regard CCTV-News as a news channel for English native speakers only. 
This dichotomous focus may be misguiding, giving an impression that the 




The prevailing scholarship on CCTV, 284  Chinese international 
broadcasting, can be summarized as follows. 
First, understanding CCTV through its historical development. Some 
scholars argue that CCTV-9 is an important starting point for China’s 
international broadcasting (Guo et al. 2004; Paterson and Sreberney 2004). 
Brady places CCTV-9 in the context of the expansion of China’s foreign 
propaganda media organizations (Brady 2008: 166-167). Along with China’s 
engagement in Africa,285 Fan (2013) explores the strategy of the localization 
of CCTV-News in Africa (Yun Fan 2013).  
Second, understanding CCTV through its production, from news-
making, news-reporting to soft power: Ying Zhu’s book Two Billion Eyes: The 
Story of China Central Television was written based on interviews with 
journalists to understand how CCTV programs for domestic subscribers were 
                                                                
284 Case studies of particular programs of CCTV employ a discourse or framing analysis. 
Chang and Chen’s (1998) study on CCTV Spring Gala’s audience and Twizell (2011) and 
Zhong (2004)’s study on CCTV “Dialogue” as a case study are such examples.  
285 On China’s engagement with Africa, mostly concerning issues of development, labor and 
trade, see Broadman, Harry G. 2008. “China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the 
Developing World.” Foreign Affairs 87(2): 95-109; Eisenman, Joshua. 2012. “China–Africa 
Trade Patterns: Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Contemporary China 21(77): 793-810; 
Lee, Ching Kwan. 2009. “Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and the 
Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves.” The China Quarterly 199 (China and 
Africa: Emerging Patterns in Globalization and Development): 647-666; Mohan, Giles and 
Ben Lampert. 2013. “Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-African 
Relations.” African Affairs 112(446): 92-110; Michel, Serge. 2008. “When China Met Africa.” 
Foreign Policy 166: 38-46; Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus and Ian Taylor. 2011. “Contextua
lising Chinese Engagement in Africa.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29(2): 129-136; 
Julia C. Strauss. 2013. “China and Africa Rebooted: Globalization(s), Simplification(s), and 
Cross-Cutting Dynamics in “South-South” Relations.” ASR Forum on Africa and China. African 
Studies Review 56(1): 155-170; Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. 2008. “Dancing with the Dragon 
Africa's Courtship with China.”The Global South 2(2): 171-187. See also China and Africa: 
Emerging Patterns in Globalization and Development (2009). The China Quarterly Special 
Issues. New Series. No. 9, edited by Julia C. Strauss and Martha Saavedra. In relation to 
CCTV’s expansion in Africa, see Ronald Yick (Global Voices). 2012. “Chinese ‘Soft Power’ 





made. Jirik (2008) studied the news-making process of CCTV reporters and 
producers on the issue of deciding and sorting out newsworthy values. 
Newsroom practices (Jirik 2008; Jirik 2009; Ning 2011) and news report 
strategies of CCTV (Zhang Lin 2003) have also been discussed from 
journalistic perspectives. Jirik noted that the CCTV-9 and transnational 
broadcasting are a significant addition to the original set-up of CCTV, without 
explicitly highlighting the launch of its 24-hour global English Channel, CCTV-
9, as China’s effort to expand its soft power. On the other hand, Volz (2011) 
and Xiaoling Zhang (2011), in the recent edited volume Soft Power in China: 
Public Diplomacy through Communication (J. Wang 2011), emphasize the 
roles CCTV or often CCTV’s international channel, i.e., CCTV-9, play in 
informing others about China and delivering China’s image through the 
channel by tracing its historical trajectories. And in terms of the target 
audience it has been argued that, 
despite the fact that among the channel itself, the recognition of CCTV-
9’s targeted audience vary largely, according to one of the reporters, it 
mainly consists of three categories of viewership: Our primary 
audience are the English-speaking countries, U.S., Europe, the opinion-
makers in these countries, they are the people that monitor our 
programs; secondarily, that will be the Asian African countries; but 
our de facto audience, which is also the largest group are the English 
speakers in China, which we are aware of. Also, we have the foreigners 
stationed in China (Ning 2011: 3). 
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 “CCTV News can be received in 97 countries and regions with nearly 100 
million viewers (CCTV 2010c).” While the Chinese state expects to have a 
viewership of that number, the number of overseas de facto viewers is still 
unknown and may not live up to the expected figure.  
Drawing the issues together, in what follows how the external (trans-
local) market of China’s international broadcasting is constructed in South 
Korea and Japan is discussed. 
 
7.2 Managing global CCTV markets in South Korea and Japan 
Creating “global” CCTV markets: Process and marketplaces 
When exploring CCTV’s overseas markets, we need to look at how the CCTV 
channels are exported and how such markets are constructed. Many Chinese 
TV products are sold and exported officially through a state-owned 
enterprise known as China International TV Company (see Chapter 4);286 it 
serves as an agent of overseas marketing CCTV program copyrights and for 
the overseas sales of alliances of exporters of Chinese TV programs (M. Kang 
2008b: 30). It is the only company which has been authorized by the Chinese 
government to act as the agent for foreign satellite programs. 
In the case of launching CCTV channels overseas, using a satellite is 
the usual route; for example China Great Wall Satellite TV (Zhongguo 
Changcheng Weixing TV), which has bureaus in North America, Asia, Africa, 
                                                                
286 See also the China International TV Company (CITVC) (N.d.). The former name was 
Zhongguo guoji dianshi zonggongsi which was established in 1984. It is a state-owned 
company which is fully supported by CCTV, established in 1984. After experiencing capital 
and organizational restructuring it has further developed to become the biggest and the 
most profitable media company in China (M. Kang 2008b: 30). See also Y. Li (2013). 
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Europe, and Latin America, plays an important role in promoting the 
channels internationally. Through these bureaus, “Chinese channels, English 
channels, Spanish and French channels are transmitted via satellite to 120 
countries in North and South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Pacific (M. 
Kang 2008b: 28).” Zhenyu Lin (2010: 53) draws attention to that fact that 
CCTV-4, CCTV-9, Spanish, French, and Arabic channels are transmitted via 
satellite. Through cable networks, satellite TV, terrestrial TV, IPTV, and 
broadband internet, more than 100 countries and hotels have CCTV channels.  
However, the means by which CCTV is brought into Japan and South 
Korea remains rather unknown. Reflecting on the manner in which foreign 
broadcasters, such as the BBC, CNN and NHK are available in these two 
countries, a Korean media professional respondent said that “CCTV is also 
transmitted linearly via embedded facilities between CCTV and a foreign TV 
station who acquires the rights to have CCTV programs in its own station.”287  
The availability of the CCTV channel in the South Korean and Japanese 
markets needs to be closely examined.  
In South Korea CCTV-4 is shown in Chinese. Cable TV providers, such 
as CJ Hello Vision and Tbroad in South Korea have CCTV News channels as 
part of their package options. In addition, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), 
a new broadcaster, has SK Telecom (B TV), KT (QOOK TV), and LG (U plus). In 
Japan, Sky Perfect TV (Skapa) and Hikari TV offer CCTV subscription services. 
Eonet has Channel 783 for a 24-hour CCTV channel (Chugoku terebi CCTV 
                                                                
287 Interview with a South Korean media professional, November 2011, Seoul, South Korea; 
Interview with a South Korean media professional, Singapore, November 30, 2012. 
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Daihu) with simultaneous translation in Japanese, as an optional channel, 
which costs 19 USD per month (Eonet N.d.),288 a reasonable fee compared to 
subscriptions to other optional channels (which are equally available in 
South Korea).  
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 CJ Hello Vision 
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Skapa: Ch 783, Ch 568, 
Hikari TV Ch 180, 
EoHikari Terebi Ch 783. 
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SK Telecom (B tv, 
Channel 660) 
KT: QOOK TV, 
Channel 354, 
LG: U+, Channel 85 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author. Eonet (N.d.) and SATCH (N.d.) provide some sources of 
the Japan data. 
 
 
As documented in Table 7.1, the availability of the channels in the two 
societies is not very obvious. Although the information in Table 7.1 may not 
be exhaustive, domestic institutions in the two countries consciously control 
how many channels and where and what to import into their local 
broadcasting markets. Japan’s implementation of optional channels shows 
                                                                
288 As of January 2014, the same amount of JPY is 18 USD. However, due to a recent decrease 
in the Japanese Yen, it may slightly underrepresent the value. On the Japanese cable TV 
market, each channel which ranges from 480 JPY to 3,150 JPY per month is optional to be 
added on top of the basic program package.  
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the country’s commercial and market logic. The aim of CCTV Daifu, the 
Japanese agent for CCTV, is “to provide information about the latest culture 
and current affairs for Chinese who live in Japan, at the same time, to make 
Japanese better understand China, and further to establish Japan and China's 
friendly relationship (Daifu N.d.).” In the case of Tbroad in South Korea, the 
CCTV channel is not optional but part of a cable subscription package. 
Therefore, the number of Tbroad subscribers does not mean that the same 
people actually consume and watch this particular channel.  
On the Japanese market, CCTV is not a mainstream channel; the 
informants generally show limited interest in other countries. In addition, 
there are structural factors such as a hierarchical compartmentalization of 
importing Western and Asian programs for Japanese market players and 
potential consumers to import foreign channels.289  
This inherent barrier functions as a self-regulation of such channels. 
On the South Korean market, where the local barriers are taken as trade-
related issues—including the Republic of Korea (ROK)-US Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) text (Long and Lee 2013) and ROK-China FTA preparation 
text290—there are written practices and regulations on the importation of 
foreign programs and channels. Another reason why entry barriers of foreign 
satellite broadcasting channels are high in South Korea is due to a “cultural 
imperialism thesis.”  
                                                                
289 For a further discussion and similar findings on different types of the commodities, see 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  




In 2000 there was not a single foreign satellite channel that was 
officially recognized in South Korea, but after that a limited number of foreign 
channels would be specified by the Korean Broadcasting Commission (Song 
and Lee 2000). Now, at the time of writing in 2014, foreign satellite channels 
are available through Program Providers or Cable Television packages.  
The upshot of considering the location of CCTV-9 in the South Korean 
and Japanese markets is clear: the locally embedded market structures and 
barriers play an important role in making and unmaking audiences of such 
channels in the two countries. 
 
7.3 Manufacturing response of CCTV International  
CCTV International faces a similar situation in South Korea and Japan. As 
explained in Chapter 4 and earlier in this chapter, the channel currently has a 
well-developed infrastructure, with many channels (see Chapter 4) in place; 
the next step is to discuss the audiences.  
Interviewees in these two countries provided different stories in 
relation to their consumption and perception of the channel. A Japanese 
informant, JV42,291 a student of the University of Tokyo, replied to the 
question whether he had experienced watching CCTV, “CCTV? I never heard 
of it. Can I watch it in Japan?” He did not know about whether or not, where, 
and how he could watch CCTV in his country. JV35,292 similar to other 
Japanese respondents, said, “I know about CCTV, but do not know that foreign 
                                                                
291 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 27, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
292 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 23, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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language channels of CCTV exist.” 
In contrast, the Korean interviewees consistently indicated that they 
at least were aware of the existence of the network. Some of them even 
recognized that the channel in South Korea was available. KV3293 said, “I 
know CCTV is available to watch in South Korea.” In addition, KV41294 said, “I 
know there is an English channel.”295 However, when asked whether they 
would be willing to watch the English channel in the near future responses 
varied. The first type of response was flagged by unwillingness to watch the 
channel. KV1296 explained, “For me, watching programs in Chinese has two 
reasons. One is only for my interest; another is because of language learning 
itself. I do not find any reason to watch Chinese channels which are 
broadcasted in another language other than Chinese.” Similarly, KV16297 said, 
“I don’t have any intention to watch it. I watch Chinese programs to enhance 
my Chinese language ability and not to learn English.”  
A Japanese informant, JV36,298 repeated the same view: “I watched 
CCTV, but not the foreign language channels.” Another Korean informant 
KV24299 strongly expressed her opinion: “Why should I watch other language 
channels when I watch China’s CCTV?” The second type was due to language 
                                                                
293 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 27, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
294 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
295 It could be dependent on when they were in China or having such information before or 
after their arrival in China.  
296 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 19, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
297 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, Seoul, South Korea. 
298 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 23, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
299 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 9, Seoul, South Korea. 
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competence. KV9,300 who did not know about CCTV International, said, “I 
understand Chinese. That’s why it gives me joy to watch channels in Chinese. 
Yet, due to my poor English capacity, I rather stick to watch the Chinese 
version. It is certainly difficult for me to understand English.”  
Judging from the interviewees’ responses, one might conclude that 
non-viewers of CCTV International assume that Chinese-language channels of 
CCTV offer the same programs in English on CCTV International. In this 
regard they usually perceive CCTV, regardless of the language medium of 
broadcasting (either in Chinese or English), as the Chinese authority-
coordinated channel.   
KV10,301 who learned Chinese and Arabic, said, “I know CCTV has 
English and Arabic channels. On cable TV channels, at home, I was so excited 
to get to know that to be able to watch CCTV. I have missed Chinese language 
programs since I came back from China. In my first encounter, I thought it is 
in Chinese, which is CCTV1, the Chinese news channel, but I happen to listen 
to English.” She anticipated the Chinese channel because she was not aware 
of the availability of CCTV channel broadcasting in English in South Korea 
although she knew about the existence of the channel in general. Like 
KV16302 and JV36303, she expected that CCTV to be in Chinese and other 
language channels of CCTV were not the primary reason for them to watch 
CCTV. She now expresses her intention to watch the English Channel.  
                                                                
300 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 30, Seoul, South Korea. 
301 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 5, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
302 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
303 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 23, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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Unlike those who are reluctance to watch the channel, other 
informants expected and assumed that CCTV International would provide a 
broad open view of China and the world. They expected news in foreign 
language could deliver less biased views than information that the state 
media would provide in general, although they are aware that Chinese media 
in general, including CCTV, are state-coordinated media.304  
For most South Korean and Japanese informants who watch CCTV 
International did not leave impressions of China’s views on China and the 
world; propaganda or external publicity characteristics or messages of the 
channel were not necessarily conveyed to the audience, in part because the 
channel is in English, and not in their local languages or Chinese.  
KV15,305 a female student, had “an intention to watch international 
channels. I can know about and listen to China in English.” KV6306 said, "I am 
willing to watch such an English channel. By watching it, I think I could have 
more chances to know about China and the world. On top of that, I can listen 
to English.” In a related vein, KV28307 said, “I want to watch such a channel for 
a better understanding of China and language learning.”  
These responses indicated that the media, for them, did not exist in 
its own right. Moreover, CCTV, in this case, was a channel for studying English 
or Chinese. As such, it is indeed “killing two birds with one stone.”  
The responses from Japanese audiences show a rather different 
                                                                
304 See Lee (2013c). 
305 Interview with a South Korean respondent, Seoul, South Korea. 
306 Interview with a South Korean respondent, Seoul, South Korea. 




On the Japanese market, CCTV is “regulated” by a local media player 
which gives the specific impression that the channel is not available outside 
the country. The Japanese interviewees did not usually watch the channel 
online; all their responses were based on their consumption patterns and 
experiences on television. JV42308 said, “I watched CCTV as part of the NHK 
news. On the NHK news, there is a corner that shows overseas TV network 
abridged news. Except for that, I did not watch CCTV at all. KBS, YTN, and 
CNN news have streaming websites. I often watch them through them. I don’t 
know about CCTV, whether it has such a function.”  
Another interviewee, JV57309 said, “On a morning NHK world news 
program on BS 1, I watched CCTV. The news program has Chinese, Korean, 
which is KBS, Aljazeera, Spanish, French, German, and American TV news 
which are broadcasted in Japan for about several minutes.” He continued, 
“There is a place to watch such programs on campus. I am not sure how many 
people are interested in and are willing to watch them.”  
Both of the two Japanese respondents shared the opinion that CCTV 
was watched as a “nested program” of their own national TV network.  
Coupled with this arrangement, domestic institutions play an 
interesting and important role by providing an abridged version of world 
news for local Japanese to understand the world and to shape their ideas and 
behavior. Although TV news is not the only window to know the world, the 
                                                                
308 Interview with a Japanese respondent, April25, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
309 Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. 
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ways in which Japanese are exposed to world news are greatly influenced by 
their national broadcasting company and the mass media. Along with the 
domestic institution’s control by selecting certain channels to import in the 
market, this offers another role for the domestic institution in the sending 
country’s soft power making.  
As noted earlier, viewers and non-viewers in South Korea know of 
CCTV International. However, their understanding of the channel varies. 
KV21310 said, “I watched some of the programs of CCTV International. I am 
more than happy to watch that again. It is more open than other Chinese 
channels, and from an international perspective. It has many international 
contents. I am sure I can learn more about China through this.”  
Similarly, KV26,311 a male student, said, “I think through watching the 
international channel I can receive many kinds of international information.” 
These were obviously certain assumptions and expectations. KV7312 had 
worked in China as a Korean language teacher for two years, had had 
opportunities to watch the Arabic channel disagrees with the assumption and 
expectation. She said, “The Arabic channel is meant for China’s minority—
Uyghur—which is what I heard from my Chinese co-worker.” The 
misinformation came from her Chinese colleague, who taught Chinese to 
foreigners. She did not know whether her colleague’s information is factual 
                                                                
310 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
311 Interview with a South Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
312 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 
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or otherwise. In any case, KV7313 was not aware of the difference between 
Uyghur and the Arabic languages. Uyghurs do not speak Arabic as Uyghur is a 
Turkic language, not a Semitic language.  
Summing up, then, CCTV International has been perceived and 
understood in several ways. Attentive recipients stress the following: learning 
more about China and the Chinese language (Mandarin), learning about 
international current affairs, and providing a better platform for minorities to 
know about China and be exposed to local Chinese news. The discussion of 
ethnic minorities was appeared in the context of the recent development of 
CCTV and CNTV.314  On the other hand, reluctant informants stressed that 
CCTV International was not for learning about the world via English and 
other foreign languages which were used in the CCTV project, but for 
learning about China in Mandarin or just for learning the language itself. 
To conceptualize the chapter’s finding, Figure 7.1 presents typologies 
of the dynamics of the managing and (un)making of audiences in these 
countries (see Figure 7.1). The most noticeable observations to be made 
about this data are the following. 
First, the indifferent audience: those who had no interest in China-
produced programs; therefore, they did not watch them at all. Second, the 
transient audience: they were aware that it existed; however, they did not 
continue to keep interests in watching them. Third, the simply-experiencing-
                                                                
313 Interview with a South Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea. 




it audience: they often consumed the programs but, it might not be a long-
term investment for them. Accordingly, they did not necessarily have an 
interest in such channels. Last, a devoted audience—the most ideal one from 
the Chinese state’s perspective—are those who had a great interest in the 
channels as well as China. Thus they were likely to continue to consume them. 
Such engagement, in turn, may also be translated into other related matters 
and by-products of soft power such as travel, learning language, and studying 
abroad. 
 
Figure 7.1 Situating Knowledge and Consumption: 









The purpose of this chapter has been to consider international broadcasting 
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as a soft power facilitator or as a potential direct mediator of soft power 
through an examination of the reception of CCTV-9 in South Korea and Japan. 
The main findings are as follows. 
First, the Chinese government’s strategy of using CCTV-9 as a means 
of soft power at the policy level may not be fully realized at the level of 
practice in another country. This finding is in line with the assertion that “it is 
difficult for the Chinese media to win over foreign audiences in a timely 
fashion, especially regarding perceived sensitive issues by the government (Li 
Zhang 2011: 203). 315  This is because while the use of international 
broadcasting to reach overseas audiences is largely dependent on the policy 
and infrastructure of the country with such aims, the ways in which 
international broadcasting may work is contingent on the domestic market of 
the receiving countries. 
Second, there is a marked difference in the embedding of CCVT-9 in 
South Korea and Japan and in the audience response to it. Given that these 
countries are not English-speaking, although enrolment in Chinese language 
classes is increasing, exposure to CCTV-9 is limited. Whereas South Korean 
viewers show their awareness and willingness of watching the channel, 
ordinary Japanese did not know about CCTV. However, the Japanese learned 
about CCTV through their own national broadcasting station (NHK) namely, 
NHK World News. This limitation is the result of implicit Japanese regulation 
of the channel as well as less willingness to acknowledge China as a global 
                                                                
315 Li Zhang (2011) shows the news coverage and reporting of the Sichuan earthquake in 
2008 and the Tibetan Riots in the same year as well as the Beijing Olympic torch relay.  
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hegemon in statu nascendi. South Koreans tended to emphasize that CCTV is a 
mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party316 and did not think CCTV 
International was comparable in quality, interest, and fidelity to the BBC and 
CNN.317 On the whole, the South Korean respondents were better informed 
and more aware than the Japanese, confirming the observations made in the 
previous two chapters. 
Interweaving this study’s empirical findings with reconsidering the 
implications of Figure 7.1, what can be noted are the existing differences 
between South Korea and Japan with regard to CCTV audiences regarding the 
similar market penetration. Considering the time that the field research was 
conducted between 2011 and 2013, this observation resonates with the 
result of the Pew Global Attitudes Project on China’s image. In 2013 South 
Korea has an ambivalent attitude towards China as in perceiving it as both 
continuously as a partner and less likely as an enemy, whereas Japan shows 
its increasingly antagonist view of China as an enemy in keeping with  its 
view of less dominantly seeing the country as a partner. These contrasting 
attitudes shed light on the influence of external environment of foreign CCTV 
market in South Korea and Japan.  
                                                                
316 This is in line with arguments of the following two papers. Under the big umbrella of 
China’s FDI policies in telecom services and media sectors, related views were offered (Lee 
2012a; 2012b). The Chinese government’s reluctance to embrace foreign capital in the 
Chinese market is in part because newspapers and television are traditionally regarded as 
representative of the Chinese Communist Party. They are not only a means of providing 
information, but they also provide citizens with political and ideological education. For more 
detailed information, see Lee (2012a) and Lee (2012b).  
317 China’s expenditure on CCTV America exceeds that of BBC by more than 19 times. 
Although China as a latecomer puts much effort and money into this project, the channel 
does not have the prestige or reach or renown of the BBC (Wedge Infinity 2013).  
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With the infrastructural building of CCTV International, it can clearly 
been seen that China has devoted itself to work on image enhancement and 
soft power development to deliver its voice to the world. However, in order 
for Chinese soft power via CCTV International to be effective, it should be 
understood not only in the Chinese context, but the emphasis should be 
equally paid to that of its target countries. Through empirical investigation, 
this study has reached the conclusion that CCTV International as a means of 
projecting its soft power to South Korea and Japan at this stage of 
development has had a limited impact. 
What remains to be observed in the study of Chinese international 
broadcasting is whether and how China’s further development reinforces the 
emergence of these media processes, products, and innovation and the wider 
audience, and the political economy of international broadcasting that impel 
its circulation and audienceship in foreign countries, with CCTV 
International’s slogan “Your Link to Asia.” To be sure, digital media platforms 
and technological developments will open new pathways along the road of 














This study has endeavored to provide a sociological understanding of the way 
in which China’s soft power strategy through the export of media products is 
constructed, and how the comparative case studies of South Korea and Japan, 
as importing countries, have responded to it. As an exercise in empirically-
based interpretative sociology, it provides a theoretically-grounded 
sociological understanding of soft power—particularly of the behaviors and 
engagements of the multiple actors in both the importing and exporting 
countries and how, considered comparatively, they shape China’s soft power 
as a socially constructed. In essence, this study has investigated the 
projection of China’s soft power using a theoretically synthesized variant of 
economically-oriented sociology, consumer behavior, media studies, and 
cultural sociology/studies.  
 
8.1 Key arguments reconsidered  
Taking Nye’s now well-known concept of “soft power” as its starting point, 
the theoretical argument of this thesis has been substantiated empirically 
leading to the assertion of the following two positions: First, according to Nye 
(2004; 2010 xiv), “All power depends on context—who relates to whom 
under what circumstances—but soft power depends more than hard power 
upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers.” As shown earlier in 
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the thesis (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), the translation of soft power is effective to 
the extent that the source country has a capacity to develop and project its 
soft power and the pertinent policy to realize its potential influence. 
Furthermore, more importantly, the way in which China’s projection of its 
soft power is related to how the institutional arrangements and mediators 
(interpreters and receivers) in the target countries operate under the direct 
or indirect influence of the cultural and foreign policies of the receiving 
countries; the receiving country’s contextual and institutional environment 
creates the soft power field to facilitate and generate its soft power capacity 
of the source country. Institutions play a critical role in regulating the flow 
and ability of the soft power instruments of the exporting country to reach 
the potential consumers in the importing countries.  
Second, Nye contends that “attraction often has a diffuse effect, 
creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific 
political capital to be drawn on in future circumstances” (Nye 2004: 16). On 
this understanding China’s projection of its soft power can be understood to 
play an important role in not only shaping an international arena to reduce 
other nation-states’ anxieties over perceived threats from China, but also in 
lowering anxieties among Chinese citizens over the country’s stability. For 
example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, President Xi Jinping’s blueprint of the 
“China Dream” underscores and resonates with the internal dynamics of its 
development and relation with local people and the outside world.  
Third, reflecting on these two characteristics of soft power, a country’s 
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achievement of soft power influence is the outcome of the interactive co-
production of the exporting country and the importing country. Regarding 
the two cases considered in this study, the media circuit from production to 
consumption within South Korean and Japanese respectively, plays an 
important role in the making of Chinese soft power in these countries. The 
media market structures, the official and unofficial regulatory regimes, 
market demands, and local customers’ preferences act on media institutions 
and practitioners in the importing country to operate concertedly to control 
the level of the exporting country’s transnational soft power projection. The 
Japanese and Korean cases exemplify how media practitioners contribute 
significantly to restrict China’s capacity to promulgate its soft power abroad 
via its media products; CCTV-International, as a medium of Chinese soft 
power, has had difficulties reaching foreign audience due to market 
structures and interest and attractiveness to audiences. Thus, projecting soft 
power is shaped by China’s external cultural policy and the receiving 
country’s setting within the soft power field.   
 
8.2 Summary of main findings 
Based on the above theoretical characterization of soft power, the major 
findings of the research can be summarized as follows: First, given that the 
soft power mechanism is relational and interactive, the interactive co-
construction of the configuration of Chinese soft power can be illustrated as 




Figure 8.1 Pathways of the “Co-construction” of China’s Soft Power 





As can be seen, correlated with the hierarchically ordered three macro (state), 
meso (market), and micro (individual) levels are, respectively, the Chinese 
state’s agenda of reviving cultural wealth, the market performance of the 
global export of China’s media products, and the behavior of the consumer 
audiences in the target countries. More specifically, the state level focuses on 
the Chinese government’s soft power policy and on its projection to foreign 
countries through its cultural globalization strategy. The media market level 
explores how embedded market structures and the practices of the target 
countries manage the importation of Chinese media products. The market is 
the place where domestic institutional structures and cultural intermediaries 
play an important role in the selection of products conveyed through the 
media circuit; exemplified by the role of market players in South Korea and 
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Japan in regulating the flow of foreign and Chinese commodities into their 
own markets. Ironically, as a soft power regulator and filter, they also become 
inadvertently soft power generators and facilitators. By selectively importing 
media products, media professionals as gatekeepers and cultural 
intermediaries determine what is perceived as “foreign” culture. The 
individual level consists of individual audiences in their selective 
consumption of the media products as entertainment or “cultural” products 
which have a potential to generate soft power influence of the projecting 
country.  
In sum, the projection of a soft power policy from one country through 
the exporting of media products to the importing countries is contingent on 
local institutional arrangements and the local audience’s perception and 
reception in the target country. The interplay at all three levels between 
sender and receiver needs, therefore, to be analyzed in order to better 
understand the workings of soft power. The present research has illustrated 
this by examining China’s projection of its soft power through the export of 
its media cultural products to the neighboring countries of South Korea and 
Japan.  
Obviously, in order for media products to be translated into soft power, 
they must have the potential influence to reach an audience. Undoubtedly, 
from this study, there is a discrepancy between the Chinese state’s intention 
and the responses the Korean and Japanese audiences, as they resist 
embracing the Chinese programs—in part due to quality of the products per 
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se, and in part due to the imported process—the intercession of media 
professionals and institutions—selling strategies and preoccupied 
prescriptions. China’s configuration of soft power to target countries is 
obviously subjected to the target countries’ sense of cultural security and 
protection of their local markets, in managing the in-flow of Chinese media 
products. Together, the exporting and importing countries work together in 
the construction of Chinese soft power.   
 
8.3 In search of typologies of projecting soft power  
Following from the main findings of the study, further theoretical claims can 
be drawn regarding the typologies of the soft power mechanism and the 
cultural wealth of China. There is a debate on the strong and weak states in 
political sociology and political science (Midgal 1988; 2001; Kohli 2004). The 
varieties of soft power model, which were presented in the Conclusion, were 
based on this line of literature. Delineations for strong versus weak states are 
state centrality, state capacity, and intervention. “Strong” states, like China, 
tend to employ dual faceted attitudes in dealing with social change and 
external power dynamics. For example, South Korea as a small-sized state but 
still a “strong” state has implemented state regulations and quotas on foreign 
products, while strongly encourages its products to be exported. This results 
from South Korea’s export-driven media industrial structure, illustrated by 
the successful Korean Wave. On the other hand, Japan, as a less strong state, 
does not have a written regulatory regime nor, until recently, did it promote 
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export of its media cultural products. Revisiting the typology of soft power 
models proposed in 8.3, China is classified as a state-centralized model, South 
Korea as the case of a multiple actor soft power model, and Japan a profit-
oriented model of soft power mechanism.  
As this thesis has focused on the configuration of China’s soft power, 
attention is not given to the exploration of the varieties of models for 
projecting soft power in other contexts. In proposing three models, this 
research extends the discussion to broader areas of soft power and cultural 
globalization in cultural and economic sociology. The active participant(s) in 
each model, which is a result of the levels and ways of implementing the 
state’s economic development, is varied. The first type is centralized soft 
power (state-geared) as a state agenda; hence, the state is the only active 
participant along with the help of sub-state organizations. The second type is 
a commercially oriented soft-power model, and the third type is multiply 




Table 8.1 The Varieties of Soft Power Mechanism and Different Paths of 
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While soft-power policies can vary from model to model, the way in which 
soft power can be translated from its medium is similar for all models. In 
other words, a source country’s soft power can be projected with co-
production by the state, institutions and receivers. Projecting soft power and 
a national image to the world is in line with the prevalent global logic that a 
country’s image can be exported through a conduit of soft power. In 
particular, products, ideas, and images are easily mobilized and intertwined 
with each other. The way in which nation-states engage in utilizing soft 
power is reflected in such logic. Ultimately, the manifest and latent intentions 
of nation-states in seeking soft power can lead them to acquire cultural 
wealth from such efforts. China strives for the accumulation of soft power 
and the converting of economic into cultural wealth. Similar processes and 
aims of the projection of soft power can be found in case of Hollywood and 
South Korea, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Such instances of the creative 
influence of culture industries can be a driver of further economic 
development as well as enhancing a country’s image.  
 
8.4 Chinese soft power: Looking backwards and ahead  
Media products, which have potential soft power influence, are a reflection of 
the source country’s culture. Chinese commercial media products have a 
tendency to emphasize its rich culture in historical dramas. While Taiwanese 
dramas show a modern lifestyle, Hong Kong dramas stress kung fu and action 
themes. These compartmentalized TV dramas give the Chinese government 
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the scope to think further on how to draw on or reject such media products 
for constructing and projecting its soft power towards other nation-states. As 
shown in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, both media professionals and audiences 
in Korea and Japan find PRC Chinese media products less compelling and 
attractive compared to Hong Kong and Taiwan products. This constrains the 
extent and the ways in which China’s soft power outreaches to foreign 
audiences. China, as a strong state, where its central government and state 
organizations, including the Ministry of Culture and SARFT, put forward the 
idea of soft power together, offers a limited autonomy to other stakeholders 
to participate in construction of its soft power. As shown from this study, 
China may encounter difficulties in projecting its soft power with a 
centralized sole stakeholder. More active engagements of different 
stakeholders from non-state institutions and public support may be 
beneficial to aid China in projecting its soft power.  
 
8.5 The Predicament of building Chinese soft power in South Korea and 
Japan  
This study has aimed to offer a modified conception of soft power with the 
intention of understanding how Chinese soft power mediated through the 
mass media works in the context of South Korea and Japan. It is important to 
be cognizant of the particularity of these two receiving countries of Chinese 
soft power when considering China’s potential for building soft power field in 
them. Based on empirical findings, it is turns out that mass media, both 
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commercialized TV products and CCTV International, as instruments for the 
projection of Chinese soft power in Japan and South Korea have so far failed, 
unlike the Korean Wave and Japanese pop in China. What are the possible 
reasons for this relative failure? 
First, one of the major reasons for such failure is the relative absence 
of dubbing from Mandarin to Korean or Japanese. Considering the market 
size, either Korean or Japanese dubbing from Chinese series may not always 
be attractive to Chinese industries. Some products are dubbed, but most of 
them are subtitled to air in the Korean and Japanese “televisionscapes.” In 
sharp contrast to this, “Within this ‘Pop Culture China’, Japanese and Korean 
films and TV programs are usually dubbed as a means of ‘domesticating’ the 
foreign” (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008: 8). Sinophone world or “Pop Culture 
China” are big enough to generate and self-consume dubbed programs in the 
region.  
A second reason for the limited penetration of China’s soft power into 
South Korea and Japan can be explained with reference to the differences 
between the reverse dynamics of the ways in which Chinese soft power 
works based on this study and the mechanism of how the Korean Wave and 
Japanese pop culture work for transnational audiences.  
As has been emphasized in this study, watching Chinese media takes 
place by and large because it is considered a useful and entertaining way to 
learn the Chinese language. Unlike the case of the success of the Korean wave 
in China and Japan (some of my Japanese informants) or the consuming of 
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Hong Kong and Taiwanese media products in South Korea and Japan, there 
are multiple other reasons to explain the relative failure of China’s projection 
of its soft power into South Korea and Japan via its media products such as 
liking celebrities, contents, liking the culture and language to reinforce the 
mechanism of soft power. 
Furthermore, as presented in Figure 6.1, the interplay between 
interests of the country (including culture, history, language, and other 
aspects), along with images and boundaries of China and the Chinese 
altogether play an important role in ensuring Chinese soft power successfully 
reaches foreign audiences.  As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the reception of 
Chinese soft power among South Korean and Japanese audiences varies 
considerably to the extent that it can be concluded that the level of effectivity 
of Chinese soft power is uneven and perhaps unstable at this moment.  
Third, at the macro level, the interplay between state, market, and 
business is important for China to further develop its soft power. Reflecting 
on the soft power model presented in Table 8.1, the Chinese government-led 
strategy does not necessarily translate well into other countries on the 
ground, so to speak. Market-oriented models or multiple engagements 
between state, market, non-state, and business are likely to perform better.  
Normatively speaking, taken together, if the Chinese were to take into 
account the above-mentioned factors, the effectivity of their soft power 
ambitions vis-à-vis South Korea and Japan might be expected to be greater 




8.6 Limitations of the study and prospects for future research 
The present research has examined the making of China’s soft power under 
the constellation of the state, market, and audience. In addition, the study 
was designed to explore both the sender and recipients’ engagement in the 
circuit of soft power. However, this has had a number of limitations. First, 
only one type of soft power channels, media products, was examined through 
the way in which soft power is projected and received; media products are 
utilized as a channel to project China’s soft power into East Asia, but other 
channels for projection such as international students, institutional and 
infrastructural transfer in developing countries can be further studied.  
Second, methodologically, the rationale justifying a qualitative 
methodology was in part due to the fact that a single author’s field work was 
constrained by time and money. Also, pertinent quantitative information was 
already available in public opinion survey data from South Korea, Japan, and 
the US, on soft power and/or its perceptions. Another limitation of the 
methodological design is that it was not possible to collect and generate 
exactly identical sets of data from South Korea to Japan. 
Given that each cohort has a different understanding of the Chinese 
media in the context of industrial development mediate through different 
representations of China and their country, intergenerational analysis of 
transnational audiences in South Korea and Japan will be very useful in 
understanding such dynamics. Nevertheless, efforts to control and obtain 
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similar demographic characteristics regarding the social composition of the 
audiences were made in the course of the study. Taking into account the 
implications of the predicament China faces in building Chinese soft power in 
these two neighboring Northeast Asian countries, future research will need 
to scrutinize further government programmatic rationales and the 
development of China’s cultural industries oriented towards foreign export 
with the aim of generating soft power overseas. 
Constructively, these limitations suggest directions for further 
investigations. Methodologically, for more detailed explanations of the 
variations of the soft power mechanism, future research could take the form 
of cross-national studies using mixed methods of comparative historical, 
qualitative, and quantitative studies. It would be important to interview 
informants before and after their exposure to the various soft power 
mediums regarding how different channels of soft power and their 
mechanisms have effect affect. Conceptually and analytically, the typologies 
can be further ratified as being cogent and relevant with more abundant 
empirical evidence.  
Substantively, the key findings about the configurations of Chinese soft 
power in South Korea and Japan invite scrutiny. In general the soft power of 
any country can be studied under similar framework of incorporating and 
situating the interactive dual processes of the projector and the potential 
recipient. In other words, the model of soft power developed in this 
dissertation can be applied to other countries and cultural and media 
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industries.  Future studies of soft power via other soft power mediums at 
local, trans-local, and global levels can be further investigated.  
Finally, at the end of this study it can be stated that, by focusing on 
multiple forms of the regionalizing and globalizing of soft power, the synoptic 
aim of this thesis has been to facilitate dialogue and debate among the fields 
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Appendix 2: Interviews conducted during the Field Research 
(By field site) 
 
1. Interviews in South Korea 
1.1 South Korea: Viewers and non-viewers (Seoul and Metropolitan 
Seoul) 
 
Code Date Gender Age Education level Occupation  
KV1  November 19, 
2011  
Female 20s University graduated Educational 
sector 
KV2 November 27, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated International 
organization 
KV3 November 27,  
2011 
Male 20s University graduated Bio industry 
KV4 November 28, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Media 
company 
KV5 November 29, 
2011 
Female 20s Graduate student (MA)  Teacher  
KV6 November 29, 
2011 
Female 20s Graduate student (MA) Teacher 
KV7 November 29, 
2011 
Female 30s Graduate student (MA) Teacher 
KV8 November 29, 
2011 
Female 30s Graduate student (MA) Teacher 
KV9 November 30, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Fashion 
industry 
KV10 December 5, 2011 Female 20s University graduated Law firm 
KV11  December 8, 2011 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV12 December 8, 2011 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV13 December 8, 2011 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV14 December 8, 2011 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV15 December 9, 2011 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV16 December 9, 2011 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV17 December 9, 2011 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV18 December 9, 2011 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV19 December 10, 
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV20 December 11,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV21 December 11,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 




KV 23 December 13, 
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV24 December 13, 
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV25 December 15,  
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV26 December 15,  
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV27 December 15,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV28 December 15,  
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV29 December 16, 
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV30 December 16,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV31 December 16,  
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV32 December 16,  
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV33 December 17,  
2011 
Female 40s University graduated Housewife 
KV34 December 17,  
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV35 December 19,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV36 December 19,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV37 December 20,  
2011 
Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV38 December 21, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Graduate 
student  (MA) 
KV39 December 21, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Graduate 
student  (MA) 
KV40 December 21, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Graduate 
student  (MA) 
KV41 December 21, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Graduate 
student  (MA) 
KV42 December 21, 
2011 
Female 20s University graduated Graduate 
student  (MA) 
KV43 December 24, 
2011 
Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV44 December 27,  
2011 
Male 30s University graduated Photographer 
KV45 January 2, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV46 January 10, 2012 Male 30s University graduated Civil servant 
KV47 January 10, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Company 
KV48 January 11, 2012 Female 20s University graduated Office worker 
KV49 January 24, 2012 Male 30s University graduated Working  
KV50 January 26, 2012 Female 20s University graduated Civil servant 
KV51 February 4, 2012  Female 30s University graduated Teacher 
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KV52 February 4, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Trade 
company 
KV53 February 5, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Banker 
KV54 February 16, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Trade 
company 
KV55 February 16, 2012 Female 20s University graduated Banker 
KV56 February 16, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV57 February 16, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV58 March 17, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV59 June 5, 2012 Female 20s University graduated Working 
KV60 June 5, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV61 June 5, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV62 June 6, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV63 June 7, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV64 June 7, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV65 June 7, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV66 June 9, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV67 June 9, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV68 June 26, 2012 Male  20s University student University 
student 
KV69 June 26, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV70 June 26, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV71 June 28, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV72 June 28, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV73 June 29, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV74 June 29, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV75 June 30, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV76 June 30, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV77 July 2, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
KV78 July 2, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 




KV80 July 3, 2012 Female 20s University student University 
student 
KV81 July 4, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Office worker 
KV82 July 10, 2012  Male 30s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
KV83 July 20, 2012  Female 20s MA   Graduate 
student (PhD) 
 
1.2 South Korea: Media practitioners  
 
Code Place Date Type 
KM1 Seoul December 20, 2011 Freelance producer (China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea) 
KM2 Seoul December 22, 2011 Media company 
KM3 Seoul January 4, 2012 Reporter (Kyodo News) 
KM4 Seoul January 19,2012 TV Producer (KBS Media) 
KM5 Ilsan January 25, 2012 TV Producer (MBC) 
KM6 Seoul January 25, 2012 Distribution manager (China, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea) 
KM7 Seoul January 26, 2012 Distribution manager at a broadcasting 
company 
KM8 Seoul March 15, 2012 Media practitioner at a broadcasting 
station 
KM9 Seoul March 17, 2012 Media practitioner at a broadcasting 
station (Junghwa TV) 
KM10 Seoul March 18, 2012 Distribution manager  
KM11 Seoul March 20, 2012 TV producer (MBC) 
KM12 Ilsan June 26, 2012 Media practitioner at a  broadcasting 
station 
KM13 Seoul June 26, 2012 TV Producer (SBS) 
KM14 Seoul June 27, 2012 TV Producer (KBS)  
 
 
2. Interviews in China 
 
Code Place Date Type 
CM1 Beijing December 5, 2011;  
June 15, 2012 
Film production company 
CM2 Beijing December 5, 2011;  
August 1, 2013 
Film director 
CM3 Beijing February 22, 2012;  
August 3, 2013 
Production manager 
CM4 Shanghai February 6, 2012 Researcher 
CM5 Shanghai February 7, 2012 TV producer 
CM6 Shanghai February 7, 2012 Professor (International 
communication) 
CM7 Shanghai February 7, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM8 Shanghai February 7, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM9 Shanghai February 8, 2012 Professor (Sociology) 
CM10 Shanghai February 8, 2012 TV Producer 
CM11 Shanghai February 9, 2012 Professor (Media studies) 
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CM12 Shanghai February 9, 2012 Professor (Chinese studies) 
CM13 Shanghai February 9, 2012 Viewer 
CM14 Beijing February 19, 2012 Media practitioner at a broadcasting 
station 
CM15 Beijing February 20, 2012 Viewer 
CM16 Beijing February 21, 2012 Reporter (Xinhua news agency) 
CM17 Beijing February 23, 2012 Professor (Communication studies) 
CM18 Shenzhen February 26, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM19 Shenzhen February 27,  2012 Media practitioner 
CM20 Shenzhen February 28, 2012 Professor (Communication studies) 
CM21 Shenzhen February 28, 2012 Distribution manager 
CM22 Shenzhen February 28, 2012 Distribution manager 
CM23 Shenzhen February 28, 2012 Media practitioner at a  broadcasting 
station 
CM24 Shenzhen February 28, 2012 Reporter (Nanhua zaobao) 
CM25 Shenzhen February 29, 2012 Professor (International 
communication) 
CM26 Beijing March 5, 2012 Beijing Film Academy 
CM27 Shenzhen June 14, 2012 Reporter 
CM28 Shenzhen June 14, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM29 Hong Kong June 16,  2012 Media practitioner 
CM30 Hong Kong June 17, 2012 Reporter (Xinhua news agency) 
CM31 Hong Kong June 18, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM32 Shenzhen June 19, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM33 Shenzhen June 19, 2012 Media practitioner 
CM34 Shanghai July 15,  2012 Media practitioner 
CM35 Beijing October 13, 2012;  
August 4, 2013 
Professor (Communication studies) 
CM36 Beijing October 13, 2012;  
August 4, 2013 




3. Interviews in Japan  
3.1 Japan: Viewers and non-viewers  
 
Code Date Gender Age Education level Occupation 
JV1 February 13, 2012 Male 20s University student University 
student 
JV2 February 14, 2012 Male 70s High school graduated Retried 
JV3 February 14, 2012 Female 50s High school graduated  Housewife 
JV4 February 14, 2012 Female 50s High school graduated Housewife 
JV5 February 14, 2012 Female 30s High school graduated Kindergarten 
teacher 
JV6 February 14, 2012 Male 30s University student Teacher  
JV7 February 14, 2012 Male 60s University graduated Office worker  
JV8 February 14, 2012 Female 50s University student  University 
student 
JV9 February 14, 2012 Male 20s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV10 February 13, 2012 Male 20s University student  University 
student 




JV12 March 28, 2012 Male 30s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV13 April 4, 2012 Male 20s University student  University 
student 
JV14 April 8, 2012 Female 40s PhD  Civil servant 
JV15 April 9, 2012 Male 30s University graduated Media 
company 
JV16 April 13, 2012 Female 30s MA  Service 
industry 




JV18 April 13, 2012 Female 30s MA Teacher 
JV19 April 13, 2012 Female 30s MA Research 
fellow  
JV20 April 16, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Banker 
JV21 April 16, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Office worker 
JV22 April 16, 2012 Female 50s High school graduated Housewife 
JV23 April 17, 2012 Female 20s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV24 April 17, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV25 April 17, 2012 Female  20s University student  University 
student 
JV26 April 17, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV27 April 17, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV28 April 17, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV29 April 17, 2012 Female  20s University student  University 
student 
JV30 April 18, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV31 April 21, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Civil servant 
JV32 April 21, 2012 Male 30s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV33 April 22, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Pharmaceutica
l company 
JV34 April 22, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Transport 
company 
JV35 April 23, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV36 April 23, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV37 April 2, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 
JV38 April 23, 2012 Female 20s University student  University 
student 




JV40 April 24, 2012 Male 30s University graduated Trading 
company  
JV41 April 25, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Banker 
JV42 April 25, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV43 April 27, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV44 April 27, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Banker 
JV45 April 27, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Banker 
JV46 May 7, 2012 Male 20s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV47 May 7, 2012 Female 40s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV48 May 7, 2012 Male 20s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV49 May 7, 2012 Male 60s University graduated Retired 
JV50 May 7, 2012 Female 60s High school graduated  Housewife 
JV51 May 13, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Reporter 
JV52 May 13, 2012 Male 30s PhD Faculty 
member 
JV53 May 15, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV54 May 15, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV55 May 16, 2012 Female 30s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV56 May 16, 2012 Male 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 
JV57 May 24, 2012 Male 30s MA Graduate 
student (PhD) 
JV58 May 24, 2012 Female 20s University graduated Graduate 
student (MA) 




3.2 Japan: Media practitioners  
 
Code Place Date Type 
JM1 Tokyo; 
Singapore 
April 9, 2012;  
August 27, 2013 
Freelancer (Producer) (Taiwan, Japan) 
JM2 Tokyo April 13, 2012 Distribution manager 
JM3 Tokyo April 15, 2012 Media practitioner 
JM4 Tokyo May 8,  2012 Media practitioner 
JM5 Tokyo May 10, 2012 Distribution manager 
JM6 Tokyo May 10, 2012 A TV station 
JM7 Tokyo May 11, 2012 Government agency 
JM8 Tokyo May 14, 2012 Professor (Media studies) 
JM9 Tokyo May 15, 2012 Production 
JM10 Tokyo May 16, 2012 TV Producer 
JM11 Tokyo May 16, 2012 Media practitioner at a broadcasting 
station 
JM12 Tokyo May 18, 2012 Professor (Media studies) 
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JM13 Tokyo May 22, 2012 TV Producer 














Appendices 3.A and 3.B 
 
 
For readers’ convenience, Appendices 3.A and 3.B are provided here. The following paragraph is adopted from Chapter 3. “Over the 
course of analyzing the Chinese government’s documents, I divided them into three categories in terms of levels of documents:  (1) 
High-level: Large-scale programs and plans (ganglingxing); (2) Medium-level: Field-specific guidelines (zhidaoxing) and (3) Low-level: 
Specialized and technical documents (zhuanmenxing). This classification is primarily benefited from Ju’s analysis, but the examination 
does not specify actors – both institutions and political figures.” 
 
Source: Modified and reorganized from Ju (2011).  
Note: Documents mentioned in the article are 21 without specifying actors; I only reflect 19 documents for relevance. The documents 
are marked with an asterisk in Appendix 3.A. The English names of organizations are from the website of the Government of People’s 
Republic of China (www.gov.cn) and of each organization (Retrieved November 20, 2012). In the case of non-specific actors or 
organizations, I only specify the name of the document and publication date.   
 
 
Appendix 3.A Documents by the Chinese Government 
 
 
 Phase 1 
(1991-2000)318 
Phase 2  
(2001-2004) 




and plans  
 
- 14th National Party Congress the 
Communist Party of China (CPC)319 
(Deng 1992) 
 
- The 16th Party Congress of CPC (2002) 
- Decision on Issues to Improve the 
Socialist Market Economy (The third 
Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central 
Committee 2003) 
- Decision by the CPC Central Committee 
to Strengthen the Building of the Party’s 
Governance (The Forth Plenary Session 
of the 16th CPC Central Committee 2004) 
- The 11th Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development 
(2006) * 
- The 17th Party Congress of CPC 
(2007) 
- Speech on the 17th National People’s 
Congress of People’s Republic of China 
(Hu, 2007) * 
- Speech on the 26th Collective Study at 
the 16th Plenary Session of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee 
on November 26, 2005 (Hu, 2005) 
                                                                
318 A few documents which were published before 1992 were mentioned as their importance to the following period’s policy 
implementation. 
319 In this document, the Communist Party of China (CPC) may appear as China’s Communist Party (CCP).   
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- Views of the CPC Central Committee 
on the Proposed 12th Five-Year Plan 
for the  
Development of the National  
Economy and Social Planning (The 5th 
plenary session of the 17th CPC Central 
Committee, 2009) 
- The 12th Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development 
(2011) * 
- During the 12th Five-Year Cultural 
Reform and Development Plan 
(General Office of the Communist 
Party of China (GOCPC) and General 





- Improving Cultural and Economic 
Policy (Beijing Normal University 
Publisher 1994) 
- Recommendations from the 10th 
Five-Year Plan (CPC 2000) 
 
 
- Outline for the Development of the 
Cultural Market: 2003-2010 (Ministry of 
Culture (MOC) 2003) 
- Provisions for Transforming 
Management and Cultural Institutions as 
Enterprises among Testing Locations 
(shidian) (Tentative) (GOSC 2003) 
- Opinions to Support and Promote the 
Development of Cultural Industries 
(MOC 2003) 
- The 11th Five-Year Plan for National 
Cultural Development (2006) * 
- A Number of Opinions by the CPC 
Central Committee and the State 
Council on Deepening the Reform of 
the Cultural System (CCP and SC 2006) 
* 
- Several opinions on Deepening the 
Systemic Reform of State-Owned Art 
Performance Troupes (Department of 
Propaganda (DOP)320 and MOC 2009) 
- The Cultural Industry Promotion 
Plan (SC 2009) * 
- Guidance from the Ministry of 
Culture on Accelerating the 
Development of Cultural Industries 
(MOC 2009) * 
- GAPP Guidance to Further Promote 
the Development of the Press and 
Publishing Industry (General 
Administration of Press and 
                                                                
320 Department of Propaganda (DOP) may appear as the Propaganda Department (PD). 
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Publication (GAPP) 2010) * 
- Overall Plan for the Promotion of 
Cultural Products and Services to 
Export to the World (2010)  
- Guidance on Financial Support for 
the Revitalization of the Cultural 
Industry: Its Development and 
Prosperity (DOP, People’s Bank of 
China, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry 
of Culture, State Administration of 
Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), 
General Administration of Press and 
Publication, China Banking Regulatory 
Committee, China Securities 
Regulatory Committee, China 
Insurance Regulatory Committee 
2010) 
- The News Publishing Industry “12th 
Five-Year” Period of Development 
Planning (GAPP 2011) 
- Views on Deepening the Reform of 
the Non-Political Newspaper 
Publishing Unit System (GOCPC and 
GOSC 2011) 
- The Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee on Deepening the Reform 
of the Cultural System to Promote 
Socialist Cultural Development and 
Prosperity, as They Relate to a 
Number of Major Issues (The 6th 
Plenary Session of the 17th CPC 
Central Committee 2010) 
- Plan for the “12th Five-Year” Period of 
National Cultural Development (2012) 
- Plan to Make Cultural Industries 
Double during the “12th Five-Year” 
Period (MOC 2012) 
Specialized 
and technical 
- A Statistical Report on the 
Establishment of the Third Sector 
- Notice from SARFT to Strengthen 
Radio and Television for “Going Out” 
- The State Council Issues Opinions on 







- Advice/Notice of the 
Strengthening of Cultural Market 
Management (MOC and the State 
Administration for Industry and 
Commerce 1988) 
- A Report on the Cultural Affairs of 
a Number of Economic Policy 
Consultations by the Ministry of 
Culture (SC 1991) 
- Decision to Accelerate the 
Development of the Third Industrial 
Sector (1992) 
- Major Strategic Decisions to Speed 
Up the Development of the Third 
Industrial Sector (State Council 
Information Office 1992)321 
- Several Opinions on Accelerating 
Beijing’s Cultural Development 
(Committee and Government of 
Beijing 1996) 
 
Management (SARFT 2004) * 
- The Ministry of Culture Promotes the 
Export of Commercial Performances and 
Exhibitions of Cultural Products (MOC 
2004) * 
- National Commercial Performances 
and Exhibitions of Cultural Products and 
Exports: Guidance Catalogue 
Management (Tentative) (2004)* 
Cultural Exports of Goods and Services 
(SC 2005) * 
- Opinions on Further Strengthening 
and Improving the Export of Cultural 
Goods and Services (GOCPC, GOSC, 
and MOC 2005; 2007) 
- Decision by the State Council on 
Investing non-Public Capital in the 
Cultural Industry (SC 2005) 
- Policy to Encourage and Support the 
Exports of Cultural Goods and Services 
(MOC 2006) * 
- Catalogue for the Guidance of 
Exporting Cultural Goods and Services 
(Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, MOC, SARFT, General 
Administration of Press and 
Publication, the State Council 
Information Office 2007) * 
- Notice of the General Office of the 
Ministry of Culture (2007-2008) for a 
Project to Encourage the Excellent 
Export of Cultural Products and 
Services (General Office of MOC 2007) 
* 
- Office of the State Council on the I
ssuance of  
Managing Cultural Institutions in t
he Reform of the  
Cultural System  Conversion; Provi
sions for the Notice for the Develop
ment of Enterprises and Support of 
Cultural Enterprises (Organization 
Department of the Propaganda 
                                                                
321 Department of Propaganda, People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Culture, State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (SARFT), General Administration of Press and Publication, China Banking Regulatory Committee, China Securities 
Regulatory Committee, China Insurance Regulatory Committee. 
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Department of the Central 
Committee of the Communist 
Party, State Commission Office of 
Public Sector Reform, National 
Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, Ministry of Culture, 
State Administration of Taxation, 
State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce, SARFT, General 
Administration of Press and 
Publication and related 
organizations 2008) 
- Guidance on Financial Support for 
Cultural Exports from the Export-
Import Bank, GAPP, Ministry of 
Commerce, MOC, and SARFT (Ministry 
of Commerce, Ministry of Culture, 
SARFT, General Administration of 
Press and Publication, the Export-
Import Bank of China 2009) 
- 2009-2010 National Cultural Export 
Directory of Key Enterprises; 2009-
2010 national Cultural Export 
Directory of Key Projects (MOC, 
2009)* 
- Guidance to Further Promote the 
National Cultural Export Directories of 
Key Enterprises and Projects (Ministry 
of Commerce, DOP, Ministry of 
Finance, MOC, People’s Bank of China, 
General Administration of Customs, 
State Administration of Taxation, 
SARFT, General Administration of 
Press and Publication, State 




- Ministry of Culture on the Promotion 
of Cultural Goods and Services “Going 
Out”: 2011-2015 Overall Planning 
(MOC 2011) * 
- Cultural Export Declaration of the 
Year 2011: Incentive Funds by the 
Central (MOC 2011) * 
- Guidance Catalogue of Cultural  
Goods and Services Exports (Ministry 
of Commerce, DOP, Ministry of 
Finance, MOC, General Administration 
of Customs, SARFT, General 
Administration of Press and 
Publication, the State Council 
Information Office 2012) 
- Ministry of Culture Introduced the 
Current Status of Foreign Cultural 
Affairs in Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan: Since the 17th Congress (MOC 
2012) 
- Notification of the Ministry of 
Culture to Promote the Cultural Work 
of the Domestic Initial Public Opening 
(MOC 2012) 
- Implementation of Opinions on 
Encouraging and  
Guiding Private Capital to enter the 
Field of culture (MOC 2012) 
- Summary of the Reform of the State-
Owned Art Troupes System: Write a 







- National Cultural Industry 
Development Seminar (1999) 
- National Cultural Reform Testing 
Points Work Conference (Beijing): 9 
places, 35 Cultural Work Units as Testing 
Points  
(2003) 
- National Cultural Reform Work 
Conference (Beijing) (2006)  
- National Cultural Reform Work 
Conference (Beijing) (2008) 
- National Cultural Reform Work 
Conference (Qingdao) (2010) 
- National Cultural Reform Work 
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Conference (Hefei) (2011) 
- National Cultural Reform Work 

























Appendix 3.B Documents by the Chinese Government: 
Individual Actors as Representatives and Middle-men 
 
 
Source: Complied, selected, and reorganized from the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
xuanchuanbu), China Central of the Communist Party of China Party Literature Research Office (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian 












Leaders   
- The Contemporary Chinese 
Communists Solemn Mission (Jiang 
1991) 
 - Speech in Celebration of the 70th 
Anniversary of the Establishment of 
CCP (Jiang 1991) 
- Comprehend and Implement the  
Important Talk and Spirit of Comrade 
Deng Xiaoping, Making The Economic 
Development and Reform Faster and 
Better (Jiang 1992) 
- Discussion of the National Work 
(people) (Jiang 1992)  
- Accelerate Open Reform and 
Modernization; Win a Great Victory 
for Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics (Jiang 1992)    
-Exert the Army’s Political Advantage, 
and Vigorously Strengthen the 
Spiritual Civilization of Army Building 
(Jiang 1993)  
- Speech on the 100th Anniversary of 
the Birth of the Comrade Mao Zedong 
(Jiang 1993) 
- Speech at the 8th National People’s 
- Speech at the Central Ideological 
and Political Work Conference (Jiang 
2000) 
- Speech at the General Meeting to 
Celebrate the 80th Anniversary of the 
Communist Party of China (Jiang 
2001) 
-Speech on Arts and Literature are 
the National Spirit (Jiang 2001) 
- Science meets Marxism (Jiang 
2001) 
- Speech in Beidaihe; Discussion with 
National Defense Science and 
Technology and Social Science 
Experts (Jiang 2001) 
- Building a Xiaokang Society, 
Starting a New Phase of Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics (Jiang 
2002) 
- We Need to Pay Attention to the 
Development of Philosophy and 
Social Sciences (Jiang 2002) 
- Sports is related to People’s Health 
(Jiang 2002) 
 
- Speech on the 26th Collective Study at 
the 16th Plenary Session of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee 
on November 26, 2005 (Hu 2005) 
- Speech at the 1th Plenary Session of 
the 16th  CPC Sixth plenary Session 
(Hu 2006) 
- Speech at the 2nd plenary session of 
the 16th  CPC Sixth Plenary Session 
(Hu 2006) 
- Firmly Establish the Socialist 
Outlook on Honor and Shame (Hu 
2006) 
- Adhere to the road of Independent 
Innovation with Chinese 
Characteristics, and Work Hard to 
Build an Innovative Country (Hu 
2006) 
- Speech at the China Federation of 
Literary and Art Circles in the 8th 
National People’s Congress and China 
Writers’ Association in the 7th 
National People’s Congress (Hu 2006)  
- Hold High the Great Banner of 
Socialism with Chinese 
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Congress (Jiang 1993) 
- The Purpose and Hope of Publicity 
and Ideological Work (Jiang 1993) 
- Speech at the Meeting of National 
Publicity and Ideological Work (Jiang 
1994) 
- Speech in Memory of Mei Lanfang 
and Zhou Xinfang’s 100th Anniversary 
(Jiang 1994) 
- Special Economic Zones are needed 
to Create New Advantages and 
Improve (Jiang 1994) 
- Handle Certain Major Relationships 
Correctly in the Socialist 
Modernization Drive (Jiang 1995) 
- The Main Task of the Propaganda 
and Ideological Front (Jiang 1996)  
- Guidance of Public Opinion is Correct 
and is a Blessing of the Party and the 
People (Jiang 1996) 
- Strive to Create a New Situation in 
the Socialist Spiritual Civilization 
(Jiang 1996) 
- The Development and Prosperity of 
Socialist Literature and Art (Jiang  
1996) 
- Hold High the Great Banner of Deng 
Xiaoping’s Theory, the Construction of 
the Socialist Cause with Chinese 
Characteristics into the 21st Century 
(Jiang 1997) 
- Speech on Building a Spiritual 
Civilization at the First Plenary 
Meeting  
of the Central Steering Committee 
(Jiang 1997) 
- Speech on the Ceremony Awards for 
the National Flood Rescue Conference  
(Jiang 1998) 
 Characteristics, and the Struggle  
to Win New Victories in Building a 
Xiaokang Society (Hu 2007) 
- Speech on the 38th Collective Study of 
the 16th CPC Central Committee 
Political Bureau on January 24, 2007 
(Hu 2007) 
- Speech on the 38th Collective Study at 
the 16th CPC Central Committee 




-On Strengthening and Improving 
Learning (Jiang 1999) 
-Improve the Scientific Quality of the 
Whole Nation (Jiang 1999) 
- Letter to the National Science 
Popularization Work Conference 
(Jiang 1999) 
- Education as to Improve the Quality 
of the Nation (Jiang 1999) 
- Solid Job to Western Region 
Development (Jiang 2000) 
- Speech in the Central Ideological and 
Political Work Conference (Jiang 
2000) 
- Several Issues Need to Grasp the 
Current Economic Work (Jiang 2000) 
Continued innovation in accordance 
with the Practice (Jiang 2000) 
Secondary  
Position  
 - Speech at the Meeting of 
Propaganda (National Publicity) and 
Ideological Work (Hu 2003) 
- Speech on the Seventh Collective 
Study at the 16th Plenary Session of 
the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee (Hu 2003) 
- Speech at the End of the Inspection 
Tour of Guangdong Province (Hu 
2003)   
- Promote the Work and Important 
Guiding Thought of the “Three 
Representatives” (Hu 2003)   
- Speech at the First Plenary 
 Meeting of the Third Plenary Session 
of the 16th CPC Central Committee 
(Hu 2003) 
- Speech at the Meeting of 
Propaganda and Ideological Work 
(Hu 2004) 
- Speech on May 28, 2004  
- Hu Jintao’s Report on the 17th 
National Congress of the CCP (Hu 
2007)  
- The Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee to Deepen Reform of the 
Cultural System to Promote Socialist 
Cultural Development and Prosperity, 
as They Relate to a Number of Major 
Issues (Li Changchun, 2011) 
- March Firmly on the Path of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
and Strive to Complete the Building of 
a Moderately Prosperous Society in All 
Respects (Report on the 18th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of 




on the 13th Collective Study at the 
16th Plenary Session of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee 
(Hu 2004)  
- Speech by Hu Jintao on the Topic of 
“Do the Good Work of the Party and 
the State” (Hu 2004) 
Third - Dialogue on the Development of the 
Cultural Industry in an Era of Reform 
and Opening Up (Gao Zhanxiang, 
1993) 
 - Correctly Understand and Deal with 
Some Significant Relationships in the 
Cultural Efforts to Explore the 
Development under Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics (Li 
Changchun, 2010) 
 
 
 
